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ABSTRACT 
Since Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory (1958) established the foundation of 
capital structure theory, many literatures and empirical studies over the past four 
decades have tested the theory for developed and developing countries. However, China, 
as the largest developing and transitional economy in the world, has different 
institutional structures from developed as well as many developing countries. The 
institutional environment for Chinese companies has a number of distinctive features 
compared with other markets: (1) China is in transition from a command economy to a 
market economy; (2) China does not have a well developed corporate bond market; (3) 
Chinese government keeps tight control over the issuance of equities; (4) Most Chinese 
listed companies were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before and the state still 
maintains its controlling right after the companies go public. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the capital structure choices made by listed 
companies from China that have different institutional structure with western countries. 
The study presents the economic environment in China and discusses whether capital 
structure theory can be applied in China. 
The study examines the capital structure of Chinese listed companies' by using a 720 
firm-level panel data set from 1997 to 2005. This relatively large panel data set allows 
the study to construct and test more complicated behavioural models than purely 
cross-sectional or time series data. It also allows the study to make inferences about the 
dynamics of change from cross-sectional evidence. 
The findings reflect the transitional nature of the Chinese corporate environment. 
Although China is still transforming its economy from a command economy to a market 
iii 
economy, and the state is still the controlling shareholder for most listed companies, the 
firm-specific factors which affect companies' leverage in other countries also affect 
Chinese companies' leverage in a similar way. However, neither the trade-off model nor 
the pecking order hypothesis which are both derived from the Western settings, provides 
convincing explanations for the capital choices of the Chinese companies. Due to the 
characteristics of institutional environment in China, Chinese listed companies' capital 
structure seems to follow a pecking order: retained earnings, short term bank loans, and 
then equity. On the other hand, trade-off theory might not be applicable to China 
because of four unstable factors: undeveloped corporate bond market, bankruptcy 
difficulty, tax preference, and agency problem. 
The regression results find that leverage in Chinese listed companies has positive 
correlation with tangible assets, firm size (total assets), state ownership, and non-debt 
tax shields, and negatively correlates to profitability and firm size (sales). The study 
also finds that growth opportunity, dividend policy, and cost of bankruptcy have no 
significant impact on capital structure. In addition, industry pattern is also not 
significant. Even though the obtained total debt ratio is similar to developed countries, 
Chinese listed companies prefer short term finance and have substantially low amounts 
of long term debt. 
The study contributes to the existing literatures by providing in empirical evidence in a 
Chinese setting to the capital structure debate. It highlights the importance of financial 
market and institutional environment for corporate financing decision. It also provides 
important policy guidelines for the firm's financial management in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Keywords: Capital Structure, Leverage, China, Institutional Environment 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
One way that companies raise cash to finance their investment activities is by selling or 
issuing securities. Securities issued by corporations may be classified roughly as equity 
securities and debt securities. Equity represents ownership shares in a corporation. Each 
share entitles its owner to one vote on any matters of corporate governance that are put 
to a vote at the corporation's annual meeting and to a share in the financial benefits of 
ownership. Debt is the long agreement that is a liability of the firm with an obligation to 
repay a specified amount at a particular time. ' 
The'difference between equity and debt is a basic distinction in the modem theory of 
fmance. At its crudest level, debt represents something that must be repaid; it is the 
result of borrowing money. When corporations borrow, they promise to make regular 
scheduled interest payments and to repay the original amount borrowed. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A., Marcus, A. (2004). Investments, Sixth Edition. McGraw-Hill Irwin, USA. 
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The amount owed to the creditor is a liability of the corporation; however, it is a 
liability of limited value. The corporation can legally default at any time on its liability. 
This can be a valuable option. The creditors benefit if the assets have a value greater 
than the value of the liability, but this would happen only if management were reckless. 
On the other hand, the corporation and the equity investors benefit if the value of assets 
is less than the value of the liabilities, because equity investors are able to walk away 
from the liabilities and default on their payment. 
The distinction between debt and equity is important for tax purposes. When 
corporations try to create a debt security that is really equity, they are trying to obtain 
the tax benefit of debt while eliminating its bankruptcy costs. Table 1.1 shows an 
example of the differences between equity and debt for a general image which is based 
on U. S. markets. 
Table 1.1 Equity versus Debt 
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Income Dividends Interest 
Tax status Dividends are taxed as personal income. Interest is taxed as personal income. 
Dividends are not a business expense. Interest is a business expense, and 
corporations can deduct interest when 
computing corporate tax liability. 
Control Common stock and preferred stock usually Control is exercised with loan agreement 
have voting rights. 
Default Firms cannot be forced into bankruptcy for Unpaid debt is a liability of the firm. 
non-payment of dividends. Nonpayment results in bankruptcy. 
Bottom line: Tax status favours debt, but default favours equity. Control features of debt and equity are 
different, but. one is not better than the other. 
Source: Ross, S. A., Westerfield, R. W., Jaffe, J. (2002). Corporate Finance, 6th Edition, Pp381. 
McGraw-Hill Irwin, USA. 
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Financing arrangements determine how the value of the firm is divided up. The 
individuals or institutions that buy debt from the firm are called creditors. The holders 
of equity shares are called shareholders. 
The phrase capital structure refers to the mix of debt and equity securities in the 
long-term financial structure of a company. As contrasted with terms such as debt ratio, 
leverage ratio, and other more general measures of a company's total indebtedness, 
capital structure usually is applied strictly to the "permanent" or long-run capital that 
undergirds a company's operations. We can write the value of the firm, V, as: 
V=D+E 
Where D is the value of debt and E is the value of equity. 
Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory (1958) established the foundation of capital 
structure theory. Financing decisions that simply divide up operating cash flows do not 
increase overall firm value. This is the basic idea behind Modigliani and Miller's 
famous proposition I: In perfect markets changes in capital structure do not affect value. 
As long as the total cash flow generated by the firm's assets is unchanged by capital 
structure, value is independent of capital structure. The value of the whole pie does not 
depend on how it is divided up. 
M&M's proposition tells us where to look for reasons why capital structure decisions 
may matter. Taxes are one possibility. Debt provides a corporate interest tax shield, and 
this tax shield may more than compensate for any extra personal tax that the investor 
has to pay on debt interest. Also, high debt levels may spur managers to work harder 
and to run a tighter ship. But debt has its drawbacks if it leads to costly financial 
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distress. 
Much of the finance literature on capital structure over the past four decades has tested 
the irrelevance theory with more realistic assumptions, which include corporate taxes, 
financial distress, agency costs, and tried to explain just exactly what does matter in 
determining capital structure rather than `nothing matters'. The focus of both academic 
research and practical financial analysis has been on those large corporations with 
publicly traded debt and equity securities that dominate economic life throughout the 
developed world. 
Since Modigliani and Miller published their seminal paper in 1958, the issue of capital 
structure has generated great interest among financial researchers (Harris and Raviv, 
1991). With respect to the theoretical studies, there are two widely acknowledged 
competitive models of capital structure: the static tradeoff model and the pecking order 
hypothesis. 
According to static tradeoff models, the optimal capital structure does exist. A firm is 
regarded as setting a target debt level and gradually moving towards it. The firm's 
optimal capital structure will involve the tradeoff among the effects of corporate and 
personal taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, etc. Both tax-based and 
agency-cost-based models belong to the static tradeoff models, such as Modigliani and 
Miller (1958,1963), Miller (1977), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Kim (1978), 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986), Grossman 
and Hart (1982), Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990), Diamond (1989), and Chang 
(1999). 
On the other hand, the pecking order hypothesis, first suggested by Myers and Majluf 
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(1984), states that there is no well-defined target debt ratio. Firms are said to prefer 
retained earnings as their main source of funds for investment. Next in order of 
preference is debt, and last comes external equity financing. It is so because the 
existence of the asymmetric information problem between insider and outsider investors. 
Debt ratios change when there is an imbalance of internal cash flow, net of dividends, 
and real investment opportunities while the factors considered in the tradeoff model are 
regarded as the second-order. Many papers have extended the basic Myers-Majluf idea, 
such as Krasker (1986), Brennan and Kraus (1987), Narayanan (1988), Noe (1988), 
Constantinides and Grundy (1989), and Heinkel and Zechner (1990). 
It is important to test which hypothesis, tradeoff or pecking order, is more powerful in 
explaining firms' financing behavior. Unfortunately, there is no conclusive test. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) claim that tradeoff model can be rejected and pecking 
order model has much greater time-series explanatory power than tradeoff model by 
testing the statistical power of alternative hypotheses. However, Chirinko and Singha 
(2000) show that the test conducted by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) generates 
misleading inferences and that their empirical evidence can evaluate neither the pecking 
order nor static tradeoff models. Fama and French (2002) find pecking order and 
trade-off models each explains some of companies' financing behavior; and none of 
them can be rejected. 
Booth et al. (2001) point out that empirically distinguishing between these two different 
models has proven difficult because variables that describe one model can also be 
classified as other model variables. Partly because of this, many recent empirical studies 
have employed cross-sectional tests and a variety of variables that can be justified using 
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any of these two models. 
The majority of empirical studies of capital structure, such as Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim 
(1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Wald (1999), 
employ data from developed countries, mainly from the US to document the 
determinants of capital structure. Studies on emerging markets, such as Booth et al. 
(2001), Wiwattanakantang (2001), and Chen (2004) only appeared in recent years. 
Recently, Booth, Aivazian, Demirgu-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) provided the first 
empirical study to test the explanatory power of capital structure models in developing 
countries. The study used data from 10 developing countries to assess whether capital 
structure theory is portable across countries with different institutional structures. It 
investigated whether the stylised facts, which have been learned from studies of 
developed countries, apply only to these markets, or whether they have more general 
applicability. The results are somewhat sceptical of the premise. They have provided 
evidence that firms' capital choice decisions in developing countries are affected by the 
same variables as they are in developed countries. Knowing these factors helps predict 
the financial structure of a firm better than knowing only its nationality. Nevertheless, 
there are persistent differences of institutional structure across countries, indicating that 
specific country factors are at work. Knowing the country of origin is usually as 
important as knowing the firm-specific factors. Their findings suggest that although 
some of the insights from modem finance theory are portable across countries, much 
remains to be done to understand the impact of different institutional features on capital 
structure choices. 
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1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Booth (2001) selected countries operating a market-orientated economic system, which 
bears many similarities to developed countries. It would be interesting and important to 
know how capital structure theories work in a transitional economy environment within 
which institutional structures differ not only from developed countries, but also from 
other developing economies. China is the largest developing and transitional economy 
in the world and, therefore, is chosen as the focus of this study. 
The institutional environment for Chinese companies has a number of distinctive 
features compared with other markets: (1) China is in transition from a command 
economy to a market economy; (2) China does not have a well developed corporate 
bond market; (3) Chinese government keeps tight control over the issuance of equities; 
(4) Most Chinese listed companies were state-owned enterprises (SOEs) before and 
the state still maintains its controlling right after the firms go public. It is not difficult to 
understand that China has different institutional structures from developed as well as 
many developing countries. For example, in the world of Modigliani and Miller, tax 
should have no effect on firms' capital structure in a command economy. This is 
because in China the government or state is the owner of firms and banks, as well as the 
beneficiary of tax. 
Similarly, it is widely acknowledged that most SOEs (except listed SOEs) are not 
profit-maximisers, their size (proxy for bankruptcy cost), tangible assets (collateral) and 
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even profitability may have no effect on their capital structure. Also, because the state is 
the controlling shareholder for most listed companies, if it does not change its behavior 
towards the fines, the firms are less likely to run into financial crisis compared with 
their counterparts whose controlling shareholders are individuals or private institutes, 
which are wealth-maximization oriented. The proxies for financial crisis cost (size and 
volatility) in Chinese firms are expected to have less or no effects on capital structure. 
Chen (2004) analyzed the determinants of capital structure of Chinese-listed companies. 
The study found that firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining capital 
structure in developed economies are also relevant in China. However, neither the 
trade-off model nor the pecking order hypothesis derived from the western settings 
provides convincing explanations for the capital structure choices of Chinese firms. 
Huang and Song (2006) document the determinants of Chinese listed companies' capital 
structure by using a pooled data set from 1994 to 2003 including 1200 firms. The study 
found that as in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases with firm size, 
non-debt tax shields and fixed assets, and decreases with profitability and correlates 
with industries. They also found that ownership structure affects leverage. Different 
from those in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases with volatility and 
firms tend to have much lower long-term debt. The static tradeoff model rather than 
pecking order hypothesis seems better in explaining the features of capital structure for 
Chinese listed companies. 
These empirical studies have been carried out using a relatively small sample set and 
short time series. Chinese listed companies experienced a 5-year long bear market from 
2000 to 2005 and even Chinese economics kept a high growth rate during the period. 
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These listed companies realised how important corporate governance and ownership 
structures are. A lot of changes have happened in recent years. A long time series and 
wide cross section sample set may be better able to analyse Chinese listed companies' 
capital structure. On the other hand, these empirical studies discussed China's 
institutional environment broadly, but have not had space to develop a deeper and wider 
discussion about China's financing system, ownership structure, bankruptcy, agency 
costs, and tax breaks, etc. 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the capital structure choices made by listed 
companies from China that have different institutional structure compared with western 
countries, and lay some preliminary groundwork on which a more detailed evaluation 
could be based. This study documents the determinants of capital structure in Chinese 
listed companies and investigates whether companies in the largest developing and 
transition economy of the world entertain any unique features. Specifically it would like 
to answer the following two questions: 
1. Are corporate financial leverage decisions in China influenced by institutional 
structures which make them different from those in developed countries? 
2. Do the firm-specific factors correlated with leverage that have been identified in 
other countries have similar effects on Chinese listed companies' capital structure? 
The factors have been identified by theoretical studies and by previous empirical 
studies on data from other countries including both developed and developing 
countries. 
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This study will carry out a fully detailed literature review of capital structure theories, 
including agency theory, transaction cost economic, property rights, trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory, and signalling theory. The study will further carry out some 
fundamental researches of China's capital markets and Chinese listed companies. These 
researches will include China's stock and bond markets, China's law and regulation 
system, China's tax and accounting system, Chinese listed companies' ownership 
structure and corporate control, and listed companies' corporate financing. These 
fundamental studies will provide important evidences and explanations for the 
hypotheses setting and variable design. 
Based on the fundamental research, the study will discuss whether trade off theory 
could be applied to Chinese listed companies. The discussion will focus on four factors 
which affect trade off theory, they are: corporate bond market, bankruptcy costs, tax 
system, and agency problems. The study will raise its hypotheses based on the 
discussions. The hypotheses will be set up for China's specific characteristics. 
This study will use relatively large panel data set for regression analysis. Panel data can 
provide rich sources of information about the economy, which combine time series and 
cross sections. Panel data set allows the study to construct and test more complicated 
behavioural models than purely cross-sectional or time series data. It also allows the 
study to make inferences about the dynamics of change from cross-sectional evidence. 
The study will use both static and dynamic panel data models for quantitative analysis. 
In addition, two software, PcGive and LIMDEP, will both be used to run the regression. 
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Finally, the study will carry out a further discussion about state ownership and capital 
structure. It will discover the relationship between state owned shares and capital 
structure, and will find whether state owned share affects Chinese listed companies' 
capital structure. 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
In Chapter 2, the study begins with a review of the foundation theories of capital 
structure. It introduces Agency theory, transaction cost economic, and property rights 
approach. Chapter 3 discusses the major capital structure theories, including trade-off 
theory, pecking order theory, and signalling theory. Chapter 4 begins with an 
introduction of China's financial markets. It presents an overview of Chinese financial 
and regulation systems, and also discusses the significant financing character in China. 
Chapter 5 discusses ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. Especially 
introduces the state owned shares and corporate control in China. Chapter 6 provides a 
discussion of the determinants of capital structure in China, discusses the institutional 
environment for applying trade-off theory to Chinese listed companies, and then 
presents the hypotheses of this study. Chapter 7 begins with a discussion of the research 
design including data set, variable measurement, industry index, data statistics, and 
panel data models including both static and dynamic panel data models. Chapter 8 
begins with a discussion of the regression results. It further discusses the relationship 
between state owned shares and leverage. Chapter 9 provides an overall discussion of 
the empirical outcomes concluded in the previous chapters and makes suggestions for 
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further research in the area. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FOUNDATION THEORIES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
A modem corporation is a team effort involving a number of players, such as mangers, 
employees, shareholders, and bondholders. For a long time economists used to assume, 
without question, that all these players acted for the common good, but in the last 30 years 
they have a lot more to say about the possible conflicts of interest and how companies 
attempt to overcome such conflicts. These ideas are known collectively as agency theory. 
Transaction cost economics adopts a contractual approach to the study of economic 
organisation. It supports and develops the view that economising over the sum of production 
and transaction costs is the core problem. It is concerned with the governance of contractual 
relations in transactions between two parties. Transaction cost economics is now used to 
study a variety of economic phenomena, ranging from vertical and lateral integration to 
transfer pricing, corporate finance, marketing, the organization of work, long-term 
commercial contracting, franchising, regulation, the multinational corporation, company 
towns, and other contractual relationships, both formal and informal. 
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The view held by proponents of the property rights approach is that a firm can be defined by 
its non-human assets and the allocation of property right to these assets. Property rights to 
corporate assets are specified in the firm's financial contracts. The firm's capital structure 
here refers to both the composition of different types of financial contracts and the 
distribution of these contracts among investors. 
In this chapter, agency theory, transaction cost economic, and property rights approach as 
foundation theory of capital structure will be introduced. Especially the relationships between 
capital structure and these three foundation theories will be explained. The remainder of this 
chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses agency theory and agency cost. In 
section 2.3, transaction cost economics will be presented. Then, property rights will be 
introduced in section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 sets out some conclusions. 
2.2. AGENCY THEORY 
Prior to 1976, finance theories generally used the standard economic model of the firm to 
describe corporate behaviour. This model viewed the firm as a "black box" that processed 
inputs into usable outputs and that responded rationally to economic incentives. It was 
usually assumed that the company was controlled and operated by a single, 
wealth-maximizing entrepreneur/owner whose incentives were identical with those of the 
firm and any outside shareholders. While some theories had tried to expand this model of the 
firm to account for the fact that most corporate activity was undertaken by large companies 
with professional managers (rather than entrepreneur/owners) and numerous, 
widely-dispersed shareholders, even these models generally assumed that managers would 
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always act in the best interests of the. shareholders (Megginson, 1997). Many of these 
problems associated with the inadequacy of the theory of the firm can be viewed as the theory 
of agency relationships. 
In this section, some concepts of asymmetric information and agency theory will be 
introduced at the beginning. Agency theory will then be discussed and how it can be applied 
to capital structure. Finally, some empirical studies in agency costs will be introduced. 
2.2.1. Asymmetric Information and Agency Theory 
The classical agency theory was posed by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means in 1932. They 
observed that ownership and control in a large corporation were often separated and inquired 
whether this had organisational and public policy ramifications. 
Agency theory (AT) is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises when (1) the desires or goals of 
principal and agent conflict and (2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing. The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent 
has behaved "appropriately". The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk. The problem here is that the principal 
and the agent may prefer different actions because of the different risk preferences. 
The relationship of agency is one of the oldest and commonest codified modes of social 
interaction. In the earlier study, Ross (1973) defines an agency relationship has arisen between 
two (or more) parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as 
representative for the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision 
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problems. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service 
on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. From 
its roots in information economics, the principal (or uninformed player) is defined as the 
player who has the coarser information partition, and the agent (or informed player) is the 
player who has the finer information partition. 
In information economics, information is classified by symmetric information and 
asymmetric information. In the case of symmetric information, a player's information set at: 
(a) any node where he chooses an action, or (b) an end node, contains at least the same 
elements as the information sets of every other player. Otherwise is asymmetric information. A 
game has asymmetric information if information sets differ at the end of the game, even though 
no player takes an action after the end nodes. Such as principal and agent, the agent observes 
the agent's move, but the principal does not, although he may be able to deduce it. Here, we 
classify the information by incomplete and complete information. Incomplete information is 
nature moves first and is unobserved by at least one of the players. Otherwise is complete 
information. 
There are two ways to classify the asymmetric information. One is by timing of efficiency; 
another one is by the content of information. Defining optimality is not always straightforward 
in models of asymmetric information. Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) distinguish three kinds 
of efficiency, depending on when expected payoffs are evaluated: ex ante, before any player 
has private information; interim, when each player has received private information; ex post, 
after all information has become common knowledge. Analysis of asymmetric information in 
ex ante is called adverse selection; the analysis in ex post is moral hazard. From the content 
of information, asymmetric information can be player's action or knowledge. If the action is 
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unobserved, analysis of this kind of asymmetric information is called hidden action; if the 
knowledge is unobserved, it is called hidden knowledge or hidden information. Dependents 
asymmetric information that we introduced above, table 2.1 shows the classification of the 
principal-agent model. We divide asymmetric information into four categories. 
Table 2.1 Classification of the Principal-Agent Model 
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(1) Moral hazard with hidden actions 
Principal and agent begin with symmetric information and agree to a contract, but then 
agent takes an action unobserved by principal. Information is complete. 
(2) Moral hazard with hidden information 
Principal and agent begin with symmetric information and agree to a contract. Nature then 
takes a move observed by agent but not by principal, and agent takes some action, which 
may be simply a report of Nature's move. Information is complete. 
(3) Adverse selection 
Nature begins the game by choosing agent's type (his payoff and strategies), unobserved by 
principal. Principal and agent then agree to a contract. Information is incomplete. 
(4) Signalling and screening 
Nature begins the game by choosing agent's type, unobserved by principal. To demonstrate 
his type, agent takes actions that principal can observe. If agent takes the action before they 
agree to a contract, he is signalling; if he takes it afterwards, he is being screened. 
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Information is incomplete. 
Signalling and screening are special cases of adverse selection, which is itself a situation of 
hidden information. Information is complete in either kind of hazard, and incomplete in adverse 
selection, signalling, and screening. 
If the employer (the principal) knows the employee's (the agent) ability but not his effort level, 
the problem is moral hazard with hidden actions. If neither player knows the employee's ability 
at first, but the employee discovers it once he starts working, the problem is `moral hazard with 
hidden information'. If the employee knows his ability from the start, but the employer does 
not, the problem is `adverse selection'. If in addition to the employee knowing his ability from 
the start, he can acquire credentials before he makes a contract with the employer, the problem 
is 'signalling'. If the employee acquires his credentials in response to a wage offer made by the 
employer, the problem is `screening'. Table 2.2 shows some applications of the principal-agent 
models. 
The four categories are only gradually rising from the mass of literature on agency models, and 
the definitions are not well established. Myerson (1991) suggests calling the problem of players 
taking the wrong action "moral hazard" and the problem of misreporting information "adverse 
selection". 
The theory of agency relationships was introduced above. However, the relationship between 
agency theory and the main line of this study - capital structure - is not being explained yet. 
Next section will discuss how agency theory can apply to the capital structure of the firm. 
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Table 2.2 Applications of the Principal-Agent Model 
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Moral hazard with hidden actions Bondholders Shareholders Riskiness of corporate 
projects 
Employee Manager Operating decision 
Manager Employee Hard working 
Shareholders Manger Hard working 
Moral hazard with hidden information Shareholders Companiy president Investment decision 
Bondholders Shareholders Riskiness of corporate 
projects and investment 
decision 
Employer Employee Hard working 
Adverse selection Investor Stock issuer Stock value and percentage 
retained 
Bondholders Shareholders Riskiness of corporate 
projects 
Signalling and screening Employer Employee Skill and education 
Investor Stock issuer Stock value and percentage 
retained 
Source: Rasmusen, E., 1994. Game and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, Second Edition, Chapter 7, 
Cambridge, Black-well Publisher, pp. 168. 
2.2.2. Agency Theory and Capital Structure 
Major insights into the problems of capital structure can be gained if they are understood in 
terms of principal agent theory. Many principals such as shareholders, bondholders, 
customers, etc., are dependent on an agent (or a group of them), and conflicts of interests 
arise. These conflicts of interest stem from the structure of the claims against the firm, which 
are respectively the fraction of the shares held by the "owner-manager2", the amount of 
2 Owner-manager is a manager who has whole or partial ownership interests in the firm. 
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shares owned by non-owner managers, and the creditor's claims. This financing structure 
determines a kind of sharing rule, and conditions the actions that could be considered optimal 
from the agent's point of view. 
Usually, agent maximize principal's welfare is general. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
point out that if the relationship between principle and agent are utility maximizers, there is 
good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. 
The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for 
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. 
In addition in some situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to 
guarantee that he will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that 
the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally 
impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal 
decisions from the principal's viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the 
agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), 
and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent's decisions and those 
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. 
An example is shareholders and managers. The separation of ownership and management has 
clear advantages. It allows share ownership to change without interfering with the operation 
of the business. It allows the firm to hire professional managers. However, it also brings 
problems if the managers' and owners' objectives differ. The danger can be highlighted: 
Rather than attending to the wishes of shareholders, managers may seek a more leisurely or 
luxurious working lifestyle; they may shun unpopular decisions, or they may attempt to build 
an empire with their shareholders' money. 
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Such conflicts between shareholders' and managers' objectives create principal-agent 
problems. The shareholders are the principals; the managers are their agents. Shareholders 
want management to increase the value of the firm, but managers may have their own 
agendas. The costs are incurred when: (1) Managers do not attempt to maximize firm value; 
(2) Shareholders incur costs to monitor the managers and influence their actions. Of course, 
there are no costs when the shareholders are also the managers. That is one of the advantages 
of a sole proprietorship. Owner-managers have no conflicts of interest. 
Conflicts between shareholders and managers are not the only principle-agent problems that 
the financial manager is likely to encounter. For example, just as shareholders need to 
encourage managers to work for the shareholders' interests, so senior management needs to 
think about how to motivate everyone else in the company. In this case senior management 
are the principals and junior management and other employees are their agents. 
Given the illustration above, the consequent costs by the problems between principal and agent 
is called agency costs. Agency costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a 
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests, plus the residual loss incurred because 
the cost of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits. In Jensen and Meclding's 
research paper (1976), they define agency costs as the sum of the costs of structuring contracts 
(formal and informal): (1) monitoring expenditures by the principal; (2) bonding expenditures 
by the agent; and (3) the residual loss. The residual loss is the opportunity cost associated with 
the change in real activities that occurs because it does not pay to enforce all contracts 
perfectly. 
In the Jenson and Meckling model, the "firm" is a legal fiction that serves merely as a nexus of 
contracts for agreements between managers, shareholders, suppliers, customers and other 
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parties (including employees). All the parties are consenting adults who act in their own 
self-interest, and fully expect all other parties to act in theirs. In other words, it is a model that 
relies on rational behaviour by self-interested economic agents who understand the incentives 
of all the other contracting parties, and who take steps to protect themselves from predictable 
exploitation by these parties. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency problems emanating from conflicts of interest 
are general to virtually all cooperative activity among self-interested individuals whether or not 
it occurs in the hierarchical fashion suggested by the principal-agency analogy. They argue that 
the parties to the contracts make rational forecasts of the activities to be accomplished and 
structure contracts to facilitate those activities. At the time the contracts are negotiated, the 
actions motivated by the incentives established through the contracts are anticipated and 
reflected in the contracts' prices and terms. 
In their paper (1976), they define that there are at least two kind of agency problems in the firm. 
One is the problem between shareholders and managers, which is like the case we presented 
above. Another one is the problem between debtholders and shareholders. These two agency 
problems lead two kinds of agency costs, they are: agency costs of equity and agency costs of 
debt. 
A significant fraction of the effort of researchers has been devoted to models in which capital 
structure is determined by agency costs, i. e. costs due to the conflict of interests between 
different groups in a firm. We show below that an explanation of how agency costs generated 
by the corporate form are born leads to capital structure of the firm. 
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APency Costs of Equity 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observe that when an entrepreneur owns 100 percent of the stock 
of a company there is no separation between corporate ownership and control. This means 
that the entrepreneur bears all of the costs, and reaps all of the benefits, of his or her actions. 
Once a fraction, a, of the firm's stock is sold to outside investors, however, the entrepreneur 
bears only 1-a of the consequences of his or her actions. This gives the entrepreneur a clear 
incentive to, in Jensen and Meckling's tactful phrasing, "consume perquisites". 
However, informed investors expected the entrepreneur's performance to change after they 
purchase their a stake in the firm, and they will thus only pay a price per share that fully 
reflects the expected induced decline in firm value that will result from the entrepreneur's 
consumption of "perks". In other words, the entrepreneur is charged in advanced for the perks 
he or she is expected to consume after the equity sale, so the entrepreneur once again bears 
the full costs of his or her actions. Furthermore, society suffers because these agency costs of 
(outside) equity reduce the market value of corporate assets by (1-a) times the expected value 
of entrepreneurial perquisite consumption. 
Selling stock to outside investors creates agency costs of equity, which are borne solely by 
the entrepreneur, but which also harm society by reducing the value of corporate assets and 
discouraging additional entrepreneurship. Selling external equity is vital for entrepreneurs, 
however, both because of individual portfolio diversification demands and because of the 
need to finance corporate growth once it outstrips personal wealth constrains. 
Jensen and Meckling point out that using debt financing can help overcome the agency costs 
of external equity in two ways. First, using debt by definition means that less external equity 
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will have to be sold to raise external financing. If agency costs of outside equity rise more 
than proportionally as a increases, then economizing on the amount of outside equity sold 
will reduce the deadweight agency costs of the manager/shareholder relationship. The second, 
and more important, effect of employing outside debt rather than equity financing is that this 
reduces the scope for excessive managerial perquisite consumption. The burden of having to 
make regular, contractually enforceable, debt service payments serves as a very effective tool 
for disciplining entrepreneurs. With debt outstanding, the cost of excessive perk consumption 
might well include the entrepreneur losing control of his or her company following default 
and bondholder seizure of the company's assets. In Jensen and Meckling's words, external 
debt serves as a bonding mechanism for managers to convey their good intentions to outside 
shareholders. Because taking on debt validates that managers are willing to risk losing control 
of their firm if they fail to perform effectively, shareholders are willing to pay a higher price 
for the firm's shares (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
From the sight of monitoring corporate managers, the agency costs between managers and 
stockholders are also difficult effectively reduce. One way to control these costs is for the 
firm to issue debt. This actually accomplishes two things. First, it forces managers to directly 
confront and be monitored by the public capital market. If investors have a negative view of 
management's competence, they will charge a high interest rate on the money they lend to the 
firm, or they will insist on restrictive bond covenants to constrain management's freedom of 
action, or both. Second, outstanding debt effectively limits management's ability to reduce 
firm value through incompetence consumption. If management is unable to operate the firm 
well enough to at least cover debt service payments (interest and principal repayments), the 
firm will be forced into bankruptcy, the bondholder will take control of the firm, and the 
offending managers will be invited to seek employment elsewhere. By choosing to issue debt, 
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managers voluntarily accept this risk of being replaced, and this reduces the agency costs of 
the manager/stockholder relationship (Jensen, 1986). 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) Managerial perquisites Increase managerial ownership Asset substitution 
Jensen (1986) Overinvestment Reduce free cash Unspecified 
Harris and Raviv (1990) Failure to liquidate Allows investors option to liquidate Investigation costs 
Stulz (1991) Overinvestment Reduce free cash Underinvestment 
Source: Harris, M. and Raviv, A., 1991. "The Theory of Capital Structure, " The Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 
1, pp. 303. 
Azency Costs of Debt 
As the fraction of debt in a firm's capital structure increases, bondholders begin taking on an 
increasing fraction of the firm's business and operating risk, but shareholders and managers 
still control the firm's investment and operating decisions. This gives managers a variety of 
incentives to expropriate bondholder wealth for the benefit of themselves and the 
shareholders they represent. The easiest way to do this would be to float a bond issue, then 
pay out the money raised to shareholders as a dividend. After default, the bondholders would 
be left with an empty corporate shell, and limited liability would prevent the bondholders 
from trying to collect directly from shareholders. 
Another way the shareholders can separate gullible bondholders from their wealth is to 
borrow money on the promise that it will be used to finance a "safe" investment, and then 
actually invest in a risky project. If lenders are convinced their money will be employed 
prudently, they will accept a lower interest rate on the funds they lend. Therefore, if managers 
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and stockholders can find enough naive bondholders, they can borrow at a "safe" interest rate 
and then make high risk/high return investments. If these investments are successful, 
shareholders can fully repay bondholders and pocket any excess project returns. If the project 
is unsuccessful, shareholders simply default and bondholders take over an empty corporate 
shell. 
The most effective preventive steps bond investors can take involve writing very detailed 
covenants into bond contracts, which sharply constrain the ability of the borrowing firm's 
managers to engage in expropriative behaviour. Unfortunately, these covenants make bond 
agreements immensely costly to negotiate and enforce, and in constraining management's 
ability to make value-decreasing investment decisions these covenants often also prevent 
managers from making value-increasing investments (Smith and Warner, 1979). For example, 
if a bond covenant limits a firm's ability to issue additional debt of equal seniority, managers 
may be forced to pass up value-increasing investments such as synergistic mergers major 
capital expenditures for new plant and equipment if these investments would have to be 
financed in part with newly-issued bonds. Other covenants almost invariably restrict dividend 
payments, even for very profitable firm (Kalay, 1982). This means a firm may be forced to 
over-invest (in negative NPV projects) if current profits are high and positive NPV 
investment opportunities are exhausted. These agency costs of debt can be quite real, and 
become progressively more important as a firm's leverage ratio increases (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
Jensen and Meckling's model predicts that managers of an individual firm, starting from an 
all-equity position, will substitute bonds for stock in the firm's capital structure in order to 
reduce the agency costs of equity. As this process continues, however, the agency costs of 
debt begin to rise at an increasing rate. The firm's optimal (value maximizing) debt-to-equity 
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ratio is reached at the point where the agency cost of debt exactly equals the agency cost of 
equity retired. 
This section discussed the relationship between agency theory and capital structure 
discovered that agency costs can be applied to capital structure. It also introduced two kinds 
of agency costs: agency costs of equity and agency costs of debt. However, which factor of 
capital structure would be affected by these agency costs? How to measure and solve them? 
How is the situation in China? These questions will be answered in further chapters. In the 
following section, some empirical studies in agency costs will be introduced. 
2.2.3. Empirical Studies in Agency Costs 
The agency costs of any relationship are born by the parties to the contracting relationship. This 
means that some individuals can always benefit by devising more effective ways of reducing 
them. Jensen and Meckling use the agency framework to analyse the resolution of conflicts of 
interest between stockholders, managers, and bondholders of the firm. 
The development of a theory of the optimal contract structure in a firm involves construction of 
a general theory of organizations. Jensen (1983) outlines the role of agency theory in such an 
effort. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) analyze the nature of residual claims and the 
separation of management and risk bearing in the corporation and in other organization forms. 
They provide a theory based on trade-offs of the risk sharing and other advantages of the 
corporate form with its agency costs to explain the survival of the corporate form in large-scale, 
complex non-financial activities. They also explain the survival of proprietorships, partnerships, 
mutuals, and nonprofits in other activities. Since the primary distinguishing characteristic 
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among these organisational forms is the nature of their residual or equity claims, this work 
addresses the question: What type of equity claim should an organisation issue? This question 
is a natural predecessor to the question of the optimal quantity of debt relative to equity-the 
capital structure issue-that has long been discussed in finance. 
One factor contributing to the survival of the corporation is the constraints imposed on the 
investment, financing, and dividend decisions of managers by what Manne (1965) calls the 
market for corporate control. Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue that this market is the arena in 
which alternative management teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources, 
with stockholders playing a relatively passive role accepting or rejecting competing takeover 
offers. In the last ten years, there has been extensive examination of the stock price effects 
associated with corporate takeovers through mergers, tender offers, and proxy fights. The 
evidence indicates that successful tender offers produce approximately 30 percent abnormal 
stock price performance in target firms' shares and 4 percent abnormal stock price 
performance in bidding firms' shares, while for mergers the numbers are 20 percent and 4 
percent. Jensen and Ruback provide a review of this literature. 
2.3. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
This section examines corporate fmance through the lens of transaction cost economics 
(TCE). One important factor missing from the principal-agent view is the recognition that 
writing a (good) contract is itself costly. This is a theme that lies at the heart of the large 
transaction cost literature, which started with Ronald Coase's famous 1937 paper and has 
been extensively developed by Oliver Williamson and others. 
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Coase (1937) observed that the production of final goods and services involved a succession 
of early stage processing and assembly activities. He suggested that transactions will be 
organised in the firm when the cost of doing this is lower than the cost of using the market. 
He added some content to this idea by proposing that the costs of constant recontracting with 
an outside firm or manager can be high relative to those of signing a long-term contract with 
an employee in which the employee agrees to carry out the commands of the employer. In a 
later work, Coase (1960) returned to the definition of transaction costs is "in order to carry 
out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one deals with, to inform 
people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a 
bargain, to draw up a contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms 
of the contract are being observed, and so on". 
TCE described by Oliver Williamson (1996) as "(1) relentlessly comparative (organization 
forms are always examined in relation to alternative feasible forms), (2) micro analytic (the 
action resides in the details), (3) discrete structural (alternative forms of governance differ in 
kind, and so it is impossible to replicate markets by hierarchies or the reverse), and (4) 
preoccupied with economising, principally with reference to organisation rather than 
technology". 
TCE studies how trading partners protect themselves from the hazards associated with 
exchange relationships. As developed by Williamson (1975,1985,1996), Klein, Crawford, 
and Alchian (1978), and more formally by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990), TCE maintains that in a complex world, contracts are typically incomplete. Because 
of this incompleteness, parties who invest in relationship-specific assets expose themselves to 
a hazard: If circumstances change, their trading partners may try to expropriate the rents 
accruing to the specific assets. 
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Transactions differ in a variety of ways: the degree to which relationship-specific assets are 
involved, the amount of uncertainty about the future and about other parties' actions, the 
complexity of the trading arrangement, and the frequency with which the transaction occurs. 
Williamson (1985) points out that asset specificity has the greatest economic significance for 
examining the governance of contractual relations. He defines asset specificity as durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of 
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the 
original transaction be prematurely terminated. TCE recognises six types of asset specificity: 
site, physical asset, human asset, dedicated asset, brand name capital, and temporal specificity. 
These types of specificity differ in their organisational consequences. 
Assume that a product or service is supplied by either of two technologies, one being the 
general purpose technology and the other the special purpose technology. The later requires 
. more 
investments in specific assets. Denote k as a measure of asset specificity. Transactions 
that invest in general purpose assets have k=0, whereas for transactions investing in special 
purpose asset k>O. As the assets are specialised to the particular needs of the parties, 
terminating prematurely this transaction will mean. losing productive values. Therefore, the 
parties have the incentive device safeguards (S) to avoid the above. An S=0 means no 
safeguards are provided, and an S>O indicates that safeguards are in place. Figure 2.1 shows 
three states of nature that could result from the combination of different states of k and S. the 
technology (k), contractual/governance safeguards (S) and price (p) are interactive and are 
determined simultaneously. 
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Figure 2.1 Simple Contracting Schemas 
A 
J-; IU 
C 
Pt general purpose assets with pl as break-even price 
P2 contract is supported by specific assets for which no 
safeguard is devised, break-even price p2, where p2>pl 
P3 contract is supported by transaction specific assets and 
a safeguard is provided, break-even price p3, where 
P3>P2 
Source: Williamson Oliver E., 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, pp. 63. 
Williamson (1996) distinguishes two dimensions of TCE: one deals with measurement 
problems, another one deals with the governance of contractual relations. He points that 
markets and hierarchies are alternative mechanisms for governing contractual relationships. 
The firm's problem is to choose a governance structure that will minimise both production 
costs and transaction costs. 
However, the question is: which governance structures are best suited to organise which 
transactions in order to have maximum economising? Given the level of asset specificity, 
market and internal organisation instrument differ in their benefits and resources. The 
benefits represent the property rights over the return stream generated from the assets. The 
resources available are in the form of control rights over managerial actions. When the level 
of asset specificity is low, market procurement has the advantage over internal organisation 
as the market has high incentive characteristics, they limit bureaucratic distortions better and 
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each party to a non specific transaction can go its own way at little cost to the other. As the 
asset specificity deepens, hierarchy becomes the favourite instrument. The reason for this is 
that the high powered incentives of markets are difficult to adapt in comparison to the 
authoritative nature of hierarchy. Governance instruments differ in two aspects: (1) the type 
and degree of adaptability and (2) the use of incentive and control mechanisms. 
Williamson (1996) lays out a simple model of how the costs of market and hierarchy 
mechanisms change as the asset specificity changes. The basic idea of Williamson's model is 
that the benefits of a more administrative (discrete, hierarchical) organisational structure 
increase as the asset specificity deepens. For investment made in highly specific assets, in 
order to increase the firm's competitive advantages, the use of a more intrusive regime to 
govern those assets will increase their relative benefits. 
TCE is introduced above. Comparing with AT which is discussed in section 2.2, there are 
some similarities and differences between them. Before moving on, it is worthwhile to find 
out these differences. 
23.1. TCE and AT Comparisons 
AT provides an alternative lens to which TCE is sometimes compared. TCE regards the firm 
as a governance structure and AT considers it a nexus of contracts. The leading similarities 
and differences between these two approaches will be examined below. 
TCE and AT are very similar in that both work out of a managerial discretion setup. They 
also adopt an efficient contracting orientation to economic organisation. And both argue that 
the board of directors in the corporation arise endogenously. 
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TCE expressly assumes that human agents are subject to bounded rationality and are given to 
opportunism. Bounded rationality is defined as behaviour that is intendedly rational, but only 
limitedly so. Opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile. Incomplete contracting is a 
consequence of the first of these. Added contractual hazards result from the second. These 
two behavioural assumptions support the following compact statement of the purposes of 
economic organisation: craft governance structures that economise on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding the transactions in question against the hazards of 
opportunism. AT refers to moral hazard and agency costs rather than opportunism, but the 
concerns are the same (Williamson, 1988). 
Both AT and TCE employ an "incomplete contracting in its entirety" orientation. Incomplete 
contracting merely vitiates a mechanism design setup. Contracting in its entirety means that 
parties to a contract will be cognizant of prospective distortions and of the needs to (1) 
realign incentives and (2) craft governance structures that fill gaps, correct errors, and adapt 
more effectively to unanticipated disturbances. And both AT and TCE maintain that the 
board of directors arises endogenously as a control instrument (Williamson, 1988). 
The most important difference between AT and TCE is in the choice of the basic unit of 
analysis. But there are also differences with respect to the cost concern and the main 
organizational concern of each. Table 2.4 shows the major differences between AT and TCE. 
Table 2.4 Major Differences between AT and TCE 
AT TCE 
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Source: Williamson, Oliver E., 1988. "Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, " 
The Journal of Finance, Vol. XLIII, No. 3, pp. 575. 
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Whereas TCE has the transaction as the central unit of analysis, AT considers the individual 
agent in that role. Identifying the transaction as the basic unit of analysis leads naturally to an 
examination of the principal dimensions with respect to which transactions differ, use of the 
individual agent as the elementary unit has given rise to no similar follow-on effort in AT. 
TCE are derived from align transactions with governance structures in a discriminating. Of 
the several dimensions with respect to which transactions differ, the most important is the 
condition of asset specificity. This has relation to the notion of sunk cost, but the organisation 
ramifications become evident only in an intertemporal, incomplete contracting context. 
AT has the residual loss as the focus of concern; TCE has the cost of mal-adaptation as its 
central focus. Residual loss is the reduction in the value of the firm that obtains when the 
entrepreneur dilutes his ownership. The shift out of profits and into managerial discretion 
induced by the dilution of ownership is responsible for this loss. Monitoring expenditures and 
bonding expenditures can help to restore performance toward pre-dilution levels. TCE 
emphasises ex-post costs, including: (1) the maladaptation costs incurred when transactions 
drift out of alignment in relation to as the "shifting contract curve", (2) the haggling costs 
incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, (3) the setup and 
running costs associated with the governance structures to which disputes are referred, (4) the 
bonding costs of effecting secure commitments (Williamson, 1985). The maladaptation costs 
are the key feature. Such costs occur only in an intertemporal, incomplete contracting 
context. 
Because of ex ante and ex post differences, while AT is little concerned with dispute 
resolution, the avoidance of disputes and the mechanisms for solving them are essential to 
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TCE (Williamson, 1996). Rather than assume that disputes are routinely submitted to and 
efficaciously settled by the courts, TCE maintains that court ordering is a very crude 
instrument and that most disputes, including many that under current rules could be brought 
to a court, are resolved by avoidance, self help, and the like (Galanter, 1981). Private ordering 
rather than court ordering is thus the principal arena. Assessing the comparative efficacy of 
alternative governance structures for harmonizing ex post contractual relations is the 
distinctive focus and contribution of TCE (Williamson, 1985). 
This section introduced major similarities and differences between TCE and AT. Whereas, 
what is the relationship between TCE and capital structure, and how TCE can apply to capital 
structure of the firm? These questions will be discussed in following section. 
2.3.2. TCE Approach to Capital Structure 
The TCE approach to economic organisation examines the contractual relation between the 
firm and each of its constituencies (labour, intermediate product, customers, etc. ) mainly with 
reference to transaction cost economising. Assessing contractual needs requires that the 
attributes of differing transactions be examined. Discriminating matches result. This same 
approach is herein applied to corporate finance. Williamson (1996) regards debt and equity as 
different governance structures. Thus, the corporate finance decision to use debt and equity to 
support individual investment projects is closely akin to the vertical integration decision to 
make or buy individual components or subassemblies. Not only is the "market mode" (debt; 
outside procurement) favoured if asset specificity is slight, but the costs of the market mode 
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go up relatively as the contractual hazards increase. Also, the disabilities of internal 
organisation (equity; internal supply) turn critically in both instances on the impossibility of 
"selective intervention". 
Williamson (1996) applies transaction cost economics to asset financing. In the agency theory 
capital structure models, the debt holders fully anticipate the ex post contracting 
misalignments that could occur and build those problems into the amount they would be 
willing to pay for debt ex ante. These models mainly assume complete contracting. Many 
moral hazard problems can be mitigated with different contractual devices ex ante - call 
provisions, managerial ownership, debt covenants, dividend constrains etc. When the parties 
cannot fully anticipate all possible future contingencies, the moral hazard problems become 
even worse. The firm must find a governance structure that is suited to deal with 
unanticipated mal-adaptations and incentive misalignments after they occur. The question is 
given the degree of asset specificity, which governance mechanism is best suited to adapt to 
unanticipated circumstances? What is the appropriate tool to govern the ownership, use and 
disposition of the assets? 
Williamson's model operates at the transaction level rather than firm level. He focuses on 
debt and equity as governance devices rather as simply deferent types of contingent claims on 
cash flows. Do the characteristics of the assets themselves, i. e. their asset specificity, make 
them more or less suitable for debt or equity financing? 
In his TCE rational for corporate finance, Williamson initially assumes that there are only 
two forms of finance, debt and equity. Investments can be financed by either but not both of 
them. Assume also that projects are arranged, from least to most, in terms of their asset 
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. 
specificity, e. g. general purpose building, general purpose equipment, special purpose 
building or special purpose machinery. 
Debt, as a relatively simple rule based governance mechanism, is suited to assets whose value 
would not be affected by autonomous action by any of the parties. Equity, a more adaptive 
discretionary mechanism, is more suited to situations of long term mutual dependency. When 
the specificity is high both the costs of autonomous action and the benefits of co-ordinated 
effort are high. 
Debt is a finite-lived, pre-emptive claims governed by a set of simple verifiable rules 
whereby (1) fixed interest payments must be made at regular intervals, (2) the business must 
continuously meet certain liquidity tests, (3) principal must be repaid at the loan expiration 
data, and (4) in the event of a default the debt holders will exercise their pre-emptive claims 
against the asset in question. "If everything goes well, interest and principal will be paid on 
schedule. But debt is unforgiving if things go poorly" (Williamson, 1996). The failure to 
meet the obligations leads to liquidation. As the degree of asset specificity deepens, the value 
of the pre-emptive claim declines monotonically. If the firm is liquidated, there could be 
losses from forced selling in imperfect factor markets. For highly firm-specific assets, no 
secondary markets may even exist. By definition, the greater its specificity the less is the 
asset value in the next best use. It would be difficult to use debt to finance assets that are 
costly to redeploy to other firms. The loss in value increases the lender's risk exposure. 
Therefore, the terms of the contract would be adjusted adversely. 
This can be extended beyond problems associated with liquidation. Bankruptcy 
reorganisation can be interpreted as a costly re-negotiation of the terms of debt contract. The 
greater the expected bargaining costs and/or control loss during the reorganisation, the more 
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costly it is to govern the use of an asset with debt. It is easier to govern the use disposition of 
an easily re-deployable asset with a simple, inflexible, rule-based device like debt. Why pay 
the added cost to keep flexibility when the net benefits are so small? If unanticipated 
circumstances did arise, the value of the asset would be unaffected by the identity of the 
owner. Since it would be costless to re-deploy an asset from one owner to another, why use 
anything more complex than a simple pre-emptive claim to govern the transfer of control? 
When asset specificity is low the parties are not locked in a long term relationship of bilateral 
dependency and there are few benefits from co-ordination among the parties. The parties can 
act autonomously without affecting the value of the asset. In this sense the debt is a market 
like mechanism. 
Confronted with the prospect that asset specific investment will be financed on adverse terms, 
the firm might respond by forgoing some of asset specificities in favour of a greater asset 
re-deployability. This would sacrifice some of the competitive advantages that these 
specificities offer. This might be avoided by creating a new governance structure instrument 
to which providers of finance would attach confidence, therefore the specific asset could be 
saved. 
If debt were the only funding device available, asset specificity would provide a strong 
incentive to invent an alternative governance mechanism that would be less rule-based and 
more flexible. When asset specificity is high governance structures should allow for more 
direct co-ordination, control, monitoring, and discretionary intervention. Suppose that this 
instrument is called equity, and has the following characteristics: (1) equity holders have the 
right to claim both residual earnings and asset liquidation value, (2) it lasts for the duration of 
the firm, (3) it could create a board of directors. This entity is elected by the prorate votes of 
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those who hold tradable shares to represent their interests. The board is directly involved in 
monitoring the performance measures on a timely basis, in reviewing the decisions, in hiring 
and/or replacing the management, in management compensation, in the appraisal of important 
investment and operating proposals before they are implemented and in disposal of assets 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Whereas the governance structure of debt is seen as a very market-like type that allows for 
autonomous adaptation, equity is much more intrusive and similar to administration. It is 
"hierarchy-like" mechanism more suited to situations that need more internal control, 
co-ordination and intervention. 
Let k be an index of asset specificity and let the cost of debt and equity capital, expressed as a 
function of asset specificity, be D(k) and E(k), respectively. A switchover will obtain as asset 
specificity increases if D(0)<E(0) but D'>E 50. 
That D(O)<E(O) is because debt is a comparatively simple governance structure. Being a 
rule-governed relation, the setup costs of debt are relatively low. By contrast, equity finance, 
which is a much more complex governance relation that contemplates intrusive involvement 
in the oversight of a project, has higher setup costs. Allowing, as it does, greater discretion, it 
compromises incentive intensity and invites politicking. 
Although the costs of both debt and equity finance increase as asset specificity deepens, debt 
financing rises more rapidly. This is because a rule-governed regime will sometimes force 
liquidation or otherwise causes the firm to compromise value-enhancing decisions that a 
more adaptable regime, of which equity governance is one, could implement. Accordingly, 
D'>E'>O. 
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The result is that whereas highly redeployable assets will be financed with debt, equity is 
favoured as assets become highly nonredeployable. Let k be the value of k for which 
E(k)=D(k). the optimal choice of all-or-none finance for all k> k0 Equity finance is thus 
reserved for projects where the needs for nuanced governance are great. 
In comparison to other theories of capital structure which seek a special rationale for debt use, 
the TCE approach states that debt is the natural financial instrument and equity appears as the 
financial instrument of the last resort. 
Williamson then suggests: why not create a new financial instrument - governance structure 
called "dequity", denoted 6(k) ? Let this instrument include all the constraining features of 
debt. When, however, these constrains impede the value maximising activities, the board of 
directors can temporarily remove the constraints, therefore to permit the firm to pursue a 
value maximising action. The constraints are thus the norm from which selective relief is 
permitted. In other words, use a set of simple rules until an unanticipated circumstance arises 
for which violating those rules would increase value. If this were feasible, S(k) would be an 
increasing function of k such that 6(0) =D(O) and 8' =E'. The former reflects the fact that 
dequity is not burdened by the bureaucratic cost of equity, and the latter that selective relief 
from the rules is permitted making dequity superior over both debt and equity. 
This section discussed how TCE can be applied to capital structure. However, which factor 
would be affected and how to solve them will be presented in next chapter. 
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2.3.3. Empirical Studies in TCE 
Economists' initial pessimism about the prospect of deriving testable implications from 
transaction cost reasoning has turned out to be untrue. Theoretical advances beginning in the 
1970s spurred a profusion of empirical research, although much of this research is required to 
examine the effect of financial strategies on firm performance. 
Balakrishnan and Fox (1993) investigate simultaneously the importance of unique, firm 
specific characteristics and industry characteristics in determining the capital structure of the 
firm. Evidence from their study of 295 mining and manufacturing' firms over a ten year 
period, strongly suggests that firm specific assets and skills are by far the most important 
determinants in explaining the observed cross sectional variations in capital structure. 
Structural characteristics of industries and/or the notion of large inter-industry differences in 
risk are not nearly as important as the firm-specific assets or the management of risk and its 
implications. The relationships between leverage and certain determinants of capital structure, 
such as tax shields and business risk, are also affected by specific effects. 
Long and Malitz (1985) examined the effect of the type of investments a firm makes in its 
financing decisions. Their survey of the aggregate financing practices of over 500 firms 
supports their hypothesis that R&D and advertising, as intangibles, have little value in cases 
of financial distress, while investments in plant and equipment support creditors in case of 
default. They conclude that it is the tangibility of the firm's assets and investments, and not 
profitability, which is the more important determinant of capital structure. 
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Barton and Gordon (1988) looked at the capital structure of 279 firms categorised by Rumelt 
typology of diversification strategy: single business, dominant business, related and unrelated 
diversification. They found that the determinants of leverage vary significantly among the 
different types. Both size and significance levels of parameters vary for different types of 
diversification. For all types of diversification, profitability was inversely related to gearing. 
Firm size and capital intensity were insignificant. For both related and unrelated firms, 
earnings volatility was negatively related to debt. Among unrelated diversified firms, sales 
growth was positively related to debt. 
2.4. PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Above two sections introduced AT and TCE. However, what defines the boundaries of the 
firm? Why some transactions are carries out through the market and contracts relating to 
particular transactions, and why are the others carries out within the organisation? To answer 
these questions, property rights will be introduced in this section. Then, the relationship 
between property rights and capital structure, as well as some empirical studies will be 
presented. 
The questions above were first raised by Coase (1937). Williamson (1975) and Klein et al. 
(1978) made the important observation that firms matter when parties must make specific 
investments and, because of the impossibility of writing detailed long-term contracts, the 
quasi rents from these investments cannot be divided up appropriately in advance. Grossman 
and Hart (1986) argued that a change in ownership brings costs as well as benefits. 
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Transferring ownership of an asset from party A to party B increases A's freedom of action to 
use the asset as he or she sees fit and therefore increases A's share of ex post surplus and ex 
ante incentive to invest falls. Hence, concentrating ownership in A's hands will be good to 
the extent that A's investment decision is important relative to B's, but will be bad if the 
opposite is the case. They defined property rights as the rights to return streams and the 
rights to make strategic decisions in contingencies not explicitly contracted upon (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986). Property rights include the right to determine how assets are used (control 
rights), the rights to the cash flows generated by these assets (return rights), and the right to 
sell these rights (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). 
Hart and Moore (1990) develop the theory by ownership and control over assets. Ownership 
is defined as the residual right of control over these assets, where residual refers to all the 
rights which have not been specifically transferred in any other contract. This concept is 
related to the assumption that contracts are incomplete, in the sense that they do not specify 
all decisions and trades of the contracting parties for all future contingencies. Specifying such 
a contract would be very costly, and generally would only specify trades and decisions for 
some events and will allocate the right to make decisions for all other events in a summary 
way to one party, who is than said to exercise residual rights control. The theory does not 
distinguish between ownership and control. As a rule, agents whose investments are 
important for a trade should be also given the specific assets, since this gives them a stronger 
ex post bargaining position and hence better incentives to invest. On the other hand, agents 
whose investment is less important for a trade should not be given ownership over assets 
which give them bargaining power. They would extract parts of the surplus and dilute the 
incentives to the other agents whose investments are more important. 
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A further and important aspect of ownership and contracting is the incorporation of new 
information, which is of particular importance for the analysis of financial contract. This 
aspect of the property rights theory is better understood in a framework with an explicit 
stochastic structure in which at least some of the variables (e. g. money income, payments to 
creditors) are verifiable. Aghion and Bolton (1992) discussed a model which showed how 
securities can implement such a contingent control structure. 
The important new aspect of the explicit stochastic of the model is that the optimal control 
structure is stochastic: in one state, control by an outsider (creditor) is optimal. In the other 
state, control by an insider is optimal. This dominates any deterministic control structure. The 
key insight is that the security structure can implement such a stochastic control structure 
over the assets, and new information becoming available is used optimally in the sense that 
the ownership of the firm, and hence the decision making structure, adjust optimally in the 
light of this information. 
The property rights theory of the firm, and the related approach to financial contracting, 
analyse the questions of ownership and contract design. They start from the observation that 
contracts are incomplete: agents find it cheaper to allocate control rights in a summary way 
than to specify and monitor actions for all future contingencies. This implies that some 
actions remain unspecified, and the initial contract lays down only the procedure by which 
decisions are made in the future, and how parties to the contract resolve conflicting views 
about the course of action. This situation poses two key problems. Firstly, investments and 
actions, which are relationship specific, have to be protected and rewarded in the future, 
hence some initial contractual arrangement must to be made. Secondly, actions have to be 
taken in the light of information, which arrives in the future. A complete contract would 
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assign the optimal action to each state. However, if either the state or the action is too 
complex to be described ex ante, they cannot be part of the initial contract and the link 
between actions and states must be implemented in another way. The literature has analysed 
two ways in which incomplete contract can provide for an optimal adaptation of decisions to 
a changed environment: stochastic control structure and re-negotiation. 
Property rights literature views capital structure as a mechanism for the transfer of control 
from the management; each instrument is associated with a particular mechanism (Grossman 
and Hart, 1986). Equity makes possible a control transfer to a party outside the initial contract 
through a takeover. Debt ensures that control is transferred to external investors in low 
performance states (bankruptcy). Capital structure when and how control is transferred and 
the terms on which transfer occurs. 
Most of research based on the property rights approach generates capital structures where 
external finance comes from only one financial instrument, either all debt or all equity. In 
Aghion and Bolton (1992), standard debt dominates equity unless the first best is 
implementable under an all equity structure where the entrepreneur retains control. Grossman 
and Hart (1986) exclude debt from the analysis all together, concentrating on the allocation of 
votes among equity holders. In Hart and Moore (1990) there is no role of equity, where the 
whole analysis of capital structure is made from a debt use point of view. It portrays equity in 
a rather rudimentary manner and gives the impression that equity financing is a residual of 
debt financing decisions. 
At a general level, the property rights literature suggests that capital structure is related to the 
nature of the firm's assets, e. g. their degree of liquidity. Furthermore, more profitable firms 
and those with a larger fraction of cash flows that are contractible should have lower debt 
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levels; the need to free cash flow is less important. Some attempts have been done to use the 
property rights approach in demonstrating how the choice of contracts is influenced by the 
nature of the underlying assets; when assets are easily diluted in bad states of nature, debt 
financing is more attractive than if such dilution were not possible (Berglof and Thadden, 
1994). The theory may be successful in explaining change in the capital structure over the life 
cycle of the firm, e. g. changes in the debt equity ratios as firms go from closely held to 
widely held and vice versa. 
However, the property rights approach is unlikely to predict exactly the debt equity ration in a 
particular fu-m. The concept of control rights is not precise enough for this purpose; more 
structure must be added for models to generate testable hypotheses. The property rights 
approach may be viewed primarily as an interpretative tool and as a theoretical framework 
within which alternative explanations can be analysed and tested. 
Davies and Brucato (1987) examined the role that property rights play in explaining 
differences in economic behaviour in the Australian banking industry for the period 
1962-1978. This industry is characterised by firms with distinctly different forms of 
ownership: those with non-transferable public ownership by taxpayers and those with 
transferable private ownership. The results of their analysis of these ownership differences 
support the general implications of property rights analysis. They found first, that the 
management of publicly owned banks prefers less risk, which leads to a lower expected 
return on assets, when managing the bank's assets. This conclusion is supported by the lower 
percentage of commercial loans and higher percentage of Australian public securities the 
publicly-owned bank holds relative to the private banks. Second, private banks show greater 
profitability than the publicly-owned bank. The result of the equations showing greater profits 
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per assets and profits per deposit for the private banks as well as the finding showing higher 
net earnings per employee support this conclusion. 
2.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced agency theory, transaction cost economics, and property rights as the 
foundation theories of this study. It also introduced some empirical studies in these fields. 
However, there are some questions and issues are still not answered or addressed yet in this 
chapter. For example, what factor of capital structure will be affected by these theories? 
These will be discussed in next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEORIES 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 introduced three foundation theories: agency theory, transaction cost 
economics, and property rights theory. It also discussed the relationship between these 
foundation theories and capital structure of the firm. Based on these theories, in this 
chapter, three major theories of capital structure choice will be introduced. They are: 
trade-off theory, pecking order theory, and signalling theory. 
Trade-off theory assumes that observed capital structures are the result of individual 
firms trading off the tax benefits of increased debt usage against the increasingly severe 
agency costs that result as debt ratios approach critical levels. The pecking order theory 
starts with asymmetric information that managers know more about their companies' 
prospects, risks, and values than do outside investors. Asymmetric information affects 
the choice between internal and external financing and between new issues of debt and 
equity securities. This leads to a pecking order, in which investment is financed first 
with internal funds, then by new issues of debt, and finally with new issues of equity. 
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The signalling theory bases on asymmetric information as well, between well informed 
managers and poorly informed outside shareholders. Choice of the firm's capital 
structure signals to outside investors the information of insiders. This chapter will 
introduce these theories in below and then discuss them in more depth. 
This chapter investigate that how the theories can explain capital structure, and also 
examines the empirical evidence concerning each of these theories. The chapter starts 
with trade-off theory in section 3.2. In section 3.3, pecking order theory is introduced. 
Then, signalling theory is presents in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents some empirical 
studies in developing countries. Section 3.6 gives a summary of this chapter. 
3.2. TRADE-OFF THEORY 
Durand (1952) discussed the chief emphasis on the conflict between capitalizes Net 
Operating Income (NOI) method and capitalizes Net Income (NI) method of 
capitalising earnings. The essence of the NOI approach is that the total value of all 
bonds and stock must always be the same regardless of the proportion of bonds and 
stock. The alternative NI approach is that the total investment value does not remain 
constant, but increases with the proportion of bonds in the capital structure. Durand did 
not believe that either method. 
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller laid an important foundation for a positive theory of 
financial structure by developing the implications of market equilibrium for optimal 
debt policy. They demonstrated that given the firm's investment policy and ignoring 
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taxes. and contracting costs, the firm's choice of financing policy does not affect the 
current market value of the firm. Their capital structure irrelevance proposition 
demonstrates that the firm's choice of financing policy cannot affect the value of the 
firm so long as it does not affect the probability distribution of the total cash flows to 
the firm. The Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition is a special case of the more 
general proposition developed by Coase (1960) that in the absence of contracting costs 
and wealth effects, the assignment of property rights leaves the use of real resources 
unaffected. 
3.2.1. The Modigliani and Miller Capital Structure Irrelevance 
Propositions (No Tax) 
The article by Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958) remains a surprisingly 
robust and vibrant description of financial market equilibrium. The M&M model 
describes how a system will work without frictions, such as gravity in physics and 
transaction costs (brokerage fees, taxes) in finance. 
The Modigliani and Miller proposition, that capital structure is irrelevant to firm value, 
has important implications for strategy research. First, managers seeking to maximise 
firm value need only be concerned with "real" decisions. Since financing decisions 
cannot affect firm value they can and should be made completely separate from the 
decision whether to invest. Managers should focus on production operations and 
investment opportunities. All security holders, no matter what their type of claim, would 
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unanimously agree that the firm should accept all non-negative NPV projects. Second, 
the firm faces no funding constraint. Any firm can raise money in capital markets to 
fund any non-negative NPV projects. Whether funded with internally generated funds, 
or externally with newly issued debt or equity, the value of the project would be the 
same. Third, in the absence of synergy or joint production, all projects will be seen as 
basically independent of each other. Decision makers need only be concerned with the 
risk-adjusted required rate of return on each project separately. Total firm value would 
simply be the sum of individual projects' values. There would be no incentive to merge 
any two firms. Their post merger value would be the sum of their pre-merger values. 
Decision makers can ignore the impact of financial decisions only when those decisions 
would not affect the firm value. 
In their original 1958 article, Modigliani and Miller set out to provide "an operational 
definition of the cost of capital and a workable theory of investment" that would 
explicitly recognise uncertainty, and would be solidly based on the principle of market 
value maximization. Assumptions of the M&M (1958) capital structure model are: 
(1) All physical assets are owned by corporations; 
(2) Capital markets are frictionless. There are no corporate or personal income taxes, 
securities can be purchased or sold at low cost and instantaneously, and there are no 
bankruptcy costs; 
(3) Corporations can issue only two types of securities, risky equity and risk-free debt; 
(4) Both individuals and corporations can borrow or lend at the risk-free interest rate; 
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(5) Investors have homogeneous expectations about the future stream of corporate 
profits; 
(6) There is no growth, so all cash flow streams are perpetuities; 
(7) All corporations can be classified into one of several "equivalent return classes" 
such that the returns on shares of all firms in that class are proportional to, and 
perfectly correlated with, all other firms in that class. 
The key to their model is assumption 7, which states that shares of firms within a given 
risk class have both the same expected return and the same probability distribution of 
expected returns, and can therefore be considered perfect substitutes for each other. 
Companies with a risk class thus differ from each other only in scale - they have the 
same expected profit per dollar of invested capital, and investors can expect their per 
share returns to be identical. M&M suggested that these classes might be comparable to 
industrial classifications, and this is a useful and intuitive analogy. 
M&M's Proposition I. " Irrelevance Proposition 
"The market value of any firm is independent of its capital structure and its given by 
capitalizing its expected return at the rate p appropriate to its class. " 
The central proposition made by M&M is that the' weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC) is independent of the debt equity ratio and equity to the cost of capital which 
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the firm would have with no gearing its capital structure. In other words, the appropriate 
capitalisation rate for a firm is the rate applied by the market to an ungeared company in 
the relevant risk category. The arbitrage mechanism will operate to equalise the values 
of any two companies whose values are temporarily out of line with each other. 
No distinction is made between short and long term debt and it is assumed that all 
borrowing is perpetual. The company is expected to deliver constant and perpetual 
annual earnings. The overall rate that company must achieve to satisfy the stakeholder 
(shareholders and debt holders) is the weighted average -cost of capital denoted po. 
This can be expressed as: 
po=So +Do =p, xV'+Pd xVD =NOI VO VO yo 
NOI 
VO = 
Po 
Where, S and D are the market value of this firm's equity and debt; pe and pd are 
the respective rates of return required by shareholders and debt holders; Vs and VD are 
the respective market value of shares and the value of outstanding debt in a company; 
VO is the market value of whole company; NOI is annual net operating income. The 
WACC also equals NOI/V0 since total operating income is composed of payments to 
shareholders. Under the MM's proposition I, the value of the firm is: 
E VOL = Vou =E 
Po 
Where, VL is market value of levered firm, VV is market value of unlevered firm, E is 
earning before tax and interest (EBIT). 
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M&M's Proposition II. - The Behaviour of the Equity Cost of Capital 
"The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate 
p, for a pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to financial risk equal 
to the debt-to equity ratio times spread between p, and r. " 
Underpinning Proposition I is a statement about the behaviour of the relevant cost of 
capital concepts, in particular the rate of return required by shareholders, which is 
expressed in MM's second proposition. This states the expected yield of a share of 
equity is equal to the appropriate capitalisation rate, p, for a pure equity stream in the 
class, plus a premium related to the financial risk equal to the debt-to-equity ratio times 
the spread between p, and r. This proposition can be written as: 
(PC - r)VD ke, =Pc+ VS 
Where, ke! denotes the returns required by the shareholders of a levered company. The 
expression simply tells us that the rate of return required by shareholders increases 
linearly as the debt/equity ratio is increased. 
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3.2.2. The Modigliani and Miller Capital Structure Irrelevance 
Propositions (with Taxes) 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller added corporate taxes to their model of corporate 
valuation, under which the value of the levered firm became sensitive to capital 
structure. In the presence of corporate taxes the value of the levered firm is: 
VL =Vu +PV(taxshield) = Vu +TB 
The expression for the value of the levered firm comprises the value of an equivalent 
unlevered firm, Vu, plus a premium derived by discounting to perpetuity the stream of 
tax savings which is applicable so long as the fine has sufficient taxable capacity. The 
introduction of the term, TD, the discounted value of the future tax savings, or the tax 
shield, is a major modification of MM's Proposition I. The required rate of return for 
shareholders is given as: 
(Pý - r)(1- T)VD ke, = p, + VS 
The return required by the levered company's shareholders is the sum of the cost of 
equity in an identical unlevered firm plus a financial risk premium related to the 
corporate tax rate and the debt/equity ratio. The premium for financial risk required by 
shareholders is lower in this case owing to the tax deductibility of debt interest, i. e., the 
debt interest burden is less exacting. Debt, therefore, increases the firm's value and 
reduces the required rate of return on equity. This implies that the firm's values are 
maximised by using 100% debt financing. 
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However, Miller (1977) added personal taxes and returned to the original MM 
irrelevance proposition. In this instance, capital structure is irrelevant because in 
equilibrium marginal taxes insure that will be so. According to Miller, the value of the 
firm is: 
') D V -V + 1-(1-T')(1-Tp (1-Tpd) 
Where, TT, Tp, and Tpd denote corporate tax rate, personal tax rate on equity and 
personal tax rate on income from debt securities respectively. Miller argues that 
- equilibrium will be reached where all tax affects balance out. This would mean that: 
0-Tß)(1-Tpe)=(1-Tpd ) 
Under the Millers argument is that if after corporate and personal taxes, debt were 
cheaper than equity on a risk adjusted basis, seekers of capital would switch into debt 
and thus force its price (interest rate) up to the point where it ceased to be cheaper. 
Following Miller, several authors developed tax based extensions of the basic capital 
structure models. The most important of these, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), 
incorporates non-debt tax shields as substitutes for debt in corporate financial structures. 
The principal hypothesis in this model is that companies with large amounts of 
depreciation, investment tax credits, R&D expenditures, and other non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) should employ less debt financing than otherwise equivalent companies with 
fewer such shields. Plausible as this hypothesis is, however, early research by Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) found just the reverse. 
Leverage seemed to be directly, not inversely, related to the availability of NDTS. This 
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was interpreted as evidence that assets which generated such tax shields could also be 
used as collateral for additional debt, so firms rich in tangible assets were able to use 
higher level of secured debt. This secured debt hypothesis was first put forward by Scott 
(1977), and was later supported theoretically by Stulz and Johnson (1985) and 
empirically by Rajan and Zingales (1995). More recent research by MacKie-Mason 
(1990) has been able to measure the separate effects of NDTS and collateralizeable 
assets, and provides support for both the secured debt and the non-debt tax shields 
hypothesis. 
3.2.3. Costs of Financial Distress 
Financial distress occurs when promises to creditors are broken or honoured with 
difficulty. Sometimes financial distress leads to bankruptcy. Sometimes it only means 
skating on thin ice. Financial distress is costly. Investors know that levered firms may 
fall into financial distress, and they worry about it. That worry is reflected in the current 
market value of the levered firm's securities. Thus, the value of the firm can be broken 
down into three parts: 
VL=Vu + PV (tax shield) - PV (costs of financial distress) 
Where, VL is the value of a levered firm, VV is the value of an unlevered firm. The costs 
of financial distress depend on the probability of distress and the magnitude of costs 
encountered if distress occurs. 
57 
Chapter 3 Capital Structure Theories 
PV (tax shield) initially increases as the firm borrows more. At moderate debt levels the 
probability of financial distress is trivial, and so PV (cost of financial distress) is small 
and tax advantages dominate. But the probability of financial distress increases rapidly 
with additional borrowing; the costs of distress begin to take a substantial bite out of 
firm value. Also, if the firm cannot be sure of profiting from the corporate tax shield, 
the tax advantage of debt is likely to dwindle and eventually disappear. The theoretical 
optimum is reached when the present value of tax savings due to additional borrowing 
is just offset by increases in the present value of costs of distress. This is called the 
trade-off theory of capital structure. 
The firm is exposed to certain costs, direct or indirect, when it faces financial distress. 
Direct costs include expenses related to courts, lawyers, experts and accountants in 
addition to administrative expenses in case of bankruptcy proceedings. Indirect costs 
may take several forms. In case of liquidation, delays may occur owing to the fighting 
between claimants. Such delays which in certain cases may extend over several years 
have an adverse effect on the market value of the assets to be sold and sometimes may 
be detrimental to certain assets due to the lack of maintenance. 
Managers and employees of a bankrupt firm face such distress due to the possible loss 
of their jobs and reputation. This situation may encourage some managers to take 
short-term actions that may harm the firm's long-term prospects. Such actions include 
drastic curbing of renovation and reduction of maintenance of machinery, selling off 
valuable assets and a decline of managerial energies. In addition, as a spill over effect of 
financial distress, customers and suppliers of the bankrupt firm suffer as well. 
Customers may incur some costs when they look for an alternative supplier, who may 
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not offer identical replacement of products. The original suppliers may suffer because 
they loose a customer. Suppliers may also deny a financially distressed firm credit on 
purchased goods, hence further aggravating the problem faced by such a firm. Banks as 
suppliers of capital and financial services to the firm would be likely to charge a higher 
risk premium. 
3.2.4. Agency Costs 
Agency theory has been introduced as a foundation theory in chapter 2. Agency costs of 
debt and agency costs of equity were discovered that can be applied to capital structure. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that, given increasing agency costs with higher 
proportions of equity on the one hand and higher proportions of debt on the other, there 
is an optimum combination of outside debt and equity that will be chosen because it 
minimises total agency costs. In this way it is possible to argue for the existence of an 
optimum capital structure even in a world without taxes or bankruptcy costs. 
For example, agency costs of external equity are assumed to decrease as the percentage 
of external equity decreases, and the agency costs of debt are assumed to increase (in a 
world without taxes). If the agency costs of external equity are very low, as may be the 
case for a widely held firm, then optimal capital structure can result as a trade-off 
between the tax shelter benefit and its agency cost. 
The modem Agency Cost/Tax Shield Trade-off Model is written as below: 
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VL=VU + PV (tax shield) - PV (costs of financial distress) 
+ PV (agency costs of outside equity) - PV (agency costs of outside debt) 
This model expresses the value of a levered firm in terms of the value of an unlevered 
firm, adjusted for the present values of tax shields, costs of financial distress, and the 
agency costs of debt and equity. The model provides an understandable and intuitively 
attractive explanation for how capital structures are actually set by real corporations. 
3.2.5. Empirical Studies in Trade-off Theory 
Bowen, Daley and Huber (1982) studied 1,800 firms in nine industries, classified using 
the 4 digit standard industry codes. The authors studied the common equity to total 
assets ratio and the long-term debt plus shpt-term debt to total assets ratio as proxies for 
capital structure. Using F-ratio analysis, they found that the firms in each industry have 
similar capital structures; and using the Spearman rank coefficient analysis, they found 
that the firm's relative ranking to mean industry financial structure across time is stable. 
Finally using the Fisher exact probability test, they also concluded that the gearing of 
firms within an industry tends to converge to the industry's average. The firms 
investigated in this study, therefore, aimed for a target capital structure. 
Marsh (1982) developed a descriptive model of the choice between equity and long 
term debt financing based on both the theory (companies in need of new finance should 
issue equity if they are above their target debt level and debt if they are below) and 
existing empirical evidence. The tested his model using a logit analysis applied to a 
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sample of 748 issues of equity and debt made by UK companies over the period from 
1959 to 1970. The study concluded that companies are heavily influenced by market 
conditions and the past history of security prices in choosing between equity and debt 
financing. The study also provided evidence that companies do appear to make their 
choice of financing instruments as through they had target levels in mind for both long 
term debt ratio, and the ratio of short term debt to total debt. Marsh concluded that the 
results are consistent with the notion that these target levels are themselves functions of 
company size, bankruptcy risk, and asset composition. 
Altman (1984) divided the cost of financial distress into direct and indirect costs. He 
defined direct costs as lawyers', courts', accounts' and other administrative costs which 
can be directly measured; and indirect costs as lost sales, reduced managerial energies 
and higher costs of funds, which can only be estimated. In the study, Altman evaluated 
the effect of direct and indirect costs by studying a sample of twelve retail and seven 
industrial firms which went bankrupt over the period from 1970 to 1978. He found that 
bankruptcy costs were not trivial. In many cases they exceeded 20% of the value of the 
firm measured just prior to bankruptcy and even in some cases measured several years 
prior. This suggested that capital structure should be set at a point where the marginal 
present value of tax benefits equals the marginal present value of financial distress 
costs. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) generalised Miller's differential tax model by including 
other non-debt tax shields such as depreciation charges and investment tax credits. They 
stated that introduction of such non-debt tax shields leads to the conclusion that each 
firm has a unique interior optimal capital structure that maximises its value. This capital 
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structure is determined only by the interactions of personal and corporate taxes as well 
as positive financial distress costs. 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) developed a model that synthesises the modem 
trade-off theory of optimal capital structure. In the empirical testing of this model, the 
authors found that the volatility of a firm's earnings had a negative relationship with 
leverage. In addition, they found a strong direct relationship between non-debt tax 
shields and the firm's debt level. 
Dammon and Senbet (1988) extended DeAngelo and Masulis' work by scrutinising the 
firm's investment decision. They disagreed with the existing literature on the 
relationship between debt and investment tax shields in the case of optimal investment 
by the firm. Dammon and Senbet showed that an increase in investment related 
non-debt tax shields owing to the changes in the tax code did not necessarily lead firms 
to reduce their debt level. They hypothesised that, in cross sectional analysis, the fact 
that firms with higher investment tax shields do not necessarily have lower debt tax 
shields, unless all the firms use the same technologies, may explain the deviation from 
DeAngelo and Masulis' results. 
Givoly, Hayn, Ofer and Sarig (1992) evaluated the response of firms to the U. S. 1986 
Tax Reform Act. The result supported the tax-based theories of capital structure. Also, 
they found that there exists a substitution effect between debt and non-debt tax shields 
and that both personal and corporate tax rates affect capital structure. 
Ashton (1989) reworked the MM (1958,1963) and Miller (1977) arguments to fit 
capital structure within the U. K. tax system at the time. He argues that if there is a U. K. 
tax advantage of debt, it is likely to be much smaller than the traditional MM value and 
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it is likely to be no more than 13% of the market value of the permanent debt. The tax 
advantage of debt is considerably less under the U. K. imputation system than it is under 
the U. S. classical system. This reduced tax advantage to debt arises because under an 
imputation system, the withholding tax on the gross dividend can both offset against the 
firm's corporation tax ability and treated as a tax credit by the shareholder, thus 
reducing both corporate tax and personal tax on equity. The smaller tax advantage of 
debt in the U. K. would predict, in general, lower levels of debt in the U. K. than in the 
U. S. 
3.3. PECKING ORDER THEORY 
The introduction into economics of the explicit modelling of private information has 
made possible a number of approaches to explaining capital structure. In these theories, 
firm managers or insider are assumed to possess private information about the 
characteristics of the firm's return stream or investment opportunities. In one set of 
approaches, capital structure is designed to mitigate inefficiencies in the firm's 
investment decisions that are caused by the information asymmetry. This branch of the 
literatures starts with Myers and Majluf (1984). 
There are several embarrassing regularities in observed corporate behaviour that the 
trade-off theory cannot explain. For example: (1) within virtually every industry, the 
most profitable firms have the lowest debt ratios - which is exactly the opposite of what 
a tax effect trade-off model predicts; (2) Leverage increasing events, such as stock 
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repurchases and debt for equity exchange offers, are almost invariably associated with 
large positive abnormal returns for a company's stockholders, while leverage decreasing 
events lead to stock price declines. According to the trade-off theory, these events 
should both net out to zero abnormal returns, since some firms will be below their 
"optimal" debt level when they increase leverage while others will be above the 
optimum; (3) Firms issue debt securities frequently, but seasoned equity issues are very 
rare. In addition, announcement of new issues of seasoned equity are invariably greeted 
with a decline in the firm's stock price. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) showed that, if investors are less well-informed than current 
fine insiders about the value of the firm's assets, then equity may be mispriced by the 
market. If firms are required to finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing 
may be so severe that new investors capture more than the NPV of the new project, 
resulting in a net loss to existing shareholders. In this case, the project will be rejected 
even if its NPV is positive. This underinvestment can be avoided if the firm can finance 
the new project using a security that is not so severely undervalued by the market. For 
example, internal funds and/or riskless debt involve no undervaluation, and therefore, 
will be preferred to equity by firms in this situation. Even risky debt will be preferred to 
equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) refers to this as a "pecking order" theory of financing, 
that capital structure will be driven by firms' desire to finance new investments, first 
internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally with equity only as a last resort. 
The trade-off theory explains observed corporate debt levels fairly well; the pecking 
order theory offers a far superior explanation for observed capital structure changes - 
especially those involving security issues. 
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This theory can explain: (1) why debt ratios and profitability are inversely related; (2) 
Why markets react negatively to all new equity issues and why managers seem to mark 
such issues only when they either have no choice (following an unexpected earnings 
decline) or they feel the firm's shares are over-valued; (3) Why managers of even highly 
regarded firms choose to hold more they should. 
3.3.1. Pecking Order Hypothesis 
The pecking order hypothesis based on two assumptions about corporate managers 
(Myers and Majluf 1984): (1) Managers are better informed about the investment 
opportunities faced by their firms than are outside investors (an asymmetric information 
assumption); (2) Managers act in the best interests of exciting shareholders. 
Suppose there are only two types of firms. The current assets of the firm are worth H 
and L, L<H. Initially, the firm's type is known only to the firm's managers whose 
objective is to maximize the true value of the current shareholders' claim. Outsider 
investors believe the firm is of type H with probability p and type L with probability 1 p. 
Both types of firm have access to a new project that requires an investment of I and has 
NPV of v. 
The firm must decide whether to accept the project. If the project is accepted, the 
investment I must be financed by issuing equity to new shareholders. Consider the 
following candidate equilibrium. A type H firm rejects the project and issues no equity 
while a type L firm accepts the project and issues equity worth I. Investors believe that 
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issuance of equity signals that the firm is of type L. To verify that this is equilibrium, 
first notice that investor beliefs are rational. Second, given these beliefs, the equity 
issued by type L firms is fairly priced by the market, i. e., current shareholders give up a 
fraction of the firm to new shareholders. 
_I 16 L+v+I 
Their payoff from taking the project and issuing equity is: 
(1-ß)(L+v+I)=L+v 
Consequently, the current shareholders of type L firms capture the NPV of v in the new 
project by issuing equity. They would not prefer to imitate type H firms since this 
would require passing up the project along with its positive NPV with no compensating 
gain in valuation of the existing assets, i. e., their payoff would be L. Third, if a type H 
firm passes up the project, the payoff to current shareholders is simply H. On the other 
hand, if a type H firm imitates a type L firm by issuing equity, this equity will be priced 
by the market as if the firm were type L. In this case, the current shareholders' payoff is: 
(1-ß)(H+v+I) 
The underpricing of the new equity can be so severe that current shareholder of the type 
H firm give up claims to the existing assets as well as the entire NPV of the new project. 
They are thus worse off by taking the project. This will happen when the above 
expression is less than H, or: 
(H - L), ß >v 
66 
Chapter 3 Capital Structure Theories 
Consequently, for parameters satisfying this inequality, in equilibrium, only type L 
firms will accept the positive NPV project. The left hand side of the inequality is the 
value transferred to the new equity holders who acquire the fraction ß of the firm at 
the bargain price of L instead of the true value H. The inequality then states that 
underinvestment occurs if this transfer exceeds the NPV of the project. 
The most important implication of pecking order theory is that, upon announcement of 
an equity issue, the market value of the firm's existing shares will fall. Prior to the 
announcement, the firm's market value of current shares is: 
pH + (1- p)(L + v) 
reflecting prior beliefs about firm type and the equilibrium behaviour of the firm. Upon 
announcement of an equity issue, investors realize that the firm is of type L, so firm 
value becomes L+v. For parameter values satisfying the above inequality, 
pH+(1-p)(L+v)>L+v 
i. e., announcement of the equity issue results in a fall in the price of current shares. 
The second implication is that new projects will tend to be financed mainly from 
internal sources or the proceeds of low-risk debt issue. Financing via internal funds or 
riskless debt (or any security whose value is independent of the private information) 
will not convey information and will not result in any stock price reaction. 
The third implication is that, the underinvestment problem is least severe after 
information releases such as annual reports and earnings announcements (Korajczyk, et 
al, 1990). Therefore equity issues will tend to cluster after such releases and the stock 
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price drop will be negative related to the time between the releases and the issue 
announcement (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). 
Final implication is that, suppose firms with comparatively little tangible assets relative 
to firm value are more subject to information asymmetries. For such firms, then, the 
underinvestment problem will occur more often than for similar firms with less severe 
information asymmetries. These firms can be expected to accumulate more debt over 
time, other things equal. 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) offered an example similar to those in Myers and Majluf. 
There are two types of firms: L and H. Each type of firm has debt outstanding initially. 
In equilibrium, firm type H issues enough equity to finance the new project and retire its 
outstanding debt at face value. Firm type L issues only enough equity to finance the 
new project. Investors infer the firm type correctly. The debt 
Unfortunately, the pecking order theory cannot explain all the capital structure 
regularities observed in practice. It suffers in comparison with the trade-off theory in its 
inability to explain how taxes, bankruptcy costs, security issuance costs, and an 
individual firm's investment opportunity set influence the company's actual debt ratio. 
The theory ignores significant agency problems that can easily arise when the fun's 
managers accumulate so much financial slack that they become immune to the market 
discipline (Megginson, 1997). This can happen when a firm does not need to raise 
external funds, and therefore cannot be penalised by the market through a low security 
price, and has accumulated so much financial slack that its managers are immune to 
forced removal by a hostile acquisition. 
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3.3.2. Empirical Studies in Pecking Order Theory 
Baskin (1989) suggested that the pecking order hypothesis appears to describe corporate 
practice. He used regression-based econometrics to distinguish between the pecking 
order behaviour and static optimal capital structure theory. A sample of 378 firms from 
the 1960 Fortune 500 that were still available in COMPUSTAT in 1984 was used. The 
results confirmed the basic pattern of correlation that is consistent with the pecking 
order theory, and it was shown that the small positive serial correlation in debt financing 
disappears once the effect of profitability, growth opportunity and dividend policy are 
controlled for. 
Norton (1991) used a survey instrument designed to examine the motivations, behaviour 
and beliefs that guide capital structure decisions of small firms. Only 110 out of 405 
such survey instruments received from small, high-growth corporations, were usable. 
The survey questions were derived from various strands of the theoretical financial 
literature on capital structure. The results showed that, contrary to mainstream financial 
theory, factors dealing with bankruptcy costs, agency costs and information asymmetry 
have little effect, if any, on the capital structure policy of such firms. In fact, he 
concluded that these factors "... are a concern only to firms living on the edge, e. g. large 
firms experiencing financial problems or firms with an inadequate track record". The 
responses showed that financial officers in the sample followed a "pecking order" when 
choosing their sources of funds. In financing assets, internally generated cash was used 
as much as possible and in the cases where external financing is needed, debt is used to 
raise funds and equity instruments are issued as a last resort. 
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Griner and Gordon (1995) used subsets of fortune 500 companies in each of the years 
1985 to 1988 to test the pecking order and managerial hypotheses, i. e. managers who 
have a small ownership stake in the firm use internal cash flows to undertake a level of 
capital expenditures higher than that which would maximise the wealth of current 
shareholders. The analysis of capital expenditures and internal cash flows confirmed the 
prediction of both theories that internal cash flow is an important determinant of capital 
expenditure levels. The analysis also showed an inverse curvilinear association between 
capital expenditures and insider ownership. The multivariate analysis confirmed that 
internal cash flow is an important determinant of capital expenditure levels. However, 
the most important finding was that there no association between capital expenditures 
and insider ownership, in any of the years, after controlling for other determinants of 
capital expenditures. The conclusion was that the reliance on internal cash flow is not 
caused by conflicts between managers and existing shareholders, but rather is a 
consequence of information asymmetries between managers and potential new 
shareholders. Hence, using internal cash flows is, ceteris paribus, wealth maximising for 
existing shareholders when compared to issuing debt. 
Adedeji (1998), in his study of 224 U. K. firms over the period 1993-1996, concludes 
that there is a negative relationship between the dividend payout ratio and investment. 
He also concluded that there is a positive association between the dividend payout ratio 
and gearing. However, there is no significant correlation between gearing and 
investments. Although investments have a positive influence on gearing, the positive 
does not hold. The results are similar to the previous evidence on pecking order theory, 
asymmetric information and dividend policy. 
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Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) tested the static trade-off model against the alternative 
of the pecking order model of corporate financing in their study of 157 firms over the 
period 1971-1989. They based their pecking order model on the idea that when a firm's 
cash flows are inadequate for its real investment and dividend commitments, the firm 
issues debt. Equity is never issued, except possibly when firms can only issue junk debt 
and costs of financial distress are high. According to their model the firms borrowing 
behaviour would depend on the amount of deficit or surplus of available cash flows. 
They calculated this deficit/surplus as the difference between operating cash flows and 
dividend, capital expenditures, net increase in working capital and the current portion of 
long-term debt. Finally they regressed the first differences in debt against the 
deficit/surplus in cash flows. Their static trade-off model was based on the idea that 
managers seek optimal capital structure. Random events would bump them away from it, 
and they would than have to work gradually back. If the optimum debt ratio is stable, 
we would see mean reverting behaviour. They target adjustment model stated that 
changes in the debt ratios are explained by the deviations of the current ratio from the 
target. The proxy target debt ratio they used was the historical mean of the debt ratio for 
each firm. 
They concluded that the pecking order is an excellent first order descriptor of corporate 
finance behaviour. The target adjustment model, when tested separately seems to 
perform well. When the two models are tested jointly, the coefficients and the 
significance of the pecking order change hardly at all, whereas the performance of the 
target adjustment model degrades. The strong performance of the pecking order does 
not occur just because firms fund unanticipated cash needs with debt in the short run. 
Their results suggest that firms plan to finance the deficit with debt. 
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Chirinko and Singha (2000) question the interpretation of the Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) regression test. Chirinko and Singha show that equity issues can create a degree 
of negative bias in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers test. Suppose that firms actually 
follow the pecking order theory, but that these firms issue an empirically observed 
amount of equity. In that case, they show that the predicted regression coefficient is 
actually 0.74 rather than one. This amount of bias is not trivial, but it still leaves the 
coefficient very far from the magnitudes of slope coefficients that are observed. 
Chirinko and Singha also point out that if, contrary to the pecking order, firms follow a 
policy of using debt and equity in fixed proportions, then the Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
regression will identify this ratio. As a result, finding a coefficient near one would not 
disprove the tradeoff theory. 
The effect of the financing decision on securities' prices was also evaluated by Krasker 
(1986). He confirmed the results found by Myers and Majluf by allowing the firm to 
vary the size of the investment. He found that the larger the stock issue the worse the 
price effect on existing common stock. - 
Mikkelson and Partch (1986) analysed the stock price effects of various types of 
financing events undertaken by a set of 360 companies in the period 1972 through 1982. 
On average they found a negative, statistically significant stock price response to the 
announcement of common stock and convertible debt offerings. The average price 
reaction to the announcement of preferred stock, straight debt, private placements of 
debt and term loans is small and non-significant at the 10% level. The average price 
response to the announcement of credit agreements is positive. 
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Cheung and Krinsky (1994) investigated the alleged underpricing in initial public 
offering (IPO) caused by the information asymmetry between the investment banker 
and the issuer. They reported that their results in general failed to support the IPO 
underpricing hypothesis. When the underpricing was asserted it appeared to be a short 
run phenomenon. 
Shah (1994) investigated the effect of pure capital structure in firms and found that 
leverage increases and decreases convey qualitative different information. Leverage 
increases appear to lower the investors' assessment of the risk of the firm's stock but 
not their expectations of cash flow. Leverage decreases appear to lower the investors' 
assessment of cash flows but not their assessment of risk. He also concluded that 
increases in leverage do not explain the information content or the information 
asymmetry of the issue. 
Beatty, Riffe and Welch (1997) assess the future net capital expenditures for a broad 
cross-section of COMPUSTAT firms from 1973-1989. They explore three general 
categories of factors expected to influence investment: external equity financing, 
internally generated accounting information and tax incentives. They find that external 
financing and information play a role in that both positive stock returns and equity 
issues indicate future increases in investments. Accounting information about internal 
sources and uses of funds is also important in the investment decision. 
Frank and Goyal (2002) test the pecking order theory of corporate leverage on a broad 
cross-section of publicly traded American firms for 1971 to 1998. They found that 
contrary to the pecking order theory, net equity issues track the financing deficit more 
closely than do net debt issues. While large firms exhibit some aspects of pecking order 
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behavior, the evidence is not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, 
nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. Financing deficit is less important in 
explaining net debt issues over time for firms of all sizes. 
3.4. SIGNALLING THEORY 
The pecking order theory was introduced above. Whereas, there is another set of 
approach. Choice of the firm's capital structure signals to outside investors the 
information of insiders. This stream starts with Ross (1977) and Leiland and Pyle 
(1977). 
Beginning in the late 1970s, Ross (1977) and other authors developed a signalling 
model of corporate capital structure based on asymmetric information problems 
between well-informed managers and poorly-informed outside shareholders. These 
models are based on the idea that corporate executives with favourable inside 
information about their firms have a clear incentive to somehow convey this positive 
information to outside investors, in order to cause an increase in the firm's stock price. 
Given the asymmetric information problems, however, managers cannot simply 
announce that they have good news because every other manager has the same 
incentives, and shareholders will be properly sceptical about any self-serving statement 
that can only be validated with the passage of time. 
One solution to this problem is for managers of high value firms to signal this 
information to investors by taking a action or adopting a financial policy that is 
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prohibitively costly for less valuable firms to duplicate. As used in the finance and 
economics literature, a signal is an action that imposes deadweight costs on the signaller 
in order to convey value to relatively poorly informed outsiders. The signal is credible if 
it is prohibitively costly for a weaker firm to attempt to mimic. Ross (1977) shows that 
it is possible to design an incentive based compensation contract for managers of high 
value firms that will induce them to adopt a heavily leveraged capital structure for their 
companies. Less valuable companies are unwilling to assume so much debt because 
they are much more likely to fall into bankruptcy, with all its deadweight costs. Given 
these assumptions, a separating equilibrium occurs where high value firms use a great 
deal of debt financing and less valuable companies rely more on equity financing. 
Investors are able to differentiate between high and low value firms by observing their 
capital structures, and are willing to assign higher valuations to highly levered firms. 
Finally, since weaker firms are unwilling to mimic the stronger ones, the equilibrium is 
stable. 
The following is a simple formal model. Suppose that the data-one returns z of a firm 
of type t are distributed uniformly on (0, t). The manager is privately informed about t. 
He chooses the face value of debt D to maximize a weighted average of the market 
value of the firm at date zero and the expected value at data one, net of a penalty L for 
bankruptcy. We denote by VO (D) the value assigned to the firm at data zero by the 
market if the debt level is D. The manager's objective function is: 
(1-y)VO(D)+y(t/2-LDIt) 
The parameter y is a weight. The expected payoff at data one, given the manager's 
information is simply t/2. He evaluates the bankruptcy probability as D/t. If 
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investors infer that t= a(D) when the manager issues debt of face value D, then: 
Vo(D)=a(D)/2 
Substituting this into the objective function and talking the derivative with respect to D 
gives the first order condition. In equilibrium, investors correctly infer t from D, i. e., if 
D(t) is the manager's optimal choice of debt level as a function of the firm type t, then: 
a(D(t)) =t 
Using this in the first order condition and solving the resulting differential equation give 
as: 
D(t) = Ct2 /L+b 
where c and b are constants. 
The main empirical result is that firm value (or profitability) and the debt-equity ratio 
are positively related. And decrease the debt level and the probability of bankruptcy. 
Ross (1977) also shows that this probability of bankruptcy is increasing in firm type t. 
Thus firm value, debt level, and bankruptcy probability are all positively related in this 
model. 
The signalling model explains market responses to the different types of security issues 
quite well. Debt issues signal good news (managers are confident about the future), and 
are greeted with a positive stock price response, while equity issues signal bad news 
(earnings will decline in the future), and are met with significant stock price declines. 
While this model, and the other signalling models that follow, are intuitively attractive, 
observed capital structure patterns suggest they are poor predictors of actual behaviour. 
As we have seen, leverage ratios are inversely related to profitability in almost every 
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industry. Furthermore, the signalling model predicts that industries rich in growth 
options and other intangible assets should employ more debt mature, tangible asset rich 
industries because growth companies have more server information asymmetry 
problems, and thus greater need to signal. As we know, exactly the opposite pattern is 
observed - asset rich companies use far more debt than do growth companies. 
3.5. EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The majority of capital structure research has focused on understanding the forces that 
influence the corporate financing behaviour of the United States, European firms, 
though they do consider various incompleteness of the capital market in some extent. 
Such as, Rajan and Zigales (1995) focus on the major industrial countries (G7) and their 
findings that high leverage can benefit company performance. 
Booth, Aivazian, Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) analyze the capital choices of firms in 
10 developing countries, and provide evidence that those decisions are affected by the 
same variables as those in developed countries. The ten developing countries include 
India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Brazil, Jordan, and 
Korea. There are five former British colonies, two Latin American countries with a 
common inflationary experience, and three others. Hence, as well as reflecting the 
Anglo-Saxon capital markets and the Continental-German-Japanese banking systems, 
there is a diversity of cultural and economic factors that should severely test whether 
extant capital structure models are portable. 
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The source of data collection is from the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The 
IFC data comprise abbreviated balance sheets and income statements for the largest 
companies in each country from 1980 to 1990, although all time periods are not 
available for every country. The IFC collects annual financial statements and in some 
cases stock price data, for a maximum of the 100 largest publicly traded firms in each 
country for which ongoing data were available throughout the sample period. In 
addition, this study applies the cross-section analysis to the data. 
The findings of the study suggest that although firms in developing countries have less 
long-term debt than do firms in developed countries and the role of specific capital 
structure determinants therefore may differ, there is little that is "special" about 
developing countries. The study's empirical models show results that would not look 
out of place in a similar study of firms from developed economies. Although capital 
structures do differ systematically across countries and country factors are clearly 
important, the financial factors that are important in developed countries are also 
important in developing countries. Thus, the study justifies the importance of factors 
like the tangibility of assets, firm size, the market-to-book ratio, business risk, and 
profitability variables in determining capital structure choice across countries. 
However, there are persistent differences across countries, indicating that specific 
country factors are at work. The findings suggest that although some of the insights 
from modem finance theory are portable across countries, much remains to be done to 
understand the impact of different institutional features on capital structure choices. 
Allayannis, Brown and Klapper (2003) analyze the relationship between capital 
structure and financial risk. They use a data set including eight East Asian countries' 
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non-financial companies to examine a firm's choice between local, foreign, and 
synthetic local currency (hedged foreign currency) debt. The study uses 327 largest East 
Asian corporations from 1996 to 1998. The sample spans the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
providing a unique natural experiment. The extreme depreciation of many regional 
currencies and the ensuing economic fallout is an example of an event that should reveal 
the risks associated with the use of alternative types of debt and, in particular, foreign 
currency debt. Thus, the crisis allows the study to measure directly changes in financial 
and operating performance associated with an exchange rate shock and relate these to 
the use of foreign currency debt. 
The study examines whether it is sufficient to study capital-raising decisions at an 
aggregate level or if analyzing the components of debt capital by currency denomination 
yields additional insights. It finds confirming empirical evidence, that there are unique 
motivations that determine the use of each debt type. Thus, examining aggregate capital 
structure might mask factors that affect only the mix of debt types. Similarly, factors 
that affect the aggregate capital structure choice may be the result of separate decisions 
concerning the choice and mix of debt types, not necessarily the result of a single 
decision regarding aggregate debt. 
The study exploits the Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to investigate the 
role of debt type in firm performance. It finds that the use of synthetic local currency 
debt is associated with the biggest drop in market value, possibly due to currency 
derivative market illiquidity during the crisis. 
In addition, the study identifies which factors are important for each type of debt. Some 
factors are related to only one type of debt, others to multiple types. For example, 
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variables related to risk management, agency costs, large external capital needs, and to 
the pecking order theory are important in explaining levels of foreign currency, but not 
natural local currency debt. On the other hand, size and market-to-book are related to 
levels of both foreign and natural local currency debt. Consistent with implications of 
the static trade-off theory, the direct costs of debt are important determinants for both 
local and foreign debt use. The study finds that the higher the difference in interest rates, 
the higher the level of foreign currency debt. These results are consistent with evidence 
that East Asian firms are likely to borrow in foreign currency in an attempt to exploit 
lower interest rates 
Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2004) analyze the capital structure of firms 
operating in the Asia Pacific region, in four countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Australia) with different legal, financial and institutional environments. The choice 
of these four countries is motivated by several factors. Firstly, they are all in the Asia 
Pacific region where the literature on the determinants of capital structure is sparse. 
Secondly, they have different institutional set-ups, such as financial markets, legal 
traditions, bankruptcy codes and corporate ownership structure. In particular, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Australia are members of the British Commonwealth and thus have some 
common attributes in accounting practices, corporate governance and corporate control. 
In addition, Thailand and Malaysia are emerging markets, while Singapore and 
Australia are more established markets. This diversity offers the opportunity to assess 
the effects of different environments on corporate financial decisions. Thirdly, they 
were hit in different degrees by the 1997 East Asian financial crisis: the crisis hit 
Thailand and Malaysia most severely; Singapore was also affected but its economy 
recovered more quickly, while Australia escaped it altogether. 
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The sample of the study includes all non-financial firms listed in the relevant national 
stock exchanges for which a continuous data set exists over the sample period. Hence 
the sample consists of 294 Thai, 669 Malaysian, 345 Singaporean, and 219 Australian 
firms for the period from 1993 to 2001. The firm-specific factors which are used in the 
study include Tangibility, Profitability, Firm Size, Growth Opportunity, Non-debt Tax 
Shield, and Earning Volatility. 
The regression results suggest that the capital structure decision of firms is influenced 
by the environment in which they operate, as well as firm-specific factors identified in 
the extant literature. The study finds that the importance of the determinants of capital 
structure varies across countries in the region. For instance, profitability has significant 
influence on the capital structure of Malaysian firms and firm size has no effect on 
Singaporean firms. These differences confirm that managerial decisions may be affected 
by country specific considerations. This inference is supported by the findings 
following the introduction of country dummy variables and country specific variables, 
such as the level of stock market's activity, interest rates, creditor's rights and 
ownership concentration. 
In addition, the financial crisis of 1997 is also found to have had a significant but 
diverse impact on fine's capital structure decision across the region. For instance, the 
relationship between leverage and firm specific variables such as firm size, growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shield, and liquidity, has altered between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods. 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) analyze the capital structures of foreign affiliates and 
internal capital markets of multinational corporations by using US multinational firms' 
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data. To what extent does corporate borrowing increase due to the tax deductibility of 
interest expenses and decline in response to costs imposed by capital market 
underdevelopment or unfavourable legal systems? Do firms use internal capital markets 
to substitute for external finance when the latter is costly, and if so, how extensive is 
such substitution? Empirical attempts to answer these fundamental questions face 
significant challenges. Limited variation in tax incentives within countries makes it 
difficult to identify the effects of taxes, and detailed information on the workings of 
internal capital markets is scarce. Previous empirical studies using cross-country 
samples exploit the rich variation that international comparisons offer, but frequently 
face problems associated with non standardized measurement across countries and 
limited statistical power due to small sample sizes. 
Cross-country studies of capital structure commonly ignore the distinctive and 
illuminating features of multinational firms. These firms face differing tax incentives 
and legal regimes around the world, making it possible to identify the impact of these 
factors on financing choices. Analysis of the behaviour of multinational firms promises 
clean estimates of the sensitivity of capital structure choice to tax incentives, an 
understanding of the mechanisms by which weak capital markets affect financing 
choices, and insight into the ways in which internal capital markets can facilitate tax 
minimization and provide an alternate financing source when external financing is most 
costly. 
The use of confidential affiliate-level data makes it possible to distinguish the behaviour 
of foreign affiliates of the same parent companies operating in markets with differing 
tax rates and capital market regimes and to differentiate the determinants of external 
borrowing and borrowing from parent companies. As a result, it allows the study to 
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obtain estimates of the impact of taxation and local capital market conditions, while 
implicitly controlling for considerations that are common to all affiliates of the same 
company. The sample of the study includes information on the activities of roughly 
3,700 U. S. multinational firms operating in more than 150 countries through 
approximately 30,000 affiliates in 1982,1989, and 1994. Since all reporting follows 
generally accepted U. S. accounting principles, and all financial information is filed 
through U. S. entities familiar with such practices, it is not necessary to make 
problematic assumptions normally required in order to analyze financial information 
collected in different countries. Furthermore, since the data distinguish borrowing from 
external sources and borrowing from parent companies. It is possible to study aspects of 
capital markets that are internal to firms. 
The study finds that higher local tax rates are associated with higher debt ratios, with 
internal borrowing being particularly sensitive to taxes. Multinational affiliates are 
financed with less external debt in countries with underdeveloped capital markets or 
weak creditor rights, reflecting significantly higher local borrowing costs. Multinational 
firms appear to employ internal capital markets opportunistically to overcome 
imperfections in external capital markets. 
Fan, Titman and Twite (2006) examine the capital structure and debt maturity choices 
of firms in a cross section of 39 developed and developing countries, focusing on the 
effect of the countries' public policies and institutional structures as corporate financing 
choices are determined by a combination of factors that are related to the characteristics 
of the firm as well as to the institutional environment. 
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The study examines a broader set of countries, providing more cross-sectional 
dispersion in the explanatory variables. Moreover, by including industry dummies, 
together with firm-level variables, it identify the variation in capital structure across 
countries that cannot be explained by either difference in the industrial mix across 
countries or by cross-country differences in firm-level characteristics. The study also 
examines a broader class of country-level explanatory variables and includes 
interactions between these variables and firm-level characteristics that allow the study 
to estimate how institutional differences between countries affect the cross-sectional 
variations in capital structures within the countries. 
The study presents evidence that indicates that firms operating within legal systems that 
provide better protection for financial claimants tend to have capital structures with less 
total debt, and more long term debt as a proportion of total debt. It finds that taxes and 
the characteristics of the institutions that supply capital have an influence on how firms 
are financed. The study finds that when dividends are more highly taxed, firms tilt their 
capital structures towards more debt. It also finds that firms in countries that are viewed 
as more corrupt tend to be more levered and use more short-term debt, and common law 
countries have lower leverage and use more long-term debt. 
The evidence shows that financial institutions, which provide capital to corporations, 
have an important influence on the type of capital that is used. Although the results 
regarding life insurance companies are somewhat mixed and difficult to interpret, the 
results that relate to the size of the banking sector are both strong and intuitive. 
Specifically, corporations in countries with large amounts of bank deposits tend to have 
shorter maturity debt, reflecting the preferences of banks to lend short-term. However, 
firms in more corrupt countries and/or with state controlled banking systems tend to use 
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more debt, in particular long-term debt, suggesting that the banking system may provide 
a channel for corrupt public officials to fund their cronies. The study also finds that the 
cross sectional determinants of leverage differ across countries. In particular, the 
relationship between profitability and leverage tends to be stronger in countries that 
have weaker shareholder protection. 
Jong, Kabir and Nguyen (2007) analyze the importance of firm-specific and 
country-specific factors in the leverage choice of firms from 42 countries around the 
world for the period 1997 to 2001. The study constructs a database of nearly 12,000 
firms including all types of firms (large and small). It analyzes the standard 
firm-specific determinants of leverage, such as firm size, asset tangibility, profitability, 
firm risk and growth opportunities. Besides, the study incorporates a large number of 
country-specific variables in the analysis, including legal enforcement, 
shareholder/creditor right protection, market/bank-based financial system, stock/bond 
market development, and growth rate in a country's gross domestic product (GDP). 
The study finds that firm specific determinants of leverage differ across countries. The 
results show that the impact of some factors like tangibility, firm size, risk, profitability, 
and growth opportunities are strong and consistent with standard capital structure 
theories across a large number of countries. Using a model with several firm-specific 
explanatory variables, the study finds a relatively large explanatory power of leverage 
regressions in most countries. 
However, a few determinants remain insignificant, and in some countries one or two 
coefficients are significant with an unexpected sign. Performing a simple statistical test, 
the study rejects the hypothesis that firm-specific coefficients across countries are equal. 
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It indicates that the often-made implicit assumption of equal firm-level determinants of 
leverage across countries does not hold. 
In addition, the study finds that there is an indirect impact of country specific factors on 
the capital structure of firms because country specific factors also influence the roles of 
firm specific determinants of leverage. The study observes that certain factors like GDP 
growth rate, bond market development and creditor right protection significantly 
explain the variation in capital structure across countries. Moreover, it finds 
considerable explanatory power of country-specific variables beyond firm-specific 
factors. 
The study then proceeds to measure the indirect impact of country-specific variables. 
The results consistently show the importance of country factors as the study documents 
significant effects of these via firm-specific determinants. For example, the study 
observes that in countries with a better law enforcement system and a more healthy 
economy, firms are not only likely to take more debt, but the effects of some firm-level 
determinants of leverage such as growth opportunities, profitability and liquidity are 
also reinforced. 
The study's findings indicate that the conventional theories on capital structure which 
are developed using listed firms in the United States as a role model, work well in 
similar economies with developed legal environment and high level of economic 
development. 
Few studies have been conducted which further our knowledge of capital structure 
within single countries that have different institutional structures. Hussain and 
Nivorozhkin (1997) examine the capital structure of listed firms in Poland to study the 
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determinants of leverage by using the early data of the Warsaw Stock Exchange from 
1991 to 1994. The objective of the study is to generate lessons from Poland's experience 
that may be useful for newly formed stock exchanges, such as those of the Baltic 
countries. 
The study describes Poland's financial sector in considerable detail and examines 
firm-level panel data for listed firms to study the determinants of leverage, with a view 
to exploring how firms choose among retained earnings, debt, and shares of stock. The 
estimation methods include the use of descriptive statistics, correlations, and panel 
regression techniques, with both pooled and variance components procedures. 
The study finds extremely low leverage levels for listed firms in Poland, suggesting a 
growing stock market and a potential reluctance of banks to grant loans to old and risky 
firms. Shareholder concentration has a neutral or even a beneficial influence on firm 
leverage. The author suggests that the nature of ownership may be primarily responsible 
for this finding. The study also finds that large, new, foreign-owned firms, and firms 
with strong cash positions have higher levels of leverage in Poland. These results for 
Poland suggest certain policy implications. The study suggests that authorities should 
promote large, new, foreign-owned firms, and those that have strong cash positions or 
high retained earnings in order to raise the degree of leverage. Efforts should be made to 
reduce the proportion of bad loans in banks' portfolio so that banks become willing to 
lend more, thereby raising the quality of leverage. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) presents empirical evidence on the determinants of the 
capital structure of non-financial Thai firms in 1996. The objective of this study is to 
investigate empirically the determinants of the Thai firms' capital structure based on 
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well known optimal capital structure theories, namely the tax based theory, the 
signalling theory, and the agency theory. The data sample includes 270 listed firms in 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996. The cross-section analysis is applied in this 
study. 
Empirical results imply that the tax effect, the signalling effect, and the agency costs 
play a role in financing decisions. The results indicate that taxes, bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs and information costs are important factors in the Thai firm's financing 
decisions. Non-debt tax shields, profitability have negative effects on debt-equity ratio. 
The results are consistent with the tax based model and the pecking order theory. The 
Thai corporate leverage ratio is positively related to firms' size and tangibility. The 
estimates of measure for firm risk, variation in sales are insignificant. 
Ownership structure also effect financial policy. Single-family owned firms have 
significantly higher debt level. Only in single-family owned firms does managerial 
shareholding have consistently positive influence on firm leverage. Finally large 
shareholders affect the debt ratio negatively, implying that they may monitor the 
management. 
Shah and Hijazi (2004) analyze the determinants of Pakistani firms' capital structure 
by using listed non financial Pakistani firms for five year period. This study attempts to 
answer the question of what determines the capital structure of Pakistani listed firms. 
This is the first thorough study to be conducted in Pakistan with regard to determinants 
of capital structure of listed non-financial firms. Even though Booth, et al. (2001) have 
worked on the determinants of capital structure of 10 developing countries including 
Pakistan; however, their study analyses data only for the firms that were included in the 
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Karachi Stock Exchange's KSE-100 Index from 1980 to 1987. This study uses a 
relatively large and new sample set including 445 listed non financial firms for the 
period 1997 to 2001. 
The study uses total debt ratio divided by total asset as a proxy for leverage, and it has 
four independent variables including Tangibility, Firm Size, Growth Opportunities, and 
Profitability. The pooled regression type of panel data analysis is used in the study. 
The results show that assets tangibility is positively correlated with debt. However, this 
relationship is not statistically significant. The study suggests that asset structure does 
not matter in determination of capital structure of Pakistani firms. This is in contrast to 
the previous empirical studies say that tangibility should be an important determinant of 
leverage. Size is measured by taking log of sales in the study which is positively 
correlated with leverage. The result shows that large Pakistani firms will employ more 
debt. The implication is that large firms consider themselves to have less chances of 
falling into financial distress and have more capacity to absorb shocks. One may also 
infer that fixed direct bankruptcy costs are smaller for large firms as a percentage of 
their total value; that is why they do not fear bankruptcy that much as the smaller firms 
do. 
Growth is measured by the annual percentage change in total assets which is negatively 
correlated with leverage. The study suggests that this result supports the simple version 
of pecking order theory that growing firms finance their investment opportunities first 
by their internally generated funds. However this does not support the extended version 
of pecking order theory. In addition, a Strong negative relationship is found between 
profitability and leverage. 
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Shah and Khan (2007) further analyze Pakistani listed companies by using a panel data 
set for the period from 1994 to 2002. The study by Shah and Hijazi (2004) was an 
improvement on the previous empirical studies as it included 445 non-financial firms 
listed on KSE for the period 1997-2001. However, it is basic in nature in terms of its use 
of pooled regression model avoiding the fixed effects and random effects models. This 
latest study by Shah and Khan is to extend the work of Shah and Hijazi (2004). It 
includes more years, using relevant models of panel data and including more 
explanatory variables. 
The study uses a balanced panel data set including 286 listed firms from 1993 to 2002. 
This study adds two new independent variables comparing to the previous one, which 
are Earning Volatility and Non-debt Tax Shields. For model selection, the study uses 
fixed effects panel data model to apply to the data. Using fixed effect dummy variable 
regression, the study finds that the coefficients for a number of industries were 
significant showing there were significant industry effects. 
The results of the study approve the prediction of trade off theory in case of tangibility 
whereas the earning volatility and depreciation fail to confirm to trade off theory. 
Profitability approves the predictions of pecking order theory. The result of size variable 
neither confirms to the prediction of trade off theory nor to asymmetry of information 
theory. 
This study uses relatively new and long time series data set. However, the cross-section 
data points (286 listed firms) are less than the previous study (445 listed firms) as two 
new variables require more data and the sample set has to keep balanced. If the study 
used unbalanced panel sample set, it would have a wider cross-section. In addition, only 
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fixed effects panel data model is used in the study. A comparison between fixed effects 
and random effects models would be an interesting topic for Pakistani listed companies. 
Medeiros and Daher (2004) present empirical evidence on the determinants of the 
capital structure of Brazilian firms from 1995 to 2002. The purpose of the study is to 
test the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory using Brazilian data in order to 
establish which theory best explains the capital structure of local firms. The study uses 
371 non-financial firms listed in the Brazilian stock markets from 1995 to 2002. The 
study uses static panel data models include both fixed effects and random effects 
models. 
The study tests both trade-off theory and pecking order theory, and it finds that the 
pecking order theory provides the best explanation for the capital structure of these 
Brazilian firms. The study suggests that the Brazilian capital market has a secondary 
role in the capitalization of Brazilian firms, both in terms of stock or debt issues. 
Besides, Brazil characterizes by having a relative small number of publicly listed firms 
and preferred stock makes the majority of shares. The theory of finance treats this type 
of stock as debt, whereas the Brazilian business regulations define it as equity. Hence, 
the pecking order theory should accept the issuing of preferred stock, since it represents 
debt, but in Brazil, it goes against the pecking order theory because it is regarded as 
equity. 
In addition, Brazilian interest rates, both short and long-term, are very high in real terms. 
This, together with credit restrictions and the incentive given to banks to invest in 
government bonds, there is a short supply of private credits. Long-term lending is 
virtually supplied by the BNDES (the state-owned development bank) only with 
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subsidized interest rates, which is a situation extremely favourable to the pecking order 
theory. 
Correa, Basso and Nakamura (2007) analyze the determinants of the capital structure 
of the largest Brazilian firms by using a panel data set. The study analyzes some factors 
that supposedly determine the level of leverage of firms in light of the two main theories 
pertaining to the subject - the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory - testing the 
empirical validity of these theories in Brazilian corporate scenario. It uses dynamic 
panel data models aimed to analyze the adjustment process of capital structure over time, 
toward a supposed optimal target level, as suggested in other studies that addressed the 
dynamic nature of decisions concerning capital structure. 
The study uses a panel data set includes 500 largest Brazilian companies, public or not, 
relating to the period from 1999 to 2004. It also applies both static panel data models 
including fixed effects and random effects, and dynamic panel data models to the data 
set. 
The results show a negative relation between leverage and the level of tangible assets, 
contradicting trade-off theory. They also demonstrate a negative relation between the 
profitability of firms and the leverage, confirming pecking order theory and 
contradicting trade-off theory. In addition, it demonstrates a positive relation between 
the risk and the level of leverage of firms, contradicting the main two theories about 
capital structure. The results indicate that although the business industry does not 
exhibit statistical relevance as a determinant of leverage, the level of leverage of the 
Manufacturing firms differs significantly both from the level observed in the Trade 
sector and from the level observed in the Transport and Telecommunication industry. 
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They also indicated that the capital origin exercises significant influence on the levels of 
leverage of firms, and that foreign companies are more in debt than national firms. 
The analysis suggests that the pecking order theory is more consistent than the trade-off 
theory to explain the capital structure of the largest Brazilian firms. The dynamic 
analysis showed a slow adjustment process of the capital structure towards the target 
level, suggesting the existence of high adjustment costs and confirming the Pecking 
Order behaviour of managers. 
Applied to Chinese firms, existing theories of capital structure may be quite improper. 
The reason for this is that such theories focus upon the typical modem economy. 
However, for a transitional economy such as China, capital markets are at their starting 
stage and there exist a lot of institutional constraints which usually do not exist in 
advanced economies. Firms in such situation, therefore, may respond these special 
constraints in ways which appear strange to orthodox theorists. 
Chen (2004) analyzed the determinants of capital structure of Chinese-listed companies. 
Chen (2004) is the first to study determinants of firm-level capital structure in China 
using a balanced panel of 77 publicly listed companies over the period 1994-2000. 
Identifying the determinants of capital structure for publicly listed Chinese companies is 
important because China is the largest developing and transitional economy in the world 
with institutional features likely to be quite distinct from both developed and most other 
developing countries. In particular, China has a less developed corporate bond market; 
Chinese firms face high agency costs, less bankruptcy risk (due either to serious 
principal agent problem during the transition period or to the fact that the dominant 
control of equity owners of non-circulating equity rest primarily with state-owned 
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investors or other influential private investors), and low income tax rate. These features 
tend to render the trade-off theory less applicable to Chinese firms. 
The study applies fixed effects, random effects, and pooled panel data models to the 
data. The independent variables include Tangibility, Profitability, Firm Size, Growth 
Opportunities, Earning Volatility, and Non-debt Tax Shields. It also measures dependent 
variables as overall leverage and long-term leverage. 
The study fmds that a difference between the capital choices of Chinese firms and firms 
in developed economies is that Chinese firms prefer short-term finance and have 
substantially lower amounts of long-term debt. To the extent that theories of capital 
structure explain capital choices of firms in developed countries, this difference, in 
long- versus short-term debt, might limit their explanatory power in China. It suggests 
that the theoretical underpinnings of the observed correlations are still largely 
unresolved. 
The results of this study shows that firm-specific factors that are relevant for explaining 
capital structure in developed economies are also relevant in China. However, neither 
the trade-off model nor the pecking order hypothesis derived from the western settings 
provides convincing explanations for the capital choices of Chinese firms. The capital 
choices decisions of Chinese firms seem to follow retained profit, equity, and then 
long-term debt. 
This study lays some groundwork to explore the determinants of capital structure of 
Chinese-listed companies. It also establishes a correspondence between corporate 
governance of the firms and capital markets. The study suggests that further work is 
required to develop new hypotheses for the capital choice decisions of Chinese firms 
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and to design new variables to reflect the institutional influence. In addition, a larger, 
comprehensive, and detailed database is also required for a further detailed capital 
structure study. 
Huang and Song (2006) used the market and accounting data from more than 1200 
Chinese listed companies covering the period from 1994 to 2003, to document the 
characteristics of these firms in terms of capital structure. The study documents the 
determinants of capital structure through the cross-sectional analysis. The independent 
variables are used in the study include Profitability, Tangibility, Tax, Firm Size, 
Non-debt Tax Shields, Growth Opportunities, Earning Volatility, and Ownership 
Structure. It also measures dependent variables as long-term debt ratio, total debt ratio, 
and total liabilities ratio. 
The results of the study show that Chinese listed firms tend to have much lower 
long-term debt. Compared with companies in other economies, Chinese-listed firms 
have much lower leverage, especially much fewer long-term debts, and their leverage 
has been rising year by year. The study suggests that one possible reason is that the 
bond market in China is very small and undeveloped. 
The study finds that the correlation between characteristics and leverage in Chinese 
state-controlled listed companies is similar to what has been found in other countries. 
As in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases with firm size, non-debt tax 
shields and fixed assets, and decreases with profitability and correlates with industries. 
Different from those in other countries, leverage in Chinese firms increases with 
volatility. It also finds that ownership structure affects leverage. 
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The results show that the static trade-off model rather than pecking order hypothesis 
seems better in explaining the features of capital structure for Chinese listed companies. 
The study provides evidence that Chinese companies consider tax effect in their 
financing decisions. It obtains such evidence by taking advantage of the fact that 
Chinese companies are subject to different income tax rates based on the nature of 
ownership and on where they are run. A company subject to 33% tax rate may have 
1.6% more long-term debt than that subject to 15% tax rate. 
The study uses a pooled panel data set including 1200 listed Chinese firms, and applies 
cress-section analysis. However, a balanced or unbalanced panel data set, and static or 
dynamic panel data models would provide more detailed analysis. 
Qian, Tian and Wirjanto (2007) examine determinants of the capital structure for 
publicly listed Chinese companies by using a panel data set with 650 publicly listed 
Chinese companies over the period of 1999 to 2004. 
The study estimates static panel data models of the firms' capital structure, with both 
unobserved cross-sectional and time effects as well as industry effects. Then the study 
posit that a firm's decision on capital structure is inherently dynamic, and formulate a 
dynamic panel data regression model, which is estimated using dynamic panel data 
generalized method of moments. There are six key variables that are used in the study as 
the determinants of a firm's capital structure, they are: Profitability, Firm Size, Tangible 
Assets, Non-debt Tax Shields, Growth Opportunities, Volatility, and Non-circulating 
Share Ratio. 
The result of the study shows that there is large and statistically significant lagged 
leverage effect on firm's current leverage, suggesting that there is a target debt-to-equity 
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ratio for publicly listed Chinese companies in the sample and thus the estimates 
obtained from the static panel data models are biased and inconsistent. However, the 
speed of adjustment toward the target level is estimated to be very slow. The study 
suggests that one reason for this is the fact that deviating from equilibrium is perceived 
to be not too costly for these publicly listed Chinese companies. 
The study also finds that publicly listed Chinese firms adjust toward an equilibrium 
level of debt ratio in a given year, but the adjustment process is very slow. The results 
also show that firm size, tangibility and ownership structure are positively associated 
with firm's leverage ratio, while profitability, non-debt tax shields, growth and volatility 
are negatively related to firm's leverage ratio. Lagged profitability has a small and 
positive impact on firm's leverage ratio. 
However, in using all sample firms in a balance panel, the study estimates the speed 
adjustment for all firms regardless of whether there are deviations of the firms' capital 
structures from their target levels and how far away the deviations are. To examine 
whether firms adjust toward an equilibrium leverage level, the study would need to 
investigate how firms rebalance their capital structures after they have experienced large 
changes in leverage since these firms are more likely to deviate from the equilibrium 
level and thus have greater incentives to make an adjustment. 
Ly Yue and Zhao (2007) analyze the role of ownership structure and institutional 
development in debt financing of non-publicly traded Chinese firms. This study focuses 
on debt financing of non-publicly traded firms. Different with large listed companies 
which have easier access to both domestic and international financial markets than their 
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non-listed counterparts, non-listed firms' capital structure decisions are less subject to 
the institutional constraints imposed by their home countries. 
The data covers the entire population of predominantly unlisted manufacturing firms 
tracked by the Chinese statistical authorities. The data in the study includes all SOEs 
regardless of their annual sales, and other manufacturing enterprises reporting more than 
five million yuan (approximately US$600,000) of annual sales. The study drops 
observations with negative values of total assets, total liabilities, and sales. The sample 
set includes 417,068 firm-year observations from 2000 to 2004. The pooled panel data 
model is applied in this study. 
The study finds that firm ownership structures are an important factor in determining 
Chinese firms' capital structure decisions. State ownership is positively associated with 
leverage and firms' access to long term debt, while foreign ownership is negatively 
associated with all measures of leverage. The result on state ownership is consistent 
with the Chinese government's dual roles as the (majority) shareholder of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as well as the owner of all major banks. Foreign ownership brings in 
not only capital and technology but also modem management and better governance 
practices. Moreover, foreign-owned firms are subject to lower corporate tax rates than 
their domestically-owned counterparts. The study shows that firms with high foreign 
ownership are not as highly levered as their Chinese-owned counterparts. 
The study also finds that firms in better developed regions are associated with reduced 
access to long term debt, suggesting the availability of alternative financing channels 
and the tightening of the lending standards under the on-going banking reform. 
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The study analyzes the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure 
from a different angle by using non-publicly traded firms. However, the sample set has 
a short time series (5 years), and it only uses pooled panel data model to apply the data. 
Using static or dynamic panel data models to apply a longer time series data set would 
have more interesting results. 
3.6. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the three major capital structure theories and the empirical 
studies both in industry countries and developing countries. The trade-off theory implies 
that, a trade-off between the benefits of debt use and the costs associated with it. For 
example, the trade-off between taxes advantages of debt and bankruptcy costs, or the 
trade-off between the reduction of free cash flow agency problems and the increase of 
underinvestment problems. The pecking order theory implies that, if outside financing is 
required, debt should be issued before equity. Only when company's debt capacity is 
reached should the company consider equity. 
Focus on the aims of this study, these capital structure theories will be applied to China 
in the following chapters. Next two chapters will introduce Chinese capital markets and 
the characteristics of listed companies, and chapter 6 will discuss how the capital 
structure theories can be applied to China. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN CHINA 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced foundation theories, capital structure theories, and some 
empirical studies. Those theories were argued and tested in western countries during the 
last forty years. Some studies, such as Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. 
(2001), also applied these theories to developing countries. However, because the 
institutional environment is different in developed countries, and it also different inside 
developing countries, the discussion about whether these theories can explain the 
country's capital structure vary depending on factors including social economic 
environment and legal systems. 
It is relevant to introduce Chinese financial markets and corporate financing in the 
beginning before discussing the capital structure of Chinese companies. The following 
two chapters will present an overview of Chinese financial markets including stock 
market and bond market, corporate financing, regulation and legal framework, and 
ownership structure. 
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Section 4.2 introduces an overview of Chinese financial markets. Section 4.3 presents 
Chinese intermediated markets and explains why short term lending is the main method 
for corporate financing. Section 4.4 introduces Chinese security markets, including 
equity and bond markets. Section 4.5 presents the regulation and legal framework. 
Finally, section 4.6 gives a summary of the chapter. 
4.2. OVERVIEW OF CHINESE FINANCIAL MARIETS 
The Chinese financial system is comprised of three components: banking sector, 
non-banking sector, and securities markets. China's banking sector is under the control 
of the Ministry of Finance (MoF). People's Bank of China (PBoC) is China's central 
bank. The bank system is comprised of three kinds of banks: state-owned commercial 
banks, policy banks, and other commercial banks. 
There are four major state-owned commercial banks in China. They are: the Bank of 
China (BoC), People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC), Industrial 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC). 
There are three policy banks who are responsible for policy lending, especially for new 
national fundamental investment projects. They are: State Development Bank (SDB), 
the Import and Export Bank of China (IEBC), and the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China (ADBC). The four biggest state owned commercial banks and three 
policy banks control 62% of all bank assets, were granted 56.6% of total loans, and took 
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59.6% of total deposits of all financial institutions in China at the end of 20023. The rest 
of the assets are controlled by other commercial banks and non-banking financial 
institutions, which are also state owned or state controlled. 
These commercial banks are classified into two kinds: national and regional. There are 
five national commercial banks, including Bank of Communications (BoCOM), Hua 
Xia Bank, and China Everbright Bank, and nine regional ones. 
Non-banking financial institutions include Urban Credit Cooperatives (UCCs), Rural 
Credit Cooperatives (RCCs), and Trust and Investment Companies (TICs). UCCs 
and RCCs mainly mobilize savings from rural and urban households and finance small 
and medium sized non-state enterprises. TICs engage in long-term debt or equity 
investments and in the financing of joint venture or other projects. There are more than 
5,000 UCCs and more than 50,000 RCCs which are allowed to engage in certain 
banking activities. Moreover, there were 133 securities companies and 34 fund 
management companies at the end of 2003. Securities markets include stock and bond 
markets. The structure of China's financial system is shown in Figure 4.1. 
China's securities markets have been developing since the 1980s, in tandem with the 
market reforms and the liberalization of the country's economy. In July 1981, issuance 
of treasury bonds was resumed in China. Six years later, a secondary market for the 
trading of treasury bonds was established. By the mid-1980s, enterprises started to issue 
corporate bonds and shares to the public. 
3 Calculation based on data from Almanac of China's Finance and Banking 2003 
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Figure 4.1 Structure of China's Financial System 
People's Bank of China (PBoC) 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) 
Banking Institutions Non-Banking Institutions I Securities Markets I 
State Commercial Banks 
I Policy Banks 
Other Commercial Banks I 
Trust and Investment Companies 
Urban Credit Cooperatives 
Rural Credit Cooperatives 
Other Financial Institutions 
Stock Markets 
I Bond Markets I 
In December 1990, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (SZSE) were established. China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) is the sole national securities regulatory body. It was mandated in October 
1992 to regulate all of China's securities markets. 
China's securities market offers seven types of financial instnunents, including: A 
shares4, B sharess, treasury bonds (T Bonds), treasury bond repurchases, corporate 
bonds, convertible bonds and securities investment funds. At the end of 2003, the total 
number of listed companies had increased to 1287 as compared with only 53 at the end 
of 1992. Total market capitalization amounted to RMB 4,245.8 billion, constituting 
36.21% of GDP of 2003. The balance of T -bonds at the end of 2003 was RMB 2,260 
4 Common shares denominated in RMB. Foreign investors may not own these shares. s Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated companies, denominated in US$ in Shanghai and 
HK$ in Shenzhen. Initially reserved for foreign investors domestic institutions and individuals make up 
the majority of trading. From June 2001, it also is denominated in RMB. 
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billion which constituted 19.28% of GDP. The balance of corporate bonds at the end of 
2003 was RMB 169.2 billion, constituting about 1.43% of GDP compared with US 
corporate bond market which constituted over 30%6 at the same time. 
4.3. INTERMEDIATED MARKETS IN CHINA 
Financial intermediation in China is still mainly dominated by bank loans. Although 
direct financing grew rapidly especially after the two stock exchanges were established, 
only a small amount of large state owned companies could finance the issuance of 
shares or corporate bonds. Most Chinese companies, especially medium and small size 
companies are still dependent on bank loans as the main or only way to finance. Bank 
loan financing remained a leading part of the financial structure. 
When companies want to finance projects from banks, there are generally two forms of 
project financing. The first is project financing without recourse. In this form of 
financing, repayment of the interest and principal of the loans depends solely on the 
performance of the project operation. At the same time, the lending bank acquires the 
property rights of the project assets as collateral for the loan. If the project fails to be 
completed or suffers operational losses and its assets or proceeds are inadequate to 
repay all the loans, the lending bank will have no recourse to the sponsor of the project. 
The second is project financing with limited recourse. In this form, with the operational 
revenue stream of the project as the source of repayment and property right as guarantee, 
6 Data for Chinese stock markets, T -bond market, and corporate bond market are from China Securities 
and Futures Statistical Yearbook 2004; Data for US corporate bond market is from the Bond Market 
Association, www. bondmarkets. com 
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the lending bank also requires a third party to guarantee the loans. Thus the lending 
bank has recourse to the third party guarantor. But the guarantor is only liable for the 
amount of the guarantee. So it is referred to as project financing with limited recourse. 
Chinese companies, especially listed companies, always guarantee each other to finance 
from banks. 
Table 4.1 shows the structure of financing in China from 1993 to 2004. In 2004, the 
share of bank loan financing accounted for about 82.9% of total capitalization of 
financing. Bank loans dominate the financing market and remain the major channel of 
financing in China. Stocks took 3.9%, and corporate bonds granted 1.1% of total 
financing respectively. 
Table 4.1 Structure of Bank Loan Financing and Direct Financing (%), 1993-2004 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
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Notes: Total denotes the total capitalization of financing 
By the end of 2004, China's banks had made cumulated RMB 15.9 trillion worth of 
loans. China's GDP was RMB 11.73 trillion in the same year. Bank loans were 135% of 
GDP, higher than the average of G-10 which was 89%7. The share of short-term loans 
accounted for about 48.96% and medium-term & long-term loans accounted for 43.25% 
7_ The data is from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
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of total loans respectively. Table 4.2 shows the structure of loans of financial 
institutions from 1998 to 2004. 
Table 4.2 Loans of Financial Institutions, 1998-2004 
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The table above shows that short-term loans are greater than long-term loans, in other 
words, short-term loans are in the majority as the financing source of Chinese 
companies. One explanation of why Chinese banks have low levels of long-term loans 
may be that short-term finance typically has better incentive properties compared with 
long-term finance. Although long-term finance allows companies to invest in more 
advanced technologies, it may not provide an immediate pay-off. Furthermore, 
short-term fmance allows suppliers of capital to monitor and control the borrowing of 
companies more effectively. In China, there are two main reasons leading banks prefer 
short term lending to medium and long term lending: (1) Debtor bankrupt and banks' 
non-performing loans (NPLs); (2) Inflexible interest rates and credit ratings. 
Firstly, debtor bankruptcies and debt recovery are serious problems for Chinese banks. 
Years of government directed lending, which mainly was policy lending to state owned 
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companies, has presented Chinese banks with large amounts of non-performing loans 
(NPLs). According to PBoC's report, NPLs account for 21.4 percent to 26.1 percent of 
total lending of China's four big state-owned banks in 2002. Creditors often have 
difficulty recovering debts from bankrupt companies which are mainly state owned 
companies. 
Current policy requires that money recovered from a bankrupt company be used to 
settle employees first and bank creditors have priority over non-bank creditors for the 
remaining money, if any. As there is often little money left after employee settlements, 
state-owned banks, which are the main creditors, are often hit hard by bankruptcies. 
These banks therefore often oppose companies' efforts to file for bankruptcy or will 
only accept bankruptcy under the government's planned programme. 
Even for enterprises whose financial situation warrants an application for bankruptcy, it 
is rare for banks or other creditors to initiate such an application. For non-bank 
creditors,, the difficulties are even more daunting. In many bankruptcies, the rights of 
these creditors are completely cancelled to allow for the settlement of employees. Other 
creditors may be fortunate enough to recover their debt at a very low rate. 
Secondly, when companies finance from banks, the most important cost, the interest rate, 
is not flexible in China. PBoC is the regulatory body which regulates banks and makes 
policies since 1995 by taking over the supervisory role of the MoF. Table 4.3 lists the 
interest rate on loans of financial institutions from 1990 to 2004. Short-term interest 
rates decreased from the peak 12.06% in 1995 which was the most over-heated 
economic year, to 5.58% in 2004. Long-term interest rates also decreased from 15.3% to 
6.12% during the same period. Both short-term and long-term interest rates decreasing 
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to a five percent level, was the macro financial policy of PBoC to stimulate lending and 
investment. However, banks are not allowed to decide their own interest rate within a 
range regulated by PBoC. Banks only have the right to decide whether the borrower's 
application is approved or not and the listed companies generally are regarded as the 
best companies in China, which are large, profitable, and have government background. 
Table 43 Nominal Interest Rates on Loans of Financial Institutions from 1990 to 2004 (%) 
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Notes: (1) The lending rate could be 10% higher or 10% lower than nominal interest rates for rural credit 
cooperatives, the lending rate could be 40% higher or 10% lower than nominal interest rates. (2) As of 
November 1998, the lending rate for small-sized enterprises could be 20% higher than nominal interest 
rates, and the lending rate for medium- and large- sized enterprises could be 10% higher than nominal 
interest rates. For all financial institutions, the lending rate could be 10% lower than nominal interest rates, 
while, for rural credit cooperatives, the lending rate could be 50% higher than nominal interest rates. (3) 
As of September 1999, the lending rate for medium- and small-sized enterprises could be 30% higher 
than nominal interest rates; for large-sized enterprises, the lending rate could be as much as 10% higher 
than nominal interest rates. For all financial institutions, the lending rate could be 10% lower than 
nominal interest rates. 
In addition, interest rates are decided by the PBoC rather than by market forces such as 
the borrower's credibility. Credit risk management is an undeveloped part of Chinese 
banking at the moment. Almost all banks still use financial ratio analysis as the major 
method which only analyses financial statements and financial ratios, but not internal 
quantitative analysis systems which use quantitative models monitoring default 
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probability and calculating expected and unexpected losses, to measure credit risk. 
Banks are not able to decide an appropriate or flexible interest rate on loans for different 
type of borrowers which have different credit levels. 
These reasons lead banks to choose short term lending because it is easier to control and 
monitor. In addition, some short-term loans are kept by companies after the expiry date 
for another one-year term. This kind of rolling over of short term loans happens 
normally and broadly in China. 
4.4. SECURITY MARKETS IN CHINA 
Direct financing is usually carried out through security markets including both equity 
markets and bond markets. The corporatisation of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) has 
driven the change in China's financial system. As a result, two capital markets, 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), began to 
emerge in the early 1990s and have developed rapidly since the late 1990s. The 
emergence of stock markets has brought a dramatic change to corporate financing 
strategy, which will be introduced in subsection 4.4.1. In addition, subsection 4.4.2 will 
explain why Chinese debt markets lag behind equity markets. 
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4.4.1. Equity Markets in China 
There are two types of shares, A shares and B shares, trading in SZSE and SHSE. A 
Shares are common shares which are dominated in RMB. B Shares' face value is 
denominated in RMB, but B shares are subscribed and traded in foreign currencies. 
Shares in registered companies in mainland China are listed in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange which are called H shares. H shares are not traded in mainland China. The 
details of listing requirements for A shares and B shares are introduced in Appendix A, 
and as a comparison, highlighting listing requirements for the London Stock Exchange 
are also presented in Appendix B. 
Table 4.4 shows the shares categories of listed companies from 1990 to 2005. By the 
end of 2005, cumulated 1442 companies were listed, of which 1259 companies issuing 
A shares only, 26 companies issuing B shares only, 87 companies issuing both A shares 
and B shares, and 70 companies issuing both A and H shares. 
Table 4.5 shows the summary of raised capital by both A shares and B shares from 1991 
to 2003. By the end of 2003, cumulated capital raised by A shares was RMB 761.7 
billion in total, while B shares had issued a total of RMB 32.5 billion, constituting 4.1% 
of the total capital raised by shares. 
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Table 4.4 Summary of Listed Companies by Shares Categories (1990-2005) 
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4.4.2. Bond Markets in China 
China's bond market consists of the inter-bank bond market and the exchange-traded 
bond market. Most of the bonds are Treasury bonds (T bonds), or financial bonds8, 
with only a small number of corporate bonds. 
Inter-bank Bond Market 
The inter-bank bond market, as a quote-driven over-the-counter (OTC) market, is the 
most important platform for block trading of bonds among financial institutions. It is 
also the platform for open market operations conducted by PBoC. The major 
participants in the inter-bank bond market are: PBoC, commercial banks, securities 
companies, insurance companies, securities investment funds and credit cooperatives. 
Non-financial institutions may entrust commercial banks to trade on their behalf in the 
inter-bank bond market. Certain commercial bank participants have been allowed to set 
up counters at their branches to target individual investors, who are allowed to buy and 
sell bonds at these counters. This is sometimes referred to as the "Commercial Bank 
OTC Market". This market is relatively new and still in its infancy. 
The major products in the inter-bank bond market are: T -bonds, financial bonds and a 
small amount of central bank bills. As of the end of 2003, the outstanding T -bonds, 
financial bonds and the central bank bills in this market amounted to RMB 1,749.1 
billion, RMB 1,160.8 billion and RMB 337.7 billion respectively. 
a Bonds issued by policy banks: SDB, IEBC, and ADBC. 
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Exchange-traded Bond Market 
The exchange-traded bond market refers to the bond markets on the two domestic stock 
exchanges SZSE and SHSE. It is an order-driven market, where the major participants 
are comprised of securities companies, insurance companies, securities investment 
funds, trust and investment companies, credit cooperatives, other non-financial 
institutional investors and individual investors. The PBoC does not trade in this market, 
and the commercial banks are not allowed to access this market yet. 
The major products in the exchange market are T -bonds, corporate bonds and a small 
amount of convertible bonds. As of the end of 2003, the T -bonds listed amounted to 
RMB 354.4 billion, corporate bonds RMB 36.4 billion, and convertible bonds RMB 
20.9 billion. Table 4.6 shows the summary of bonds issuance from 1990 to 2003. By the 
end of 2003, the balance of T -bonds, financial bonds, and corporate bonds in both 
markets amounted to RMB 2260.4 billion, RMB 1165 billion and RMB 861.63 billion 
respectively. 
Convertible bonds have been traded since 1998. A total of 26 convertible bonds are 
listed on two stock exchanges9. By the end of 2003, the total capital raised by 
convertible bonds was RMB 26.91 billion. In 2003, the amount of convertible bonds 
issued were RMB 18.1 billion. 
In addition, corporate bonds are guaranteed by other state agencies or a state owned 
bank, not by the government. Maturities range from 3 to 20 years. Coupon rates are 
generally between 150 and 250 basis points above the state-mandated 1-year bank 
deposit rate. 
9 By the end of 2003,13 convertible bonds are traded in SHSE, 13 are traded in SZSE. 
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Table 4.6 Issuing Summary of Bonds, 1990-2003 (RMB 100 million) 
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There are 9 licensed domestic credit rating agencies in China10. International credit 
agenciesl l only rate China's internationally traded T -Bonds, not domestically traded 
RMB issues. 
Almost all listed corporate bonds carry a domestic AAA credit rating; a few bonds are 
rated AA or AA+, which are all rated by Chinese domestic rating agencies12. Usually, 
the credit rating of corporate bonds must not be higher than the guarantor's credit rating 
10 They are: China Chengxin Securities Rating, Dagong International Rating, Shenzhen Rating Services, 
Yunnan Rating Services, Great Wall Credit Rating, Shanghai Far East Rating Services, Shanghai New 
Century Investment Services, Liaoning Rating, Fujian Credit Rating Committee. 
I' Such as: Moody's, Standard&Poors, and Fittch 
12 Data are from the issuance announcement of corporate bonds. 
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(In China, the guarantor is a state owned bank or an agency of the state). However, 
according to the data from S&P, the highest rating for the big-four Chinese commercial 
banks' long term deposits is A (Moody's rated A2) at the moment 13. The corporate 
bonds which are guaranteed by these banks are mostly higher than A rating14. It makes 
corporate bond investors confused because of the unclear credit rating results (Domestic 
rating agencies do not open their rating methods to the public). 
As one of the most important risk factors for corporate bond investors, credit risk is 
difficult to monitor and control by using credit rating in China, which is not issued by 
independent international credit agencies. This problem causes investors to be afraid to 
hold corporate bonds. 
4.5. REGULATION AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This section will introduce regulation and legal framework for Chinese financial 
markets. The regulatory body subsection introduces the responsibility, objectives, and 
composition of the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Regulation 
framework includes some important laws which have been issued in recent years. 
13 Rating action on August 2005 by Standard&Poors. 
14 Data is from Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
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4.5.1. Regulatory Bodies 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) was officially launched on 28 April 
2003, to take over the supervisory role of the PBOC. The goal of this landmark reform 
is to improve the efficiency of bank supervision and to help the PBoC to further focus 
on the macro economy and currency policy. CBRC is responsible for "the regulation 
and supervision of banks, asset management companies, trust and investment 
companies as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions. Its mission is to 
maintain a safe and sound banking system in China. "15 
To meet the growing demand for centralized securities regulations, the State Council 
established the State Council Securities Committee (SCSC) and the China Security 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 1992. The SCSC and the CSRC have assumed 
responsibility at national level for overseeing and administrating the securities markets 
from the PBOC and local regulators in Shanghai and Shenzhen. The SCSC, consisting 
of senior officials of several government agencies, is a policy making body responsible 
for making rules for the overall guidance of China's securities markets and operations, 
while the CSRC is the administrative arm of the SCSC, responsible for supervising 
securities operations and implementing securities laws and regulations. At the same 
time CSRC issues permits for individual transactions such as account openings, RMB 
bonds and shares and foreign exchange borrowing or placement for state or collectively 
owned companies. 
Is CSRC www. csrc. org. cn 
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The CSRC began operations in 1993 by issuing Interim Regulations on the 
Administration of the Issue and Trading of Shares, which replaced the provisional 
regulation promulgated by various local authorities. These regulations prescribe issuing 
requirements and acceptable practices in the primary and secondary markets. According 
to these regulations the PBoC has retained its role in licensing securities companies, but 
the CSRC sets the conditions of eligibility and capital requirements and supervises these 
companies' daily operations. Similarly, the MoF licenses accounting companies and 
their professionals, but the CSRC sets the eligibility requirements and supervises their 
activity. 
4.5.2. Regulation Framework 
At the core of China's legal framework of financial markets are four pieces of 
legislation: Commercial Banking Law, Bankruptcy Law, Company Law, Securities Law 
and Securities Investment Fund Law. 
In 1995, the Commercial Banking Law was published. It provides commercial banks 
with greater operational autonomy, prevents commercial banks from making 
investments in non-bank financial businesses, and protects customers' privacy and other 
interests. The law also sets the legal basis for three new so-called policy banks to make 
loans in support of various government policies, taking over much of the burden from 
the four major state banks. In fact, the old creaking state banks were mired in bad debt, 
and government restrictions on lending and interest rates are blocking their efforts to 
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become commercially viable. 
The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China (Trial 
Implementation) was enacted by the National Peoples Congress (NPC) Standing 
Committee in 1986 and became effective in 1988. However, it is difficult to declare a 
company bankrupt, because almost all companies, especially listed companies, are still 
state-owned companies (SOEs). Highly indebted SOEs do not have funds to pay for 
social claims, but are unlikely to be allowed to go bankrupt. Even under the capital 
structure optimization program (CSOP) where the allocated land use right can be used, 
the total assets are frequently insufficient to cover compensation costs in a potential 
SOE bankruptcy, and some municipalities lack budgetary funds to fill the gap. This is 
particularly the case in cities with an old industrial base, many insolvent SOEs, and an 
aged workforce. 
On October 28,2003, the Securities Investment Fund Law was passed by the People's 
Congress of China. The Law stipulates the provisions regarding fund managers, 
custodians, the placement and trading of funds, subscription and redemption of funds, 
operations and information disclosure, modification and termination of contracts, 
liquidation of funds, rights and interests of fund holders and their exercising, 
supervision and administration of funds, and legal liabilities, etc. 
The legal framework is supplemented by other regulations, administrative rules, 
departmental rules, guidelines, and codes. By the end of 2003, there were over 300 such 
regulations in force. 
The details of regulations are listed in Appendix C, which includes three parts: (1) 
regulations regarding securities offering, listing, and disclosure; (2) regulation on 
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corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions of listed companies; (3) regulations of 
market intermediaries. 
4.6. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced Chinese financial markets and regulation framework. It 
presented the environment of corporate financing in China, explained why bank loan 
financing is so important for companies. It also discussed the importance of stock 
markets for corporations. 
Apart from corporate financing, another important character affecting Chinese 
companies, is ownership. Because most listed companies were state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) before going public, the government is still the biggest shareholder in these 
listed companies. Ownership structure will be introduced in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE IN CHINA 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Finance theory suggests that companies' choices of capital structure depend on the 
existence of agency costs and asymmetric information. The extent to which these costs 
can be mitigated by ownership structures and financial contracts depends on both 
company characteristics and institutions in the economy that facilitate monitoring and 
enforcement of financial contracts. Because company ownership structures and the legal 
and financial systems differ across countries, it is possible that ownership structures and 
the quality of institutional frameworks can be as important as company characteristics in 
explaining cross-country differences in capital structure choices. 
According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large shareholdings or majority ownership, 
are relatively uncommon in the US and UK. At the same time, large commercial banks 
often control major companies in Germany and Japan. In some Europe countries (e. g., 
Italy, Finland, and Sweden), as well as Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa, firms 
are typically controlled by families. Faccio and Lang (2002) find that the level of the 
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government shareholding is well below family shareholding in the stock-market-driven 
economies, bank-driven economies, and the crony capitalistic economies. 
In China, the essential goal to establish stock markets is to fund restructuring of the 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Unavoidably, most of the listed companies in China 
are state owned. This chapter finds out what is different in China, introduces the 
ownership structure of Chinese listed companies, and corporate control in China 
including insider control, institutional investors, and board structure. 
Section 5.2 introduces the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure. 
Section 5.3 presents ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. Section 5.4 
introduces corporate control of Chinese listed companies. Finally, section 5.5 gives a 
summary of the chapter. 
5.2. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
Barton and Gordon (1988) has looked to a managerial perspective in an attempt to 
provide an explanation for the variations in capital structure. Under the managerial 
perspective, the capital structure decision is not only determined by internal and 
external contextual factors which impact on the basic concerns of risk and controls, but 
the values, goals, preferences and desires of managers are also important inputs to the 
financing decision. 
Employing the rationale underlying the agency theory framework, theoretical and 
empirical studies have suggested that managers, who have non-diversifiable human 
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capital invested in the firm, have incentives to reduce their non-diversifiable 
employment risks by ensuring the continued viability of the firm (Amihud and Lev 
1981). One method of reducing the non-diversifiable employment risk is by decreasing 
the firm's debt holdings (Friend and Lang 1988). 
Recent developments in agency theory also suggest that the structure of corporate 
ownership can affect firm performance by mitigating agency conflicts between 
management and shareholders (Putterman 1993). Firms differ in terms of the degree to 
which ownership is concentrated among corporate insiders and external investors. 
Moreover, the distribution of ownership among different groups can impact on 
managerial opportunism which subsequently has implications for managerial behaviour 
and corporate performance. 
The managerial approach to capital structure and the managerial self-interest hypothesis 
suggests that corporate financing decisions are influenced by managers' adverse 
incentives and the incentive for managers to act opportunistically can be influenced by 
the structure of equity ownership (Demsetz 1983, Shleifer and Vishny 1986, Agrawal 
and Mandelker 1990 and Prowse 1992). Consequently, the distribution of equity 
ownership may be related to capital structure. 
Large shareholders, especially the controlling large shareholders, have enormous power 
in influencing corporate policy. Capital structure decisions, as one important corporate 
policy, are certainly affected by the controlling large shareholder's preferences. The 
previous literature has extensively documented the positive role played by debt and 
ownership concentration in capital structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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5.3. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE OF CHINESE LISTED 
COMPANIES 
The rules governing the formation and operation of shareholding companies are laid out 
in Company Law. Accordingly, shareholding companies may take two forms: relatively 
small limited liability companies (LLCs) with a minimum registered capital of 
RMB100,000 and a minimum of two shareholders; or limited liability shareholding 
companies (LLSCs) with a minimum required initial capital of RMB 10 million and a 
minimum of five shareholders. LLSCs may raise funds through initial public offering 
(IPO) and stock market listing. On paper, the Chinese listed company is very much like 
a modern corporation in the West. It has four essential features (Lardy, 1998): 
  The enterprise is an independent legal person, separated from its owners (including 
the state); 
  The owners' liability is limited to their equity contribution; 
  Ownership equities are transferable; 
  The board of directors is responsible for hiring and firing the managers. 
However, most Chinese listed companies were SOEs before listed. The state still 
controls them by keeping large number of shares (state owned shares). These kind of 
state owned shares combine with other so-called legal person shares are not publicly 
traded. The government has the absolute controlling rights of these listed companies. On 
the other hand, management shareholdings or employee shares are relatively small. This 
section will explain observed Chinese listed companies' ownership structure by using a 
large data set including all listed companies from 1992 to 2005. 
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5.3.1. Categories of Chinese Listed Companies' Ownership 
There are mainly four categories of owners for most Chinese listed companies, they are: 
State Owned Share, Legal Person Share, Internal Employees Share, and Tradable Share. 
The shareholdings by the first three are not publicly traded. The legal person shares 
include sponsor's legal person shares, social legal person shares, and foreign legal 
person shares. 
  State-owned shares are owned by either central government or local government. 
State-owned shares are not allowed for trading at the two exchanges, but 
transferable to domestic institutions, upon approval of CSRC. In many of the listed 
companies, the state is the largest or majority shareholder. At the end of 2005, state 
owned shares were 361 billion shares, constituting 47.38% of total issued shares 16. 
  Legal person shares are owned by domestic legal entities which are the state 
owned institutions described earlier. Both state shares and legal person shares are 
not permitted to be traded in the stock exchanges. The distinction between state and 
legal person shareholders is in many cases superficial. State shares are held by 
government bodies such as state asset management agencies, or institutions 
authorized to hold shares on behalf of the state such as a wholly state-owned 
investment company. Legal person shares are shares held by any entity or 
institution with a legal person status, including an SOE or a company controlled by 
an SOE. Legal person shares also include foreign legal person shares which are 
16 All data showed for the four categories is from CSRC's website, and the percentages are calculated by 
Author. 
, 
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held by foreign legal person or institutions. Legal person shares constituted 13.75% 
of total shares at the end of 2005. 
  Employee owned shares are issued to employees of the issuing firm and are only 
allowed to trade three years after the IPO if the company can get CSRC's approval. 
These share offerings are designed more like a benefit to employees than as an 
incentive scheme. Employee shares are registered under the title of the labor union 
of the company which also represents shareholding employees to exercise their 
rights. 
  Tradable shares are those owned by individual investors, including A shares, B 
shares, and H shares'7. The ratio of tradable shares to total shares was 38.20% at the 
end of 2005. 
Table 5.1 shows the ownership categories and shareholding of Chinese equity capital 
from 1992 to 2005. As the table shows, non-tradable shares and tradable shares 
accounting for respectively 61.80% and 38.20% of all shares among listed companies 
by the end of 2005. State owned shares and A shares are two main parts of all types of 
shares, which account for 47.37% and 29.90% respectively. Three kinds of legal person 
shares, which include sponsor's legal person shares, social legal person shares and 
foreign legal person shares, accounted for 105 billion shares (13.76% of total 
outstanding shares) by the end of 2005. 
On the other hand, employee shares are relatively small. The highest year for employee 
shares' proportion is 1998, which accounted for only 2.05% (5.17 billion shares) of total 
shares. The lowest level is 0.05% (0.397 billion shares) in 2005. 
17 The definisions of A, B, and H shares were introduced in chapter 4. 
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Table 5.1 Ownership Categories and Shareholding (100 million shares). 1992-2005 
1992 1993 1994 1993 19% 1997 199E 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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Noar. (1) H shares covered the 30 overseas-listed companies which issued both A shares and H shares. 
(2) Others include transferred rights issues, shares placed to investment funds and strategic investors, etc. 
In addition, Figure 5.1 shows the trend of the proportion for these four kinds of 
ownership from 1992 to 2005. It showed that the proportion of non-tradable shares was 
between the range of 60% and 70%. Although it decreased to 61.80% in 2005, it is still 
the biggest part in the ownership structure. As the most important part of non-tradable 
shares, state owned shares' proportion seems not stable during the period, which was in 
the range between 30% and 50%. It reached its peak level 49.06% in 1993, and then 
decreased to its lowest level 31.52% in 1997. In recent years, it became stable. The 
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figure showed that it stood on 47.37% in 2005.18 Indeed, according to the data from 
SZSE and SHSE, 940 listed companies were state controlled at the end of 2005, 
constituting 73.04% of total listed companies. 
Figure 5.1 Proportion of different type of Share Ownership 
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Tradable shares' proportion was in a range between 30% and 40%, and the trend was 
increasing. It is owned by individual investors, including A shares, B shares, and H 
shares. The recent proportion was 38.20% in 2005, which was historically the highest 
level. As the biggest part of tradable shares, A shares has almost doubled its proportion 
of the total outstanding shares. It increased from its lowest 15.87% in 1992 to the 
highest level 29.90% in 2005.19 
In summary, the study found that Chinese equity capital had a high percentage of 
non-tradable shares, and although its proportion is decreasing, it still accounts for over 
19 
The calculations of percentage are based on table 5.1. The results are only for A shares, not including B and 11 shares. They are calculated by using table 5.1's figures. 
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60% of total shares. As the main part of non-tradable shares and the most important 
characteristic of Chinese listed companies' ownership structure, state owned shares have 
become a higher proportion of total shares. It has increased significantly during the last 
10 years. Tradable shares has less than 40% proportion, but it is still increasing, 
especially A shares. 
531. Observed Chinese Listed Companies' Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has been discussed by using the 
proportion of total outstanding shares. On the other hand, what is the situation for an 
'individual 
listed company? How much is the average proportion of non-tradable shares 
and tradable shares for these listed companies? Does the government control these 
companies? All these questions will be explained by observed results of Chinese listed 
companies' ownership structure, which uses this study's data set covering all Chinese 
listed companies from 1992 to 200520 The data set includes: 
  Percentage of non-tradable shares 
  Percentage of state owned share 
  Percentage of sponsor's legal person share 
  Percentage of foreign legal person share 
  Percentage of social legal person share 
  Percentage of internal employee share 
" Percentage of tradable shares 
20 The data is coUected and calculated by Author. It is downloaded from SZSE www. szse. cn and SHHSE 
www. MUMM 
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Table 51 shows the summary statistics of the data set, including all types of 
non-tradable shares and tradable shares of Chinese listed companies. The mean of the 
percentage of non-tradable shares and tradable shares of all listed companies are 
61.92% and 38.08% respectively. Within non-tradable shares, two types of highest 
percentage shares are state owned shares and social legal person shares, constituting 
36.63% and 14.24% of total shares respectively. These two types of shares compose the 
main part of non-tradable shares. 
Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of the Ownership Structure (all listed companies. 1992-2005) 
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The mean of the percentage of employee shares is about 0.98%. This figure includes 
managerial shares and other employee shares. Based on the same data set, a further 
survey of managerial shares shows only 14.62% listed companies' managers hold shares, 
and the average proportion is 0.05% of total shares. The situation of Chinese listed 
companies' managerial shares is that over 85% managers do not hold companies' shares, 
which causes high agency costs, and will be discussed in later chapters. 
Figure 5.2 presents the distribution of non-tradable shares, tradable shares, state owned 
shares, and A shares respectively. The distribution graph for non-tradable shares shows 
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that most individual listed companies are in the range between 60% and 70% (very 
similar with the previous result of the proportion for outstanding shares). But it also 
shows that there are some companies that do not have non-tradable shares. The number 
of these companies is less than 1% of the total sample. 
Figure 5.2 Distribution of different type of Share Ownership 
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The distribution of tradable shares also shows the similar results we discussed earlier, 
that most listed companies have 30% to 40% tradable shares of their total shares. It 
shows some companies may have 100% tradable shares, which means that they are fully 
publicly traded. In addition, the result for A shares is very similar with tradable shares. 
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The interesting result is state owned shares. It shows that there are a large number of 
listed companies which do not have state owned shares. On the other hand, the 
remaining companies have a wide range of state owned shares, which is mainly between 
25%and75%. 
For further explanation, Figure 5.3 shows sample proportions of state owned shares. 21 
The data is classified by 10 different ranges. The pie chart shows that there are 21.78% 
of total samples that do not have state owned shares (0%). Only about 1% samples have 
state owned shares of over 80% of their total outstanding shares. Most samples are 
concentrated within the range between 30% and 70%, especially from 50% to 70%, 
which has about 30% samples. 
Figure 53 Sample Proportions of State Owned Shares 
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To conclude the discussion above, the study found: firstly, there is a large proportion of 
non-tradable shares in China, which accounts for about 60% of total outstanding shares; 
21, The result is calculated based on the sample dataset. 
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secondly, over half of these non-tradable shares are state owned shares; thirdly, the 
distribution of these state owned shares is unbalanced. There are about 20% of listed 
companies that do not have state owned shares. On the other hand, about 30% of listed 
companies have 50% to 70% of their outstanding shares as state owned shares. 
5.4. CORPORATE CONTROL IN CHINA 
The previous section discussed the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. It 
also found some interesting results about state owned shares. A number of issues remain, 
how is corporate control exercised in these listed companies, and how does it relate to 
ownership structure? What is the board structure in China? What is the role of 
institutional investors in corporate control? This section will further discuss and answer 
these questions. 
Insider Control 
In China, most listed companies are re-structured SOEs. Despite the fact that many 
SOEs become public listed companies and private companies are contributing 
significantly to China's GDP on aggregate, the government is still the largest 
shareholder. According to the discussion in the previous section, approximately 50% of 
total shares are owned by the state. About 35% of listed firms have state ownership, and 
most of these companies have the state as its largest shareholder. Indeed, over 10% of 
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the listed companies are state controlled22. Although the majority of shareholders are 
individual holders of tradable A shares, the personal ownership of each individual 
shareholder is very small. 
Currently, the ownership structure in China is not optimal because state and legal person 
ownership is high and concentrated. On average, the largest three shareholders have 
held over half of issued shares, while the largest 10 shareholders have held over 60% of 
the issued shares23. As the state retains a controlling shareholding in a large amount of 
listed companies, the government could exercise its control over various functions of 
these listed companies. 
To optimise the ownership structure of listed companies, to increase the independence 
and reduce insider problems, the Chinese government has started to reduce state 
shareholding progressively. If China converts state shares into more individual shares, it 
will allow more investors (including institutional) to actively monitor the management 
of a listed company. 
In 2001, the government allowed more private enterprises to raise capital in the stock 
markets by public offering and a large number of such enterprises were listed. With 
China's access to WTO in late 2002, the policy to allow foreign investors to acquire the 
state and legal person shares of listed companies was revised. In the long run, it is 
believed that as much state ownership as possible should be converted to individual 
shares, and all shares should be made tradable ultimately24. 
u Here, company which has more than 50% state owned shares is defined as state controlled company. 
The result is calculated by using same dataset of previous section's case study. 
23 The figures are calculated by using previous chapter's data set. 
24 A new wave of reducing state shareholding process has started since the beginning of 2006. 
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Board Structure in China 
An appropriate ownership structure merely provides a good foundation for building good 
corporate governance. Chinese Company Law requires that there are three governance 
bodies: shareholders' general meetings, a board of directors and a supervisory board. 
Chinese listed companies operate a two-tier board structure consisting of a Board of 
Directors (BoD) and a Supervisory Board (SB). This two-tier board structure differs 
radically from the Anglo-Saxon unitary board model, but it also differs from the 
Germanic two-tier board system. While the German SB has the power to appoint and 
dismiss board directors, the Chinese SB does not. 
According to Chinese Company Law, a shareholders' general meeting (SGM) is the 
highest decision-making authority of a firm. The function of the shareholders' general 
meeting is to decide on the directions of the company's business strategies, financial and 
investment plans, and nomination of the board of directors and supervisors. 
In theory, all shareholders of a firm should attend the shareholders' general meetings. In 
practice, among those who attend the general meeting of shareholders, the majority are 
state representatives and representatives of legal persons, with only a few representing 
private institutional or individual shareholders. In China, annual shareholders meetings 
are usually held after publication of annual reports. The state shareholders always send 
their representatives to the conference with all the expenses covered by employers. 
Individual investors go at their own expense. Owing to free-rider problems, small 
shareholders' participation in the annual shareholder conference is also very low. 
According to an estimate from CSRC (1999), the average number of shareholders 
attending annual conferences is approximately 100, whereas the number of shareholders 
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of listed companies ranges from 3,000 to 100,000. 
According to the Chinese Corporate Law, the BoD must have between three to thirteen 
members including employee representatives. The SB should consist of one or two for 
small companies, and at least three supervisors for large companies. Both the BoD and 
the SB are appointed by, and must report to, the shareholders of the company. The BoD 
is empowered to appoint the CEO and other senior managers, call shareholder meetings, 
implement the resolutions of shareholder meetings, determine internal management 
systems and undertake necessary decisions. The law also prescribes a list of 
responsibilities of the SB. The responsibilities of the SB include: 
  Financial Review; 
  Monitoring directors and managers, to ensure compliance with law, regulations and 
the Articles of Incorporation; 
  Requesting directors and managers to alter and/or rectify any of their personal 
actions if they are in conflict with the companies' objective; 
  Proposing temporary shareholder meetings whenever they deem them to be 
necessary, 
  Fulfilling any other duties that are stipulated in the articles of association for the 
company, 
  Attending the meetings of the BoD; 
  Submitting a SB report to the shareholders' annual general meeting. 
The CSRC has issued the Standards on Corporate Information Disclosure by listed 
companies which mandate the SB report as a part of the corporate annual report. 
Recently, the CSRC stipulated that listed companies must appoint independent directors 
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and establish auditing, nomination and remuneration committees under the BoD. The 
majority of members of these specialist committees must be independent directors. 
In practice, in the 1990s, over 70% of directors and board chairmen were appointed by the 
state and legal person shareholders, and over half are appointed by the controlling 
shareholders in proportion to their shareholding, with the appointment rubber-stamped by 
the shareholders' general meetings. In more recent years, politicians and state controlling 
owners still occupy most board seats. Fan and Wong (2002) found that among 621 
corporate boards, almost half of the directors were appointed by the state owners, and 
another 30% were affiliated with various levels of government agencies. There are few 
professionals (lawyers, accountants, financial executives, academics) on these boards and 
very few representatives of minority shareholders. 
As of mid 2002,1,124 listed companies (representing 90% of all listed companies) have 
employed 2,414 independent directors (Cha, 2001). Among these companies, 90% have 
at least two independent directors, and 70% have at least one independent director with 
professional accounting background. Among the 2,414 independent directors, 50% of 
them are university professors and technical experts, 30% are information intermediaries 
(e. g. accountants, lawyers, investment advisors, etc. ), 10% are business executives, and 
about 5% are retired government personnel. 
Institutional Investors 
Currently, in China there are many individual investors but relatively few large 
institutional investors. Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, are new terms in 
China. According to the prescriptions of the CSRC, market capitalization of tradable 
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shares of one listed firm held by a fund cannot exceed 10% of net assets of the fund. 
Other institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, are not 
allowed to directly invest in the stock markets at present (by the end of 2003). Therefore, 
large shareholders, usually government (state shareholders), can completely control the 
meeting. 
In 2000, the CSRC issued the Experimental Measures for Open Investment Funds, 
aiming to regulate institutional investors, which may play an important role in the 
corporate governance of the companies invested in. The active participation of 
institutional investors can alleviate to a great extent the issues arising from 
concentration of shareholding and the excessive spread of tradable shares. 
In 2002, the CSRC and the Peoples' Bank of China issued jointly, the Interim Measures 
of Securities Investment Management of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors 
(QFII), which allows foreign institutional investors, including fund management 
companies securities companies, and commercial banks to invest in the A share market. 
In overseas well-developed markets, institutional investors do not only seek investment 
earnings, they exert extensive influence on the companies that they invest in and 
significantly reduce the agency costs. For example, in the U. S., more and more 
institutional shareholders actively attend shareholders' ownership (Wahal, 1996). 
According to one estimate, institutional investors may now be holding up to 46.5 
percent of the outstanding common stock of the U. S. corporations 25. 
Institutional investors will play an important role in China's future corporate 
governance development. Developing more institutional investors could improve the 
25 Wall Street Journal, 11 May 1992. 
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ownership structure in China so that different major shareholders could monitor each 
other. Further, institutional investors could pool together funds of many individual 
investors and this would become a powerful investment force. Serving as an agent of 
individual investors, institutional investors could play a vital role in protecting minority 
shareholders' interests. By creating more research-based predictive earnings information, 
the greater involvement of institutional investors would also enhance the efficiency of 
China's stock markets. 
If there are only a few institutional investors, they could have advantages in term of 
information, over individual investors. Such information asymmetry could allow 
institutional investors to manipulate share prices and make the market more volatile. 
However, if there are more institutional investors and they become large enough, they 
could compete with each other which would help to enhance the rationality and stability 
of the market. It is also important to increase the shareholding of institutional investors 
so that there are more incentives for them to get involved in corporate governance more 
actively. 
5.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. It found that 
there is a large proportion of non-tradable shares in China, and the state still owns over 
50% of the total outstanding shares. State owned shares' distribution is unbalanced. 
There are about 20% of listed companies that do not have state owned shares. On the 
other hand, about 30% listed companies have 50% to 70% of their outstanding shares as 
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state owned shares. This chapter also presented the corporate control of Chinese listed 
companies, and introduced the current situation of Chinese institutional investors and 
insider control of these listed companies. 
Chapters 4 and 5 draw an overview of Chinese financial markets and listed companies. 
Based on these fundamentals, the next chapter will discuss the determinants of capital 
structure in China. 
139 
Chanter 6 Determinants of Capital Structure in China: Hypotheses 
CHAPTER 6 
DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN CHINA: 
HYPOTHESES 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 2 and 3 introduced capital structure theories and empirical studies in both 
developed and developing countries. Chapters 4 and 5 gave a brief overview of Chinese 
financial markets, and also discussed corporate financing and ownership structure. 
This chapter will present an observed debt ratio of Chinese listed companies, and then 
raise the hypotheses of this study. It will also discuss the institutional environment for 
applying capital structure theories to China. 
Section 6.2 will compare the debt ratios of both developed and developing countries by 
using empirical studies' results. Therefore, observed debt ratios of Chinese listed 
companies will be analysed. Thus, section 6.3 will raise the hypotheses of this study 
based on the introduction and discussion in previous sections and chapters, including 
asset structure, profitability, firm size, growth opportunity, dividend policy, and 
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ownership structure. Finally, section 6.4 will conclude of this chapter. 
6.2. OBSERVED DEBT RATIO OF CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES 
Before starting to discuss the debt ratio of Chinese listed companies, it is necessary to 
introduce the debt ratio in other developing and developed countries. 
Table 6.1 Debt Ratios in Developing and Developed Countries 
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There are 10 developing countries and 7 developed countries chosen. Table 6.1 lists the 
debt ratios in these countries. The data is from Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et 
al. (2001). Table 6.1 shows that the average of total debt ratio (TD) in the G-7 countries 
was 66% and 51 % in 10 developing countries; and long-term debt ratio (LD) was about 
41% and 22% respectively. 
Some recent studies show that the debt ratios in both developed and developing 
countries have been changed slightly. For example, Fan and Titman (2003) uses 5344 
firms from 39 countries covering the period of 1991 through 2000 to examine an 
international comparison of capital structure. The study found that developing 
countries26 seem to dominate the higher range of leverage, while developed countries 
tend to be at the lower range. The median leverage for developed countries and 
developing countries are 27% and 32% respectively. 
Compared with developed countries, the stock markets in China are still very immature 
and other financial sectors lag behind. The institutional structures are significantly 
different from those in developed economies. Chen (2004) examines determinants of 
capital structure of Chinese listed companies by using a sample set including 88 firms 
from 1995 to 2000. The study shows that the mean of TD and LD for Chinese listed 
companies are 45% and 6.8% respectively. 
The observed TD and LD of Chinese listed companies are calculated in this study by 
using all Chinese listed companies covering a period from 1995 to 2005. Here, TD is 
16 Developing countries include Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa. 
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calculated as book value of total liabilities to total assets; and LD is measured by book 
value of long term liabilities to total assets. The reason why book value (but not market 
value) is used in this calculation will be explained in chapter 7 (research design and data 
collection). 27 The results are listed in Table 6.2. The debt ratios in the table are 
calculated based on the data from both SZSE and SHSE, including A shares and B 
shares. 
Table 6.2 Debt Ratios of Chinese Listed Companies, 1995-2005 
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The table shows that the mean of TD and LD are 50.5% and 10% respectively. The 
mean TD is similar with Rajan and Zingales (1995)'s result for developing countries 
(51%), but lower- than developed countries (66%). However, it much higher than Fan 
and Titman (2003)'s results which were about 32% and 27% for developing and 
developed countries respectively. LD is only half of other developing countries (Rajan 
and Zingales's result, 22%), far less than developed countries (about 41 %). 
27 According to the Accounting Law of the People's Republic of China, an enterprise's liabilities should 
according to their liquidity, be classified as current and long-term liabilities. 
Current liabilities are liabilities that are to be settled within one year (including one year) or within an 
operating cycle that is longer than one year, including short-term borrowings, bills payable, accounts 
payable, receipts in advance, wage payable, employee benefits payable, dividends payable, tax payable, 
other temporary accrued expenses and the portion of the long-term borrowing due within one year. 
Current liabilities should be recorded based on the actual amount incurred. Interest expense should be 
accrued on a periodic basis for short-term borrowing, interest-bearing bills payable and short-term bonds 
payable, based on the principal amount or the face value of the bonds and the specific interest rate, and 
recognized in the income statement. 
Long-term liabilities are liabilities that will be settled after one year or after an operating cycle that is 
longer than one year, including long-term borrowings, bonds payable and long-term payables. Each 
long-term liability should be accounted for separately and disclosed as a separate item in the balance 
sheet. The portion of the long-term liabilities that is due for settlement within one year should be 
classified as a current liability in balance sheet and disclosed separately. 
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Why is LD so small in China? 
There are some reasons that may explain why LD is so small in China. As the 
realisation of the Chinese bond markets has been introduced before (chapter 4), 
although the bond markets are growing fast, it is still difficult for corporations to have 
long-term finance from the small corporate bond market which currently only has 24 
corporate bonds. The reasons for the Chinese corporate bond market being 
underdeveloped include tight government regulations, poor credit rating system and an 
undeveloped bond valuation system. 
The main way to finance is to borrow money from the banks. Bank loans constituted 
over 77% of total corporate financing (see table 4.1). However, within bank loans, 
short-term borrowing is popular in China which constituted over 50% of total bank 
loans (see table 4.2). Corporations have much more short-term debt than long-term debt. 
This is a specific characteristic of Chinese listed companies. It is a reflection of China's 
undeveloped bond markets and the difficulty in obtaining long-term loans from 
domestic banks. 
Another possible explanation of why Chinese companies have low levels of long-term 
debt may be that short-term finance typically has better incentive properties compared 
with long-term finance. Although long-term finance allows companies to invest in more 
advanced technologies, it may not provide an immediate pay-off. Furthermore, 
short-term fmance allows suppliers of capital to monitor and control the borrowing of 
companies more effectively. This is particular important when considering the 
prevailing agency problems in most Chinese companies. (Chen, 2004) 
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In addition, companies normally still keep the short-term bank loans (within one year 
loans) after the expiry day for another one-year term (rolled over). However in the 
balance sheet, they are still the short-term debt on the liabilities. This is the norm in 
Chinese listed companies. 
Tax Impact on Debt Ratios 
Trade-off theory assumes that observed capital structures are the result of individual 
firms trading off the tax benefits of increased debt usage against the increasingly severe 
agency costs and bankruptcy costs that result as debt ratios approach critical levels 
(Modigliani and Miller, 1958,1963). Under some conditions, the M&M's conclusions 
will hold even in the "real world". For example, the assumption that taxes include 
corporate profit tax, value-added tax, and individual income tax (Miller, 1977). 
However, tax effects are different in China. While dividend payments in China are taxed 
at both the corporate and personal levels and interest payments are tax-deductible 
corporate expenses that are only taxed at the personal level, as in the USA, there is a 
major difference from the USA in that effective corporate tax rates in China are 
significantly lower, as explained below. 
At the beginning of 1994, the central government overhauled the taxation system. 
Before the reform, China's income tax rates were fixed according to ownership. There 
was a rate of 55% cent for SOEs, and a proportional tax rate of 33% cent for foreign 
funded enterprises. Therefore different types of enterprises were loaded with different 
tax burdens and fair competition among them was out of the question. 
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Before economic reform, tax was used as a tool to adjust prices. When cost, demand, 
and technical advance underwent inevitable changes, nothing but the tax rate could be 
employed to readjust prices. If products sold well and earned more income, the tax rate 
would be raised. On the other hand, when the cost rose and market demand slackened, 
the tax rate would be reduced a little. After economic reform, the control on prices was 
gradually relaxed, and most, products now have their price regulated by the market. 
Therefore, tax was no longer treated mainly as a tool for adjusting prices of products, 
but as an important fiscal tool in government macro fiscal and monetary policy and in 
decision-making. 
Currently, the income tax rate of listed companies is 33%. However, almost all listed 
companies have tax preference. The study calculated the average income tax rate by 
using 815 listed companies from 1996 to 2001. The result showed that the average 
income tax rate was 15.91% during the period28, much lower than 33%. According to 
the tax law, only foreign direct investment (FDI) and high technology companies can 
have tax preference. However, through the statistical data above, the study found that 
almost all listed companies have tax breaks. Local governments issued some policies to 
protect the local listed companies including giving tax preference, the purpose of which 
was to support the local economy. The regulations about tax preference were published 
by CSRC to reduce the effect of local government. As a result, the average income tax 
rate increased from the lowest 14.39% of 1996 to 19.23% of 2001. 
As the individual income tax on investment income in China's stock markets, the buyer 
and seller each pay 0.3% stamp duty of their transaction, and both buyer and seller are 
required to pay a commission of 0.7%. For tradable shareholders, capital gain is tax free, 
Zs Calculated by this study based on the data from SZSE and SHSE 
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but the income tax rate on cash dividends is 20%. 
The discussion above showed that the actual corporate income tax rate for listed 
companies (15.91%, calculated by the study) is only half of the tax rate (33%). Low 
corporate income tax rate combined with the characters of Chinese listed companies' 
financing will affect companies' debt ratios. According to the discussion about corporate 
bond issuance, most listed companies are not allowed to issue corporate bond to finance. 
They mainly borrow from banks as short term financing. Trade-off theory suggests that 
there is a positive relationship between the effective tax rate and leverage. However, it 
may not apply to Chinese listed companies. They may not want to raise their debts to 
reduce taxes, because their debts are mainly bank loans but not corporate bonds. There 
is no strong sign showing taxes have impacted on the debt ratios. 
Bankruptcy and Debt Ratios 
Bankruptcy law assumes the costs of bankruptcy include tangible costs (out of pocket 
cash payment) and intangible costs (lost sales due to lost customer confidence, the loss 
of key employees, diversion of management's attention). If a companies' value will be 
reduced by going through the bankruptcy process, then bankruptcy costs can reduce the 
amount of leverage. It affects debt ratios. 
However, corporate bankruptcy is different in China. Because bank interest rates are not 
flexible, unlike western banks they can have different interest rates for different 
borrowers. In China, banks have weak credit risk management system. It is difficult to 
make different interest rate for companies based on the analysis of default rates and 
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unexpecting losses. So, simply put companies with the same interest rate will lead 
companies that have the same financing cost under a different leverage level. The credit 
market is still regulated and the term structures of interest rates are decided by the 
central bank rather than by the market force such as the borrower's credibility. Banks 
only have the right to decide whether the borrower's application is approved or not and 
the listed companies generally are regarded as the best companies in China. As a result, 
the companies with high business risk can still get bank loans at regulated interest rate. 
On the other hand, the bankruptcy law is difficult to apply. It is difficult to announce a 
company bankrupt, because most companies, especially listed companies, are still SOEs. 
Highly indebted SOEs do not have the funds to pay for social claims, and they are more 
likely not to be allowed to go bankrupt by the government. Even under the capital 
structure optimization program (CSOP) where the allocated land use right can be used, 
the total assets are frequently insufficient to cover compensation costs in a potential 
SOE bankruptcy, and some municipalities lack budgetary funds to fill the gap. 
Therefore companies, especially listed companies, do not face bankruptcy, even if they 
are in a very bad financial condition or running a high risk business. High costs of 
bankruptcy will not affect companies to reduce their leverage in China. As a conclusion 
of the discussion above, bankruptcy costs do not seem to impact on debt ratios. 
Concluding the discussion above, this section found that total debt ratio in China is 
similar with Rajan and Zingales (1995)'s result for developing countries. In addition, it 
also discovered that Chinese listed companies have lower long term debt ratio than 
other countries. Due to China's undeveloped corporate bond market, Chinese listed 
companies mainly use bank loans to finance, and these are normally of less than one 
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year, which are defined as short term debt. This might be the main reason why Chinese 
listed companies have relatively small long term debt ratio but similar total debt ratio 
with other developing countries. 
It further discussed that tax and bankruptcy have no significant impact on debt ratios in 
China. Based on these results, the next section will discover which factors affect 
Chinese listed companies' capital structure. 
6.3. FACTORS AFFECTING LISTED COMPANIES' CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE DECISION IN CHINA 
Theoretical and empirical studies have shown that costs of financial distress, tangibility, 
profitability, tax, non-debt tax shields, size, growth opportunities, dividend policy, 
ownership structure, and so on affect capital structure. On the relationship between 
these factors and companies' capital structure, Harris and Raviv (1991), summarising a 
good number of empirical studies from US companies, suggest that "leverage increases 
with fixed assets, tax shields effects, investment opportunities and firm size and 
decreases with volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of bankruptcy, 
profitability and uniqueness of the product". 
As this study introduced earlier, the situation of Chinese stock markets and the 
characteristics of Chinese listed companies raises doubts as to whether the US models 
of capital structure have explanatory power in a Chinese setting on the capital choices of 
Chinese companies. The previous discussions may indicate that it may be difficult to 
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apply the US models of capital structure on Chinese companies that are still largely 
owned or controlled by the state under economic transition. Chinese listed companies' 
capital structure strategy may reflect various financial constraints and institutional 
structures, rather than the result of economic rationale such as cost. In this section, the 
hypotheses of the study are suggested based on the knowledge of Chinese financial 
markets and Chinese listed companies, which we have discussed in previous chapters. 
63.1. Asset Structure 
The value of intangible assets disappears (almost entirely) if a bankruptcy occurs. Thus, 
the presence of tangible assets plays an important role in determining the borrowing 
capacity of the firm. Similarly, it reduces agency costs as debts can be secured with 
known tangible assets that have alternative redeployable uses should a default occur. 
Furthermore, a firm's opportunity to engage in asset substitution is reduced by a secured 
debt (Stulz and Johnson, 1985). Because of the difficulties involved in monitoring the 
intangible assets the cost of doing so becomes high. Thus, the creditors might impose 
restrictions on firms with relatively more intangible assets. 
From the viewpoint of transaction cost economics, tangible assets usually have less 
asset specificity, thus increasing their use as collateralisation for debt to reduce lender 
risk (Williamson, 1975,1988). Agency theory also predicts the same relationship. The 
information asymmetry results in equity being mis-priced and lead to under-investment 
problems. Issuing debt secured by tangible assets reduces these agency costs. Therefore, 
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tangible assets induce more debt. 
On the relationship between tangibility and capital structure, theories generally state that 
tangibility is positively related to leverage. In their pioneering paper on agency costs, 
ownership and capital structure, Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that the agency 
cost of debt exists as the firm may shift to riskier investment after the issuance of debt, 
and transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders to exploit the optional nature of 
equity. 
If a company's tangible assets are high, then these assets can be used as collateral, 
diminishing the lender's risk of suffering such agency costs of debt. Hence, a high 
fraction of tangible assets is expected to be associated with high leverage. Also, the 
value of tangible assets should be higher than intangible assets in case of bankruptcy. 
Williamson (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1990) suggest leverage should increase with 
liquidation value and both papers suggest that leverage is positively correlated with 
tangibility. Empirical studies that confirm the above theoretical prediction include 
Marsh (1982), Long and Malitz (1985), Friend and Lang (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), and Wald (1999). 
However, the situation in China is different. Because the corporate bond market is 
undeveloped and small, almost all Chinese listed companies do not issue corporate 
bonds. The discussion about agency costs of debt might not be applied to those 
companies. According to the introduction of corporate financing earlier, the debt of 
Chinese listed companies exists mainly as bank borrowings. Project financing needs 
property rights as a guarantee, assets tangibility is an important criterion in Chinese 
bank's credit policy. A listed company that has high tangible assets can borrow more 
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from banks. Chen (2004) confirmed a positive relation between leverage and Chinese 
listed companies' tangible assets. 
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Based on the discussion above, this study suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between tangible assets and leverage ratio in China. 
6.3.2. Profitability 
Although much theoretical work has been done since Modigliani and Miller (1958), no 
consistent predictions have been reached of the relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Tax-based models suggest that profitable firms should borrow more, ceteris 
paribus, as they have greater needs to shield income from corporate tax. 
However, pecking order theory suggests firms will use retained earnings first as 
investment funds and then move to bonds and new equity only if necessary. Companies 
prefer to finance new investments from retained earnings and raise debt capital only if 
the former is insufficient, and outside equity is the least favoured source of finance. In 
this case, profitable firms tend to have less debt. As the availability of retained earnings 
depends on the profitability of the firm, one could expect an inverse relationship 
between leverage and profitability. 
Agency-based models also give us conflicting predictions. Jensen (1986) and 
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Williamson (1988) define debt as a discipline device to ensure that managers pay out 
profits rather than build empires. Jensen (1986) suggests that debt reduces the agency 
cost of free cash flow. Debt financing ensures that the managers are disciplined to make 
efficient investment decisions and are not pursuing individual objectives as this 
increases the possibility of bankruptcy (Harris and Raviv, 1990). For firms with free 
cash flow, or high profitability, high debt can restrain management discretion. In 
situations of information asymmetry, increases in the debt ratios of a profitable firm can 
signal quality financial management. Therefore, this theory implies a positive 
association between leverage and profitability. 
In contrast to theoretical studies, most empirical studies show that leverage is negatively 
related to profitability. Friend and Lang (1988), and Titman and Wessels (1988) obtain 
such findings from US firms. Kester (1986) finds that leverage is negatively related to 
profitability in both the US and Japan. More recent studies using international data also 
confirm this finding (Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Wald (1999) for developed 
countries, Wiwattanakantang (1999) and Booth et al. (2001) for developing countries). 
Long and Maltiz (1985) find leverage to be positively related to profitability, but the 
relationship is not statistically significant. Wald (1999) even claims that "profitability 
has the largest single effect on debt/asset ratios. " 
In China, trade off theory might not apply to Chinese listed companies on the 
relationship between profitability and leverage. These tax-based models suggest that 
profitable companies should have higher leverage because they have greater needs to 
shield income from corporate tax. However, according to the discussion in previous 
section, taxes seem not to have a significant impact on listed companies' debt ratios. 
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Chinese listed companies do not have strong needs to raise their debt to reduce tax 
because of actual low corporate income tax. The relationship between profitability and 
leverage might not follow trade off theory's suggestion. 
Based on pecking order theory, which suggests companies use retained earnings first, 
then bonds and equity, Chinese listed companies might prefer to finance new projects 
from retained earnings. "Retained profit is the quickest and easiest source of finance for 
most listed companies compared with new equity issuance due to the transaction costs 
associated with share issuance and the restrictions on companies' performance for 
applying for new equity issuance" (Chen, 2004). 
Bond and equity are alternative options to finance list companies. However, institutional 
environment and regulations limited them. As the study has introduced in chapter 4, the 
corporate bond market is relatively small in China (only 24 corporate bond issues at the 
moment). Most listed companies do not issue corporate bonds. Meanwhile, regulations 
governing the listed companies of new equity issuance are also striking. To apply for 
new share issuance, a listed company must ensure that its annual return on net assets in 
the past three years exceeds an average of 10 percent (3 years average). Since 2001, this 
restriction has been relaxed in that the company's total return on net assets over the past 
three years exceeds 30%, with the average annual return of net assets in each of these 
three years not less than 6%. The amount of share allotment was also limited. A listed 
company could allot new shares only once a year, which is limited to at most 30% of the 
existing equity capital. The tight regulation and limited amount of new share issuance 
might not be able to provide enough investment funds for a high speed growing 
company. 
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On the other hand, project financing can also rely on bank borrowings. Although banks 
are willing to provide bank loans to listed companies, high level NPL (about 25% of 
total lending of four big state owned banks in 2002) causes Chinese banks to "spare 
lending". Hence, listed companies prefer using retained profit to bank borrowings. 
Profitable listed companies will have less debt. 
According to the discussion above, Chinese listed companies appear to use retained 
earnings first as investment funds, then bank borrowing and finally equity issuance. 
ME 
This study suggests that there is a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage in China. A survey of all Chinese listed companies from 1996 to 2005 showed 
that about 91.2% of all listed companies are profitable companies. 29 This high 
percentage of profitable companies makes it easier to find out the relationship. 
6.3.3. Size 
Agency theory (Jensen, 1986) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1988) 
suggest that large firms issue more long-term debt because shareholders could use debt 
to better control management behaviours due to more dilute ownership. However, 
smaller firms are more subject to shareholder intervention in the case of 
mismanagement because a reasonably small group of shareholders can gain a 
The calculation is based on a dataset which includes all listed companies from 1996 to 2005. 
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controlling interest in the company. 
Marsh (1982) finds that large firms more often choose long-term debt while small firms 
tend to have more short-term debt. Large firms may be able to take advantage of 
economies of scale in issuing long-term debt, and may even have bargaining power over 
creditors. So the cost of issuing debt and equity is negatively related to firm size. 
Larger firms are often more diversified and have more stable cash flow; the probability 
of bankruptcy for large firms is smaller compared with smaller ones, ceteris paribus. 
Both arguments above suggest size should be positively related with leverage. Also, 
many theoretical studies including Harris and Raviv (1990), Stulz (1990), Noe (1988), 
Narayanan (1988), and Poitevin (1989), suggest that leverage increases with the value 
of the company. 
However, size may also be a proxy for the information that outside investors have. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that larger firms tend to provide more information to 
lenders than smaller ones. Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that larger firms tend to 
disclose more information to outside investors than smaller ones. Informational 
asymmetries between insiders within a firm and the capital markets are expected to be 
lower for large firms, so large firms should be more capable of issuing informationally 
sensitive securities like equity. Overall, larger firms with less asymmetric information 
problems should tend to have more equity than debt and thus have lower leverage. 
Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) both found evidence to support the negative 
hypothesis between size and leverage. 
Empirical studies, such as Marsh (1982), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999), and 
Booth et al. (2001), generally find that leverage is positively correlated with company 
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size. On the other hand, Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988) both found evidence 
to support the negative hypothesis between size and leverage. 
In China, according to the discussion in the previous chapters, as most listed companies 
do not issue corporate bonds, long term debt is difficult to use to control management 
behaviours. 
Pecking order theory suggests that large companies with less asymmetric information 
problems should tend to have more equity and lower leverage. However, Chinese stock 
markets are still not efficient or just weak-form efficiency30. Chinese listed companies 
have more asymmetric information problems. Pecking order theory's suggestion might 
not apply. 
Large listed companies have privileges in bank borrowing due to their deep government 
related background. Because most large companies have a high level of state owned 
shares, they might be able to borrow from banks much easier due to their state owned 
background. It means that large listed companies might have higher leverage (or higher 
short term debt ratio). 
On the other hand, large listed companies have better access to capital markets for 
equity finance because usually they have higher total assets and profitability which are 
advantageous in rights issue and followup offering. Therefore, they are easier for them 
than small size companies, to issue new shares for project financing. It can be 
understood that large companies can not only finance from bank borrowing, but also can 
use equity issuance. Comparing these two options, new share issuance is more difficult 
30 Laurence, M., Cai, F., Sun, Q. (1997). Weak-form Efficiency and Causality Tests in Chinese Stock 
Markets. Multinational Finance Journal, Vol. 1, pp 291-307. 
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because of the tight regulation and small issuance allowance. 
To conclude the discussion above, bank borrowing seems to have a relatively strong 
impact on the relationship between firm size and leverage (or short term debt ratio). 
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This study suggests that there is a positive relationship between firm size and leverage 
in China. 
6.3.4. Growth Opportunity 
Another factor, which in capital structure theories is supposed to affect capital structure, 
is future growth opportunities. Theoretical studies generally suggest growth 
opportunities are negatively related with leverage. According to trade-off theory, firms 
holding future growth opportunities, which are a form of intangible assets, tend to 
borrow less than firms holding more tangible assets because growth opportunities 
cannot be collateralised. 
Agency theory argues that firms have a tendency to expropriate wealth from debtholders 
(Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, as Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) show, if 
management pursues growth objectives, management and shareholder interests tend to 
coincide for firms with strong investment opportunities. But for firms lacking 
investment opportunities, debt serves to limit the agency costs of managerial discretion 
as suggested by Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990). The findings of Berger, Ofek, and 
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Yermack (1997) also confirm the disciplinary role of debt. 
On the other hand, debt also has its own agency cost. Myers (1977) argues that 
high-growth firms may hold more real options for future investment than low-growth 
fines. If high-growth firms need extra equity financing to exercise such options in the 
future, a firm with outstanding debt may forgo this opportunity because such an 
investment effectively transfers wealth from stockholders to debtholders. So firms with 
high growth opportunity may not issue debt in the first place and leverage is expected to 
be negatively related with growth opportunities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) also 
suggest that leverage increases with lack of growth opportunities. 
Empirical studies predominately support theoretical prediction. The findings of Kim and 
Sorensen (1986), Smith and Watts (1992), Wald (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and 
Booth et al. (2001) are consistent with the above theoretical prediction. 
Trade off theory suggests that companies which have future growth opportunities will 
tend to have lower leverage, because growth opportunities are a form of intangible 
assets, which can not be collateralised. In China, most listed companies are in the 
manufacturing and heavy industry sectors (see table 7.3). They normally have more 
tangible assets and less intangible assets. For such generally low technology level 
Chinese listed companies, trade off theory's suggestion might not have significant 
impact in China. 
On the other hand, because almost all listed companies can not issue corporate bonds, 
equity finance is the only way for them to finance in stock markets. It is easier for high 
growth listed companies to issue equity than low growth companies because they have 
better performance and higher profitability. However, as this study discussed previously, 
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tight regulations make the new share issuance difficult, and the issuance allowance is 
also low. It could be difficult to finance from equity issuance. 
Otherwise, as the only resource of debt finance, bank loans affect companies' growth 
opportunities. Listed companies which have high growth opportunity can receive bank 
loans more easily than others. As introduced earlier, Chinese banks usually ration 
lending because their high level NPL exist. They only lend to some high quality 
customers, for example companies who have high profitability, large tangible assets, 
and high growth opportunities, etc. Thus, high growth listed companies are "perfect" 
customers for Chinese banks. Those companies can have easier access to bank loans. 
Therefore, this condition would lead to a positive relationship between growth 
opportunity and leverage (or short term debt ratio). Chen (2004) confirmed a positive 
relationship between growth opportunities and Chinese listed companies' leverage. 
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This study suggests that there is a positive relationship between growth opportunity and 
leverage in China. 
6.3.5. Dividend Policy 
Tax-adjusted models surmise that investors require and secure higher expected returns 
on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The imposition of a tax liability on dividends 
causes the dividend payment to be grossed up to increase the shareholder's pretax return. 
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Miller and Rock (1985) showed that dividend and financing policies are closely related. 
Boyle and Eckhold (1997) demonstrated that if capital gains taxes are higher than 
dividend income taxes then firms with a high payout ratio will have a higher debt ratio. 
Consequently, the cost of equity relative to debt rises due to additional risk premium 
required by the shareholders, favouring debt. 
Miller and Rock (1985), Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987), and many others offer 
signaling models of corporate dividend policy. The proponents of signaling theories 
believe that a corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting the message of 
quality across has a lower cost than other alternatives. 
Agency problems result from information asymmetries, potential wealth transfers from 
bondholders to stockholders through the acceptance of high risk and high return projects 
by managers, and failure to accept positive net present value projects and perquisite 
consumption in excess of the level consumed by prudent corporate managers (Barnea, 
Haugen, and Senbet, 1981). 
Dividend policy influences these relations in two ways. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
espouse review that potential shareholder and bondholder conflicts can be mitigated by 
covenants governing claim priority. These orderings can be circumvented by large 
dividend payments to stockholders. Debt covenants to minimize dividend payments are 
necessary to prevent bondholder wealth transfers to shareholders (John and Kalay, 
1982). Although potentially substantial in precipitation of agency costs, dividend policy 
is not a major source of bondholder wealth expropriation. In firms where dividend 
payouts are limited by bondholder covenants, dividend payout levels are still below the 
maximum level allowed by the constraints (Kalay, 1982). 
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The second way dividend policy affects agency costs is the reduction of these costs 
through increased monitoring by capital markets. Large dividend payments reduce 
funds available for perquisite consumption and investment opportunities and require 
managers to seek fmancing in capital markets. Jensen's (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis also pointed out that dividend and debt interest payments decrease the free 
cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and 
manager perquisite consumption. 
How about the dividend policy of Chinese listed companies? To understand it, firstly, 
we need to know how many listed companies are paying dividends. Figure 6.1 shows 
the frequency of dividend payouts in China during 1996-2005. The data includes all 
listed companies which are from both SZSE and SHSE. It showed that there were about 
60% to 70% listed companies paying dividends to shareholders during recent years. 
However, during the same period (1996-2005), the average proportion of profitable 
listed companies was above 90% of total number of listed companies. It means that 
there were 20% to 30% profitable listed companies that did not pay a dividend. It could 
be argued that not too many Chinese listed companies are paying dividend even when 
they are profitable. 
This study suggests that the reason many profitable listed companies did not pay 
dividends to shareholders might be the needs of high speed growing businesses. 
Companies use retained profit to finance their new projects. It is also because of 
Chinese undeveloped corporate bond markets, that most listed companies do not issue 
corporate bonds. 
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Figure 6.1 Dividend Payout of Chinese Listed Companies 
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Source: Calculated by author using the study's data set. 
As the study has discussed in chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter, the Chinese bond 
market, especially the corporate bond market is undeveloped. Most listed companies do 
not issue corporate bonds. It means that the traditional dividend policy theory about 
shareholder and bondholder conflicts can not be applied in China. 
Many Chinese listed companies are growing fast and need free cash flow to invest in 
positive net present value projects. As the study discussed in subsection 6.3.2, retained 
profit might be the quickest and easiest source of finance for these projects. It could lead 
to some companies reducing or not paying dividends to shareholders. 
On the other hand, many listed companies who pay dividends are supposed to give a 
signal or a message to investors that they are doing well, in order to seek further 
financing in the capital market. Because equity issuing has tight regulations and limited 
allowance amounts, listed companies will prefer bank borrowing as the main method of 
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financing in this case. It means that there might be a positive relationship between 
dividend payout and leverage ratio from this point of view. 
To conclude the discussion above, dividend payout seems to have a positive impact on 
leverage. 
pypothesis 5z ivfend jfoucy; `»"P itcv ; reYätiönsh etivee 
payout jaho } 
This study suggests that there is a positive relationship between dividend pay out ratio 
and leverage in China. 
6.3.6. Ownership Structure 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen (1986) etc. ) suggests that the 
optimal structure of leverage and ownership may be used to minimize total agency costs. 
They propose two types of conflicts of interest: conflicts between shareholders and 
managers, and conflicts between shareholders and debtholders. So it is expected that 
there is some correlation between ownership structure and leverage. 
Large shareholders, especially the controlling large shareholders, have enormous power 
in influencing corporate policy. Capital structure decisions, as one important corporate 
policy, is certainly affected by the controlling large shareholder's preferences. The 
previous literature has extensively documented the positive role played by debt and 
ownership concentration in capital structure (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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However, as company's ownership structures and the legal and financial systems differ 
across countries, it is possible that ownership structures and the quality of the 
institutional framework can be as important as company characteristics in explaining 
cross-country differences in capital structures. 
Unlike western countries, Chinese listed companies' management level do not hold 
shares (the situation has started to change since 2006, but there are still a small number 
of management level held share options). In addition, due to undeveloped corporate 
bond markets and a tight regulation environment, most listed companies do not issue 
corporate bonds. Neither conflicts between shareholders and managers nor conflicts 
between shareholders and debtholders, works in China. The relationship between 
Chinese listed companies' ownership structure and leverage is different with developed 
countries. 
The largest shareholder in Chinese listed companies is the state. Chinese individual 
investors are small shareholders and their interests are not protected (Wei, 2002). They 
are in a disadvantageous position because of the lack of proxy voting procedures. For 
those individuals in the top 10 shareholders, their holdings are extremely small, 
normally less than 0.5% (Xu and Wang, 1999). Considering the large shares held by the 
state, 0.5 percent share held by a single individual is negligible. Almost no individual 
shareholders are on the board of directors or on the supervisory committee. Small 
investors have neither the incentive nor the capability to monitor inside managers. 
On the other hand, debt holders also are not protected. Because the Chinese corporate 
bond market is undeveloped, there are almost no listed companies issuing corporate 
bonds. Debt holders are mainly banks. Debt holders often have difficulty recovering 
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debts from bankrupt companies. Current policy requires that money recovered from a 
bankrupt company be used to settle employees first. And bank creditors have priority 
over non-bank creditors for the remaining money, if any. As there is often little money 
left after employee settlements, state-owned banks, which are the main creditors, are 
often hit hard by bankruptcies. 
The root of the Chinese listed companies' agency problem is the obsolete state owned 
system which is characterised by a poor monitoring mechanism and a discouraging 
managerial incentive scheme. It is not helpful to attempt to reduce this problem by 
applying the relationship between shareholders and debtholders, because most listed 
companies do not issue corporate bonds, while debtholders, normally banks, have 
limited control rights over the companies. 
As introduced in chapter 5, in China, state shares are held by government bodies such as 
state asset management agencies, or institutions authorised to hold shares on behalf of 
the state such as a wholly state-owned investment company. As the largest part of 
ownership, the level of state owned shares might be expected to have an influence over 
the level of borrowings, as follows. Listed companies which have a high level of state 
owned shares would have a deep and wide relationship with the government, and thus 
would find it easier to have bank loans. On the other hand, listed companies can also 
finance by equity issuance. Companies which have high state owned shares might find 
it easier to issue new equity. However, according to the discussion in chapter 4, bank 
borrowing is the main method of finance for listed companies, and the tight regulations 
and limited allowance of new equity issuance make it more difficult than borrowing 
from banks. 
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An analysis of the relationship between state ownership and bank loans financing of 
Chinese listed companies has been done by this study. It used all listed companies from 
1997 to 2005. The components of the data set include bank loans and state ownership. 
Bank loans are defined as the sum of short-term bank loans and long-term bank loans as 
a percentage of total liabilities and capital31; and state ownership is defined as the ratio 
of state owned shares to total shares32. Table 6.3 shows the summary statistics of the 
components. The results showed that the mean of bank loans financing constituted 
about 50% of total liabilities. 
Table 63 Summary of Statistics of loan financing and Ownership (All Listed Companies, 1997-2005) 
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Bank Loans 0.4999 0.5247 0.2135 -0.3422 -0.6411 0.0011 0.9618 
Ownership 0.2906 0.2785 0.2690 0.2678 -1.4026 0.0000 0.8499 
Through the calculations based on the data, the relationship between bank loans finance 
and state ownership is found in Figure 6.2. Listed companies in the 10-20 and 40-50 
range of state ownership depend more on bank loans; companies in the 40-50 range of 
state ownership appear to have highest access to bank loans. However, accompanied by 
increasing to higher range of state ownership (70-100), loans financing decreased 
sharply. There are about 7% samples that have their state owned shares above 70% of 
total outstanding shares, and they have average 34% bank loans financing of total 
liabilities. 
31 The study measures bank loans as a percentage of total liabilities and capital. 
32 State ownership is measured as the ratio of state owned shares to total shares, which is the percentage 
of state owned shares of total outstanding shares. 
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Figure 6.2 Bank Loans financing and State Ownership (Listed Companies, 2005) 
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The figure suggests that there is a non-linear relationship between state ownership and 
bank loans financing in China. The reason is that Chinese listed companies, either state 
owned companies or non state owned companies, can finance from bank loans easily. 
Compared with non-listed companies, listed companies' financial statements are 
audited33, opened to the public and its' assets value have been priced by the stock 
market. Banks prefer to lend to listed companies. In addition, listed companies are 
generally large and profitable. A company going public is seen as a most successful 
symbol by banks. They can borrow from banks more easily. 
Concluding the discussions above, due to the Chinese undeveloped corporate bond 
market and less management shareholdings, the relationship between Chinese listed 
companies and leverage is different to western countries. State ownership is the special 
characteristic of Chinese listed companies. State ownership could have a positive 
33 Auditors are pointed by CSRC. 
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relationship with leverage because of their deep relationship with state owned banks, at 
the same time, state ownership could also have a negative relationship with leverage 
because the survey showed that the relationship between bank loan financing and state 
ownership is a non-linear relationship. This study therefore assumes that there is an 
indeterminate relationship (or no relationship) between state owned shares ratio and 
leverage in China. 
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6.3.7. Cost of Financial Distress 
The costs of financial distress can be thought of as the product of the probability of 
entering a distressed situation and the costs of resolving such a situation should it occur. 
Firms financed by equity may choose not to pay dividends during a period of financial 
difficulties. Therefore, firms with highly volatile earnings should borrow the least. This 
suggests an inverse relationship between earnings volatility and the leverage ratio. 
Some empirical studies, such as: Bradley et. al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993), and Wald (1999), Booth et al. (2001), all these studies 
find that business risk is negatively correlated with leverage. 
In China, according to the discussion in section 6.2 (the part about bankruptcy and debt 
ratios), companies, especially listed companies are not afraid of being bankrupt, even if 
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they are in a very bad financial condition or running a high risk business. High costs of 
bankruptcy will not affect companies to reduce their leverage in China. 
On the other hand, Chinese banks only have the right to decide whether a borrower's 
application is approved or not and the listed companies generally are regarded as the 
best companies in China. As a result, the listed companies with a high business risk can 
still get bank loans. 
To conclude the discussion above, the cost of financial distress seems to not impact on 
debt ratios. This study therefore assumes that there is an indeterminate relationship (or 
no relationship) between the cost of financial distress and leverage in China. 
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6.3.8. Tax Shields Effects 
The impact of tax on capital structure is the main theme of a pioneering study by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Almost all researchers now believe that taxes must be 
important to a companies' capital structure. Firms with a higher effective marginal tax 
rate should use more debt to obtain a tax-shield gain. The trade off theory suggests a 
positive relationship between the effective tax rate and leverage. This holds only if the 
firms have a sufficient amount of taxable income. However, Titman and Wessels (1988), 
among others, failed to find any significant effect of corporate tax on financial 
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decisions. 
MacKie-Mason (1990) comments that the reason why many studies fail to find 
plausible or significant tax effects on financing behaviors, which is implied by the 
Modigliani and Miller theorem, is because the debt/equity ratios are the cumulative 
result of years' of separate decisions and most tax shields have a negligible effect on the 
marginal tax rate for most firms. MacKie-Mason, contrary to other researchers, studies 
the incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis. He focuses 
especially on the effect of taxes (tax loss carry-forwards and investment tax credit) upon 
the debt-equity choice conditional on going public, and finds that the desirability of debt 
financing at the margin varies positively with the effective marginal tax rate, which is 
consistent with MM theorem. 
According to the discussion in section 6.2 (the part about tax impact on debt ratios), the 
actual corporate income tax rate for Chinese listed companies is only 15.91%, just half 
of the country's standard tax rate (33%). It means that most listed companies have tax 
breaks. The mainly reason is the effect of local government. Local governments have 
issued some policies to protect the local listed companies, including giving tax 
preferences. 
According to the discussion in the previous section, low corporate income tax rate 
combined with the characters of Chinese listed companies' financing will affect 
companies' debt ratios. According to the discussion about corporate bond issuance, most 
listed companies are not allowed to issue corporate bond to finance. They mainly 
borrow from banks as short term financing. Trade-off theory suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between the effective tax rate and leverage. However, it may not 
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apply to Chinese listed companies. They may not want to raise their debts to reduce 
taxes, because their debts are mainly bank loans but not corporate bonds. There is no 
strong sign showing taxes have impact on the debt ratios. 
On the other hand, the tax deduction for depreciation and investment tax credits is 
called non-debt tax shields (NDTS). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that non-debt 
tax shields are substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing and a firm with larger 
non-debt tax shields is expected to use less debt. 
Bradley et al. (1984) employ the sum of annual depreciation charges and investment tax 
credits divided by the sum of annual earnings before depreciation, interest, and taxes to 
measure NDTS. They find leverage is positively related with NDTS. However, NDTS is 
highly correlated with tangible assets and they do not include a proxy for tangibility in 
their studies, which is also expected to affect firms' leverage. Wald (1999) uses the ratio 
of depreciation to total assets and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) employ the ratio of 
depreciation expense plus investment tax credits to total assets to measure NDTS. Both 
studies find that leverage is negatively correlated with NDTS. 
In China, as the tangible assets are very important for Chinese listed companies to 
finance from banks, companies may have high level tangible assets. At the same time, 
listed companies usually use depreciation to affect the companies' profit forecast. It can 
be thought that Chinese listed companies may also use tax deduction for depreciation. 
On the other hand, as the study discussed earlier, listed companies have already 
received tax breaks from local government, even Chinese listed companies might use 
NDTS to reduce tax, but there is no significant evidence to show that it has an impact 
on leverage. This study therefore assumes that there is an indeterminate (or no) 
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relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage in China. 
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6.4. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the average debt ratios in both developed and developing 
countries. Thus, compared with the average, an observed debt ratio of Chinese listed 
companies was presented. A further explanation was presented on the reasons for low 
long term debt ratio in China, and an. analysis of the impact of tax and bankruptcy on 
debt ratios. 
Finally, based on all discussion above, the eight hypotheses were launched including 
asset structure, profitability, firm size, growth opportunity, dividend policy, ownership 
structure, cost of financial distress, and non-debt tax shields. 
Further to these hypotheses, the research methodology including research design and 
regression models will be introduced in chapter 7 and 8 respectively. 
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CHAPTER 7 
RESEARCH DESIGN & DATA COLLECTION 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 raised the eight hypotheses of the study. This chapter and chapter 8 will 
present the methodology of the research, which includes research design and regression 
models. Section 7.2 will review the debt ratios which were used by previous empirical 
studies, then explain which one can be used in the study. It will also give a list of 
measurements of independent variables which are concluded in the hypotheses setting. 
Section 7.3 will introduce the details of the data collection and data set. Section 7.4 will 
introduce three kinds of industry classification in the world, and then point out the 
classification differences in China. Section 7.5 will give summary statistics of all 
variables including an industry breakdown statistics table and correlation matrix. 
Section 7.6 will present panel data models and software selection. Finally, section 7.7 
will conclude the chapter. 
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7.2. VARIABLE DESIGN 
This section will discuss variable designs based on the discussion results and 
hypotheses in chapter 6. Subsection 7.2.1 will present the measurement of dependent 
variables after discussing long term versus short term debt and book value versus 
market value in China. Subsection 7.2.2 will presents independent variables and their 
measurements based on the study's hypotheses. 
7.2.1. Dependent Variables 
Theoretically, there are many ways to calculate a leverage ratio, such as total liabilities 
ratio, total debt ratio, and so on. The broadest definition of stock leverage is the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets. However, it does not provide a good indication of 
whether the company is at risk of default in the near future. Also, since total liabilities 
also include items like accounts payable, which may be used for transactions purposes 
rather than for financing, it may overstate the amount of leverage. 
Another definition of financial leverage is provided by the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. This measure fails to incorporate the fact that there are some assets that are 
offset by specific non-debt liabilities. For example, an increase in the gross amount of 
trade credit is reflected in a reduction of this measure of leverage. Given that the level 
of accounts payable and accounts receivable may be jointly influenced by industry 
considerations, it seems appropriate to use a measure of leverage unaffected by the 
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gross level of trade credit. 
Leverage also can be defined as the ratio of total debt to total capital, which can 
express the effects of past financing decisions. Capital is measured as the sum of the 
book value debt and equity. Therefore, leverage can be defined as the ratio of total 
debt to net assets, where net assets are total assets less accounts payable and other 
liabilities. Although this measure is not influenced by trade credit, it is affected by 
factors that may have nothing to do with financing. For example, assets held against 
pension liabilities may decrease this measure of leverage. 
Can these measurements be applied to Chinese listed companies? Before deciding how 
to measure the debt ratio, it is necessary to discuss the institutional situation of Chinese 
listed companies. The following discussion includes two main characteristics of listed 
companies' debt ratio: (1) long term debt versus short term debt; (2) book value versus 
market value. 
Lone term Debt versus Short term Debt 
Chapter 6 discussed observed debt ratios of Chinese listed companies, and explained 
why long term debt is small in China. Here, further discussion between long term debt 
and short term debt is presented. 
Although the debt markets are growing fast in China, it is still difficult for corporations 
to have long term finance from the small Corporate Bond market (introduced in chapter 
4). Corporations have much more short term debt than long term debt. 
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Figure 7.1 shows the long term debt and short term debt for Chinese listed companies 
from 1997 to 2005 34 The graph shows that short term debt is significantly larger than 
long term debt during the whole period. 
This is a specific characteristic of Chinese listed companies. The substantially low 
amount of long term debt reflects the fact that the listed companies in China are mainly 
financed by bank borrowing. It is a reflection of China's undeveloped bond market and 
the difficulty in obtaining long term loans from domestic banks. 
Another possible and related explanation of why Chinese firms have low levels of 
long-term debt may be that short-term finance typically has better incentive properties 
compared with long term finance. Although long term finance allows firms to invest in 
more advanced technologies, it may not provide an immediate pay off. Furthermore, 
short term finance allows suppliers of capital to monitor and control the borrowing of 
firms more effectively. 
34 The data is from CSRC, including all listed companies from 1997 to 2005. 
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Short term finance typically has better incentive properties compared with long term 
finance. Within bank loans, short term borrowing which constituted over 50% of total 
bank loans is popular in China35. Corporations have much more short term debt than 
long term debt. In addition, roll over of short term debt happens normally and broadly in 
China. But in the balance sheet, it is still shown as short term debt. 
Book Value versus Market Value 
When book value of equity is replaced by market value of equity, the measurements of 
leverage may be presented as the market total debt ratio, market total liabilities ratio, 
market long term debt ratio, and so on. How is the situation in China? 
A survey36 based on all listed companies from 1997 to 2005 is presented in Figure 7.2. 
In the figure, total debt ratio is calculated as a ratio of total liabilities to the sum of total 
liabilities and equity, where equity is measured by book value and market value 
respectively, and classified by industry. 
The results of the calculations done by author shows that the average of book value and 
market value total debt ratios are about 48% and 19% respectively. It means that the 
market value of debt ratio is lower than the book value debt ratio, approximately 40% of 
the book value ratio37. Certainly market value is larger than book value, which lead 
book value debt ratio higher than market value debt ratio. It seems that both could be 
35 Calculation based on the data from China Statistical Yearbook 2004 and Almanac of China's Finance 
and Banking 2003. 
36 The data is from CSRC, including all listed companies from 1997 to 2005. The results are calculated 
b)r this study. 
3 Book value of total debt ratio is the book value of total debt to the book value of equity plus the book 
value of total debt. Market value of total debt ratio is the book value of total debt to the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total debt. The mean of book value total debt ratio is 50.50%, and market 
value total debt ratio is 19.37%. 
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used for measuring Chinese listed companies' debt ratios. 
However, Chinese listed companies' debt structures, which are mostly bank loans but 
not corporate bonds, make the measurement different. As the study introduced in 
previous chapters, most Chinese listed companies do not issue corporate bonds to 
finance. They usually borrow from banks for financing. Therefore, debts of these listed 
companies are calculated by their book value. In addition, trade credit and accounts 
payable are also measured by their book value. 
Based on the discussion above, to match these book value of debts, book value of equity 
might be suitable for measuring debt ratios. This study will use book value to calculate 
debt ratios. 
Figure 7.2 Book Value versus Market Value 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
d""ý ?ý'd Býý! c° 4ý0 
? Af vA eý 
d ý', sD 4 d' 
dsýed b 
`ýsaFý6sýa ca y4ý 
cýý9'ý a, 
`eye 
.m ew Zv 
I 
O Book Value-Debt Ratio   Market Value-Debt Ratio 
Dependent Variables 
Conclude the discussion above, this study suggests that total assets should be used in the 
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measurement of debt ratios. The study will also use the broadest definitions of leverage: 
total liabilities ratio and total debt ratio. In addition, according to the discussion in the 
previous section and chapter 6, short term debt is the most important way to finance for 
Chinese listed companies. Short term debt ratio could be another measurement of 
leverage. 
As the discussion about Chinese corporate bond market has made clear, Chinese listed 
companies have less long term debt, and some companies do not even have any long 
term debt. This study suggests that using long term liabilities can replace long term 
debt. 
Therefore, Book value of total liabilities ratio (TL), book value of total debt ratio 
(TD), book value of short term debt ratio (SD), and book value of long term 
liabilities ratio (LD) are used as the measurements of leverage in this study. The 
measurements of these variables are as follow: 
  TL is defined as book value of total liabilities divided by total assets. 
  TD is defined as book value of total debt (short-term plus long term) divided by 
total assets. 
  SD is defined as book value of short term debt divided by total assets. 
  LD is defined as book value of long term liabilities divided by total assets. 
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7.2.2. Independent Variables 
According to the hypotheses of the study, independent variables include asset structure, 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, dividend, state owned shares ratio, bankruptcy 
costs, and tax shields effects. The measurements of these independent variables are as 
follows: 
Asset Structure (TANG) 
The more tangible the company's assets, the greater its ability to issue secured debt and 
the less information revealed about future profits. Booth, etc (2001) defined the 
tangibility of assets as total assets minus current assets then divided by total assets, 
while Rajan and Zingales (1995) defined the tangibility as the ratio of fixed assets to 
total assets. Both studies mentioned that the influence of tangibility will differ between 
the long term and total debt ratios as companies match the maturity of their debt to the 
tangibility of their assets. 
According to the discussion results of chapter 4, most Chinese listed companies do not 
issue corporate bonds or any medium tern notes (MTNs) for financing. This is a 
significant difference between China and western countries. From this point of view, 
tangibility of assets may not affect companies' long term debt. On the other hand, 
according to the discussion in chapter 6, the tangible assets for Chinese listed 
companies is mainly for project financing, and using its property right as guarantee for 
bank loans. It seems tangible assets may be important for listed companies' bank loan 
financing. 
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Total assets include not only current assets and tangible assets, but also intangible assets 
and others. Thus, the study suggests that total tangible assets might be better to measure 
Chinese companies' tangibility than using total assets minus current assets. 
Tangible Assets (TANG) is defined as total tangible assets (the sum of fixed assts, 
inventories, and receivables) divided by total assets. 
Profitability (PROF) 
Highly profitable companies might be able to finance their growth by using retained 
earnings and by maintaining a constant debt ratio. In contrast, less profitable companies 
will be forced to resort to debt financing. 
Booth, etc (2001) used the return on assets (ROA) as the earnings before tax divided by 
total assets. Wald (1999) measured profitability as earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT) divided by total assets. 
The measurement of profitability for Chinese listed companies could be same as other 
empirical studies. This study uses the ratio of earning before interest, tax, and 
depreciation (EBITDA) to total assets as the measurement of profitability. The reason 
the study uses EBITDA but not EBIT to measure profitability is because many Chinese 
listed companies use depreciation to change their profit when they want it to be lower or 
higher in a particular period. EBITDA can provide the true profitability of these listed 
companies. 
Profitability (PROF) is defined as earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation 
divided by total assets. 
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Size (SIZE) 
According to the discussion in chapter 6, large Chinese listed companies can usually 
receive bank loans more easily than smaller companies. Bank borrowing seems to 
impact on the relationship between company size and leverage. Therefore, there are two 
ways to calculate company size: (1) total assets; (2) sales. 
Wald (1999) used natural logarithms of total assets to measure company size. Booth, etc 
(2001) employed natural logarithms of sales. As both of them are the characters of 
Chinese large listed companies, this study uses two measurements to calculate company 
size. To examine whether natural logarithms can be applied here, the study calculated 
the correlation between Sales and leverage, and Total Assets and leverage. It further 
compared these results with the correlation between natural logarithm of sales and 
leverage, and natural logarithm of total assets and leverage respectively. The analysis 
results are listed below in Table 7.1, which were calculated by using this study's 
sample set (see section 7.3). It showed that LN_Sales have a higher correlation with 
leverage than Sales, and LN Total Assets also obtained the same results. This study will 
use both LN_Sales and LN Total Assets to measure firm size. 
Table 7.1 Correlation between Firm Size and Leverage 
TL TD SD LD 
Sales -0.60% -5.25% -6.04% 1.84% 
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Size (SIZE 1) is defined as natural logarithm of sales. 
Size (SIZE 2) is defined as natural logarithm of total assets. 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) 
The discussion about growth opportunities in chapter 6 found that Chinese listed 
companies, which have higher growth opportunities, tend to have a greater chance to 
borrow from banks. 
Some studies use the market to book ratios of total assets (Anderson and Makhija, 1999) 
or market equity relative to net worth as a proxy for the growth opportunities. However, 
the market values or stock prices of Chinese listed companies might not be able to 
reflect the growth opportunities. Because almost 50% of issued shares are non-tradable 
shares, they are calculated as book value. According to the discussion in the previous 
section, market value of shares might not be. able to reflect the real value of issued 
shares. 
Another measurement of growth opportunities is R&D expenditures normalized by 
sales (Booth, etc, 2001). Sales growth is the past growth experience. This study uses the 
ratio of sales growth to measure growth opportunities. 
Growth Opportunities (GROWTH) is defined as sales growth divided by total assets 
growth. 
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Dividend Policy (DIVID) 
In a classic study, Lintner surveyed a number of managers in the 1950's and asked how 
they set their dividend policy. Most of the respondents said that there was a target 
proportion of earnings that determined their policy. One firm's policy might be to pay 
out 40% of earnings as dividends whereas another company might have a target of 50%. 
This would suggest that dividends change with earnings. Empirically, dividends are 
slow to adjust to changes in earnings. 
The situation in China is different. As introduced in chapter 6, an average of 60% of 
Chinese listed companies are paying dividends. Many profitable listed companies do 
not pay dividends because they want to use retained profit to invest in new projects. On 
the other hand, dividends could be seen as a successful signal of listed companies, 
which can be used by the listed company for further bank borrowing. 
However, during the past 5 years, the Chinese stock market experienced a long term 
bear market (low stock prices) even the Chinese economy kept a high growth rate 
during the period. Chinese listed companies realised how important corporate 
governance and dividend policy are. More listed companies paid dividends in recent 
years. Dividend policy may affect companies' financing policy more significantly in this 
period because they pay more cash dividend and have less retained earnings for new 
project financing. Due to this background, the study measures dividend policy as the 
ratio of ordinary dividends to net income. 
Dividend Policy (DIVID) is defined as ordinary dividends divided by net income. 
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State Owned Shares (SS) 
There are two options to measure Chinese listed companies' ownership structure, they 
are: non-tradable shares ratio or state owned shares ratio. As the study introduced in 
chapter 5, most Chinese listed companies have two main types of shares: non-tradable 
shares and tradable shares. Non tradable shares further include state owned shares, legal 
person shares, and employee shares. 
According to the research results in chapter 5, most listed companies have an average of 
about 56% non tradable shares of their total outstanding shares. It might be difficult to 
find a significant relationship between non tradable shares and leverage because most 
listed companies have non tradable shares and these shares do not change frequently. 
On the other hand, the research results showed that 35% of listed companies have state 
owned shares, which account for about 50% of total outstanding shares. In addition, 
large listed companies tend to have more state owned shares. There might be a 
significant correlation between state owned shares and companies' leverage. 
Based on the discussion above, this study chose state owned shares ratio to measure 
Chinese listed companies' ownership structure. State owned shares ratio could be 
measured as the ratio of state owned shares to total shares. According to the discussion 
in chapter 6, there is likely to be a non-linear relationship between state owned shares 
ratio and leverage. The percentage of state owned shares to total shares might not be 
able to be used in this study. 
There are many ways to transfer a non linear variable to linear. Generally natural 
logarithm is often used. This study employs natural logarithm of state owned shares 
ratio as the measurement of state owned shares. 
State Owned Shares (SS) is defined as natural logarithm of state owned shares 
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divided by total shares. 
Bankruptcy Costs (EV) 
The cost of financial distress can be thought of as the product of the probability of 
entering a distressed situation and the costs of resolving such a situation should it occur. 
The probability of financial distress can be estimated as the standard deviation of the 
return on assets (ROA) over the available time period, where ROA is calculated as the 
earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITDA) divided by total assets. 
The cost of financial distress has less impact on Chinese listed companies' leverage 
(discussed in chapter, 6), even if the company is in a bad financial condition or running a 
high risk project. They do not care much about having high earning volatility, but they 
do care about earnings. Retained earnings can be used for the financing of new projects. 
So, this study employs the second measurement to calculate the cost of financial 
distress. 
Cost of Bankruptcy (Earning Volatility, Eid is defined as the standard deviation of 
EBITDA over the available time period. 
Tax Shields Effects (TS) 
For individual companies, defining tax variables is difficult, because the marginal value 
of the tax shield should be either zero or positive for all companies. As introduced in 
chapter 6, Chinese listed companies generally have tax breaks, and they are protected by 
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local government. The average actual corporate income tax rate is only half of the 
statutory tax rate. It also concluded that taxes have no significant impact on leverage. 
On the other hand, non-debt tax shields (NDTS) might be easier to measure. It is 
defined as the tax deduction for depreciation and investment tax credits. Bradley, etc. 
(1984) used the sum of annual depreciation charges and investment tax credits divided 
by the sum of annual depreciation, interest, and taxes to measure NDTS. Wald (1999) 
used the ratio of depreciation to total assets to measure NDTS. This study uses the 
second measurement to calculate NDTS. Because only depreciation is used, there is no 
tax figure in the measurement. 
Tax Shields Effects (Non-debt tax shield, TS) is defined as depreciation divided by 
total assets. 
7.3. Data Collection 
The public held companies listed on both the Shanghai (SHSE) and Shenzhen (SZSE) 
Stock Exchange is used in this study. The Data is from China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC)38; Shenzhen stock exchange39; and Shanghai stock exchangeao. 
Data from CSRC's Statistical Report System including: 
  Major Index 
  Securities Issuing 
38 hg p: //www. csrc. jzov. cn. 
39 htt p: //www. sse. gov. cn 
40 htt v: //www. sse. com. cn 
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  Listed Companies 
  Trading of Stocks 
  Annual Reports 
CSRC's data includes all Chinese listed companies from both SHSE and SZSE. Data 
can be downloaded from its statistical information website. CSRC provides official 
published information, which has no data quality problem. However, its website only 
provides listed companies' annual reports from 2002 to 2005. As the most important 
data source of this study, audited financial statements are included in companies' annual 
reports. So the study chose CSRC as the data source for the period from 2002 to 2005. 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) is another data source of the study. It provides 
information only for the companies which are listed on SZSE. These companies' annual 
reports can be downloaded from SZSE's disclosure website. These annual reports are 
publicly published and audited. 
On the other hand, Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) provides information for the 
companies which are listed on SHSE. Annual reports of these companies can be 
downloaded from its website. As with the SZSE, the data from SHSE does not have 
quality problem neither. 
The history of the Chinese stock market dates from about 15 years, from 1991. However, 
listed companies officially started to provide annual audited financial statements from 
1995. So, the study's data collection also starts from 1995 to the recently available year 
2005. Data from 1995 to 2001 is from both SZSE and SHSE, while CSRC provides the 
data during 2002 and 2005. 
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Statistics are collected from listed companies' audited financial statements, which are a 
part of the companies' annual report. Financial statements include Balance Sheet, 
Income Statement, and Cash Flow Statement. These statements are audited by an 
individual third-party, normally an accounting company. They are presumed to be all 
correct with no quality problems. 
Sample Set 
In this study, we use both A and B share part listed companies which are listed on two 
stock exchanges SESZ and SHSE. H shares are not included in the sample set. Because 
H share companies are listed in Hong Kong, they have a different market environment 
from mainland China using different accounting standards for financial statements. 
They are excluded in the study. 
In addition, since the balance sheets of the firms in the financial sector (banks, insurance 
companies, and investments trusts) have a significantly different structure from those of 
non-financial companies, financial companies are excluded from the sample4'. Special 
Treatment (ST) listed companies42, which generally suffer heavy losses or financial 
difficulties, are also excluded from the sample. These companies have a high proportion 
of total debt and liabilities. For example, one company which has 633% total debt ratio 
is one of these ST companies. They might affect variables' statistics and distribution. 
The study removed nine ST listed companies from the sample set43. Meanwhile, those 
41 5 financial firms are excluded from the sample. 3 are from the SZSE (000001,000562,000563), 2 are from the 
SHSE (600643,600816). 
42 ST is decided by two mainly kinds of reasons: (1) the companies suffered loss in two consecutive years, 
(2) the equity per share is lower than it's face value. The first ST is from April 1998. The information is 
from the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). 
43 4 ST companies are from SZSE (000003,000015,000556,000588), 5 ST companies are from SHSE 
190 
Chapter 7 Research Design & Data Collection 
companies with any missing observations for any variable measurement are not 
included in the sample set. 
As a result, the final sample set consists of a balanced panel of 720 listed companies 
over a period of 7 years from 1997 to 2005. These listed companies are listed on both 
the SHSE and SZSE. 706 are from A shares, and 14 are from B shares. Among the 706 
A shares part listed companies, 342 are from the SZSE and 364 are from the SHSE; 
Among the 14 B shares part listed companies, 7 are from the SZSE and 7 are from 
SHSE. All of these 14 firms only issued B shares". Table 7.2 lists the sample selection 
procedure. 
Table 7.2 Sample Selection Procedure 
No. of Listed Companies 
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Total A Share B Share SZSE SHSE 
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Total sample 720 706 14 349 371 
One weakness of the sample set is the number of listed companies. The population 
includes the data from 1995 to 2005. However, only 323 companies were listed in 1995, 
530 in 1996, and 745 in 1997 (see table 4.4). The study was facing a choice between 
long time series and large cross-sections. There were two options for the study: 323 
companies and 11 years from 1995; 720 companies and 9 years from 1997. The study 
(600083,600625,600759,600845,600898). 
44 Listed companies in the sample set not include the companies which issued both A share and B share. 
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chose the second one, 720 listed companies and 9 years time series from 1997 to 2005, 
due to it has a larger sample set (larger cross-section) which should be a better example 
to examine the capital structure of Chinese listed companies and also to apply to panel 
data models. 
It is difficult to see how this selection bias would seriously affect the general results of 
the study, but it is arguable that it would not do so because the Chinese listed companies 
have demonstrated quite similar characteristics and operated under the same 
institutional and legal environment. The main purpose of this study is to find out 
whether the fundamental institutional assumptions underpinning the Western models 
would affect the determinants of capital choices of Chinese listed companies. Therefore, 
this selection bias should not be a major concern. 
7.4. INDUSTRY INDEX 
It is known that some industries are characterised by high leverage (for instance, 
capital-intensive manufacturing firms, utilities) while others are known to have low 
leverage (for instance, hi-tech companies, mining companies). Ferri and Jones (1979) 
emphasise the statistical relationship between relative debt structure class and generic 
industry class. Similarly, Harris and Raviv (1991) account for the industry classification 
by commenting that `firms within an industry are more alike than those in different 
industries, and that industries tend to retain their leverage rankings over time'. Thus, the 
industry factor is likely to play an important role in determining the capital structure of 
a firm. This study wants to find the industry pattern in China. 
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Currently, there are three industry classifications in the world. They are: Global 
Industry Classification Standard (GICS), Global Classification System (GCS), and 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). GICS is published by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poor's (S&P), which 
includes 10 economic sectors, 23 industry groups, 59 industries, and 123 sub-industries. 
GCS is published by Financial Times and London Stock Exchange (FTSE), which 
includes 10 economic groups, 39 industry sectors, 102 industry sub-sectors. NAICS is 
published by the United States, which replaced the U. S. Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) system. Table 7.3 shows the comparison of GICS and GCS. 
Table 7.3 Comparison of GICS and GCS 
GICS FTSE GCS 
Code Economic Sector Code Economic Group 
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The industry classification in China refers to International Standard Industrial 
Classification (ISIC) which is published by the United Nations and NAICS. The 
classification of industry by China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was 
published in 1999. There are 13 economic sectors, 86 industry sectors, 307 industry 
sub-sectors, which classified by this regulation. Table 7.4 shows the industry index by 
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CSRC. Finance and insurance sector is excluded from this table. 
There are 380 manufacturing companies, which make up the largest section of the 
sample set. There are 68 conglomerate companies. At the beginning, some of those 
companies were listed as single-sector business. However, some of these decided to 
change and cover multiple sectors. Figure 7.3 shows the image of industry index and 
sample numbers. 
Table 7.4 Industry Index by CSRC 
Index in the Sample Code Economic Sector Sample Number 
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Table 7.5 New Classification of Industry Index 
Index in the Sample Industry Sample Number 
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Because the sector of manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, conglomerates have a 
relatively large number of companies, especially manufacturing sector. The study used a 
new classification of industry by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
which was published in 2002. There are 36 sectors classified by this new regulation. 
Table 7.5 shows the industry index, and Figure 7.4 shows the new classification of 
industry and sample numbers. 
Figure 7.4 New Classification of Industry Index and Sample Number 
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The figure showed the new classification diversified manufacturing sector into many 
small sectors. Even through there are still some sectors significantly larger than others, 
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such as wholesale and retail, conglomerate, raw chemical materials and chemical 
products, and information and technology sector, it is much better than the old 
classification. 
Figure 7.5 below shows the book value of total debt ratio of all samples which is 
classified by the new industry index. The total debt ratio is calculated as a ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. The figure shows all factors' debt ratios are in the range 
between 35% and 65%. The factors with highest debt ratio are transport industry, and 
petroleum processing and coking sectors. They are supposed to have more debt than 
other factors. The factor with lowest debt ratio is the papermaking and printing sector. 
Figure 7.5 New Classification of Industry Index and Debt Ratio 
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All these 36 sectors' debt ratios are close, but also have some differences. This study 
will employ all sectors as dummy variables to examine the industry patterns of capital 
structure for Chinese listed companies. 
7.5. STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Section 7.2 discussed the measurements of dependent and independent variables. This 
section will use a sample set to further discuss some statistics of these variables. The 
statistics of variables including mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
skewness, and kurtosis. 
Dependent Variables 
Using the measurement of TL, TD, SD, and LD, the statistics of dependent variables are 
listed in Table 7.6. The distribution graphs are showed in Figure 7.6. The distribution 
graph of TD showed that some listed companies do not have debts (long term and short 
term) which have 0% TD ratio. It means that these companies do not have bank 
borrowings. On the other hand, the statistic results of SD showed that some companies 
do not have short term debt, some companies have a high proportion of it (maximum 
ratio is 83.82%). 
The results of LD are different to the other three dependent variables. The statistic 
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results showed that its kurtosis is 6.34, and skewness is 2.21. These two figures are 
slightly higher than other dependent variables. In addition, the distribution graph 
showed that many Chinese listed companies do not have long term liabilities or have a 
very low level of long term liabilities. 
Table 7.6 Statistic Results of Dependent Variables 
TL TD SD LD 
Mean 0.4407 0.2230 0.1741 0.0585 
Median 0.4323 0.2141 0.1556 0.0271 
Standard Deviation 0.1823 0.1380 0.1279 0.0811 
Kurtosis -0.1336 -0.0368 0.7455 6.3439 
Skewness 0.2142 0.4555 0.8501 2.2123 
Minimum 0.0091 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1046 
Maximum 0.9941 0.8382 0.8382 0.6064 
Density 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
Figure 7.6 Distributions of Dependent Variables 
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Independent Variables 
According to the discussion above, the original sample set seems imperfect for the 
research because it includes some ST listed companies which significantly affected the 
dependent variables' distribution and statistics. The study also proved that the new 
sample set which excludes the nine ST listed companies is much better than original one. 
All four depended variables obtained better results by using this new sample set. Based 
on this, the study decided to use the new sample set for further analysis. 
According to the discussion of the measurements of independent variables in the 
previous section, the statistic results of these independent variables are calculated using 
the new sample set. The statistics and distributions of these variables are showed below 
in Table 7.7 and Figure 7.7. As the study has already moved the nine ST listed 
companies from the sample set, the statistic results and distribution figures showed that 
these independent variables remained normal. However, GROWTH and DIVID have a 
slightly higher kurtosis. 
Table 7.7 Statistic Results of Independent Variables 
TANG PROF SIZE-1 SIZE-2 GROWTH DIVID SS EV TS 
Mean 0.4915 0.0373 9.0284 9.0853 0.2984 0.4830 -1.0552 0.8579 0.1217 
Median 0.4904 0.0591 9.0087 9.0563 0.2159 0.3331 -0.8530 0.4788 0.1169 
Standard Deviation 0.1776 0.3268 0.3791 0.0686 3.9870 0.7884 0.7357 1.1360 0.1046 
Kurtosis -0.0103 8.7608 0.3495 8.7608 18.8378 19.7027 32789 7.8387 2.1774 
Skewness -0.2399 -1.6023 0.4951 -1.6023 -0.3002 2.6444 -1.7647 2.6687 7.7566 
Minimum 0.0062 -0.4957 7.5521 -0.4957 -29.9714 -4.9750 -4.3342 0.0003 0.0006 
Maximum 1.2662 0.2963 10.4370 0.2963 28.8029 6.7365 -0.1212 6.9425 0.8649 
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Figure 7.7 Distributions of All Independent Variables 
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The results of GROWTH showed that there are many listed companies that have a very 
low growth opportunities ratio, which means their total assets growth is faster than their 
sales growth. This is true in China, because listed companies are more likely to focus on 
their total assets growth in order to get large enough to dominate the domestic market. 
Compared to total assets, companies may pay less attention to sales, and it may also not 
be able to grow fast due to intense competition. 
The results of DIVID showed that there are many listed companies that do not pay 
dividends. As introduced in chapter 6, an average of 60% Chinese listed companies are 
paying dividends. Many profitable listed companies do not pay dividends because they 
want to use retained profit to invest in new projects. This leads to the result that many 
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companies have zero DIVID. On the other hand, the results also showed that some 
listed companies paid dividends even if they have negative net income, and some 
companies paid out dividends more than its net income. The reason for this might be 
because dividends could be seen as a successful sign of listed companies, which can be 
used by the listed company for further bank borrowing. 
Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics of all variables including mean, median, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, skewness, and kurtosis, are reported in Table 7.8. A correlation 
matrix is reported in Table 7.9. It can be seen that most cross-correlation terms for all 
variables are fairly small, thus, give little cause for concern about the problem of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
Table 7.8 showed that mean value of four dependent variables TD, TL, SD, and LD are 
0.22,0.44,0.17, and 0.06 respectively. The results of standard deviation showed that the 
lowest variable is LD (0.08), and the highest one is GROWTH (3.99). It means that LD 
ratio is very stable, but the volatility of GROWTH is significantly high. EV and DIVID 
also have high standard deviation, which are 1.14 and 0.79 respectively. DIVID has the 
highest skewness, which is 19.70. Skewness results of GROWTH and SIZE-2 are 18.84 
and 8.76. On the other hand, TS has the highest kurtosis result, which is 7.76. 
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In addition, table 7.9 showed that TANG is correlated with PROF at 33%, which is the 
highest. SIZE1 and SIZE2 are correlated at 15%. It can be seen that most cross 
correlation terms for independent variables are fairly small, thus giving little cause for 
concern about the problem of multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
7.6. Regression Models 
This study uses panel data models, which allow the research to construct and test more 
complicated behaviour than purely cross-sectional or time-series models. It includes two 
kinds of panel data models: Static Panel Data Models and Dynamic Panel Models. 
Static models generally can be further classified in three ways, in which the estimation 
of a static panel data model can take place, depending on the assumptions made about 
the intercept term: (1) In the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (POLS) Model the 
intercept is treated as a constant across all cross-section units. (2) Using appropriate 
dummy variables, the Fixed Effects (FE) Model allows the intercept to vary between 
cross-section units, so that each unit has a fixed intercept specific to that unit. 
Differences in the intercepts reflect the unobserved differences between cross-section 
units. (3) The Random Effects (RE) Model also allows the intercept to vary between 
units, but treats the variation as randomly determined. (Greene, 2003) The static models 
could, be specified in the following structure: 
yu = ai + X, ',, B + uu i=l ,......, n; t =1,......, 9 
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In the model, y;, =TL, TD, SD, or LD, where i subscript denotes the cross-section 
dimension, X;, is a1xk vector of observations on k explanatory variables for the 
ith firm in the tth period, and ß is akx1 vector of parameters; Xu ={TANG PROF, 
SIZE-1, SIZE-2, GROWTH, DIVID, SS, EV, TS}. 
On the other hand, dynamic panel data models can be estimated by the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), which is used when the regression equation is dynamic 
and includes lagged-dependent variables. The lagged-dependent variables can create a 
bias of the estimates of the classical regression analysis because the error term by 
definition is correlated with one of the regressors, the lagged-dependent variable. 
(Greene, 2003) The general model that can be estimated is a single regression model 
with individual effects of the form: 
Ylt =±akYi(t-k)+/3'(L)x, +A +Ilj +vu t =q+1,..., T,.. i =1,..., N, 
k=1 
where q; and A are respectively individual and time specific effects, xL1 is a vector of 
explanatory variables, ß(L) is a vector of associated polynomials in the lag operator 
and q is the maximum lag length in the model. The number of time periods available on 
the ith individual, Ti, is small and the number of individuals, N, is large. Identification 
of the model requires restrictions on the serial correlation properties of the error term vu 
and/or on the properties of the explanatory variables x; t. 
Software to be Used 
There are several standard software packages that could be used for panel data models. 
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STATA, LIMDEP, TSP, EViews, and PcGive are among the most commonly used. 
PcGive makes several of the standard static panel data estimators available, such as 
between and within groups and feasible GLS. PcGive has six models for static panel 
data, they are: OLS in Levels, Between Estimator, Within Estimator, Feasible GLS, 
GLS (OLS Residuals), and Maximum likelihood (ML). Different models can be chosen 
for comparing the results. 
In the case of a panel dataset, when time series T is small, and the model dynamic, such 
dynamic panel data models are the primary focus of PcGive, particularly the GMM-type 
estimators of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and 
Bond (1998), but also some of the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimators. PcGive has 
five models for dynamic panel data, they are: OLS in Levels, One-step IV Estimation, 
One-step GMM Estimation, One-step Estimation with Robust Std. Errors, and Two-step 
Estimation. 
However, PcGive does not provide the F test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, or 
Hausman test. LIMDEP is another software that can run panel data models. For a fixed 
effects model, LIMDEP's implementation of this model is unconditional. All the 
dummy variable coefficients are actually estimated, with up to 20,000 groups, as well as 
the other model parameters. For a random effects model, integration is done using 
closed forms, Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Butler-Moffitt) or maximum simulated 
likelihood: pseudo random draws or Halton sequences. 
There are also numerous special estimators, such as Arellano and Bond's GMM 
estimator for dynamic panels and Hausman and Taylor's estimator for random effects 
models. No panel data operation anywhere in the program requires that the data set be 
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balanced. Most estimators place no limit on the number of groups in the panel. 
Comparing PcGive and LIMDEP, both of them could be used for panel data models 
including static and dynamic panel data models. PcGive has Wald test, Autocorrelation 
(AR) Test for static panel data models, and Sargan test for dynamic panel data models. 
Meanwhile, LIMDEP provides F test, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test, and Hausman test 
for static panel data models. 
This study uses both PcGive and LIMDEP for the static panel data models, and only 
PcGive for dynamic panel data models. PcGive 10.0 and LIMDEP 8.0 are used in the 
study. 
Model Specification and Selection 
The static panel data models used in this study include a pooled OLS model, a fixed 
effects model and a random effects model. These three models are compared to find out 
which one offers better modelling by examining R squares, Wald or F test, Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test, and Hausman test of the reported coefficients among the three 
models. 
The estimation results of the three static models by using PcGive are reported in Panel A 
of Table 7.10, which shows hypothesis tests including R squared and Wald test, and AR 
tests. Because PcGive does not provide an F test, LM test, or Hausman test directly, this 
study used LIMDEP 8.0 to calculate these tests. The results are listed in Panel B of the 
table. 
It can be seen that the fixed effects model has highest R-squared value, which is 0.8354. 
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The pooled OLS model has the lowest R-squared value (0.6238). The random effects 
model's R-squared value (0.6754) is the other two models. For the joint test, all of the 
three models are significant at a 5% critical level by PcGive (Ward test); and all at a 1% 
level by LIMDEP (F test). 
The LM test is a test for the random effects model based on the OLS residuals. Usually 
the LM test is used to identify the statistical model between the random effects model 
and the pooled OLS model. We obtain an LM test statistic of 757.68 by LIMDEP, which 
is significant at a 1% level. The test is to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
random effects model. It means the random effects model is better than pooled OLS. 
Table 7.10 Static Panel Data Model Comparison 
II Fixed Effects Random Effects Pooled OLS 
stimation Period 
^2 
1998 - 2005 
. 8354 
1998 - 2005 
. 6754 
1998 - 2005 
. 6239 
aid ChiA2 84.6000 (0.0000)** 250.0000 (0.0000)** 16.3000 (0.0000)** 
(1) test 0.5839 (0.5590) 13.1800 (0.0000)** . 3890 (0.0000)** 
(2) test 
Statistic 
3.1680 (0.0020)** 
15.3000 
6.7060 (0.0460)** 
02.7300 
. 0900 (0.0000)** 
688.8600 
rob>F 0.0000) 0.0000) 0.0000) 
Test 57.6800 
ausman Test 5.0800 
The Housman specification test is for the fixed effects model against random effects 
model. The test statistic in this study is 35.08, which is not significant at the 5% level. 
Hence we do not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual 
effects and other regressors. The result implies a preferred use for random effects rather 
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than fixed effects. Based on the tests above, it can be concluded that the random effects 
model is the better choice. 
The dynamic panel data models used in this study include one-step GMM, two-step 
GMM, and combined GMM models. These three models are compared to find out 
which one offers better modelling by examining the Wald test, Sargan test, and AR test. 
The estimation results of the three dynamic models using PcGive are reported in Table 
7.11. It can be seen that the one-step GMM model passed all three tests at a 5% 
significance level, better than the other two models. Two-step GMM model did not pass 
the Sargan test or the AR test, and the Sargan test for combined GMM was not 
significant. This suggests that the one-step GMM model is the better choice for the 
study. 
Table 7.11 Dynamic Panel Data Model Tests 
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Wald Test 508.4000 ** 151.9000 ** 3292.0000 ** 
Sargan Test 66.1300 ** 32.6100 120.3000 
AR Test -4.7000 ** -1.8370 -5.1920 ** 
7.7. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the measurements of dependent variables and independent 
variables. Four dependent variables are chosen for the study, they are: TL, TD, SD, and 
LD. The measurement of independent variables has also been discussed in this chapter. 
It also introduced data collection and the details of the sample set. In addition, the 
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industry index was measured as dummy variable in the study. Finally, the summary 
statistics of all variables were presented and explained. 
The panel data models were also presented, including static and dynamic panel models. 
The study applied panel data to these models by using two types of software - PcGive 
and LIMDEP. The testing results were used to analyze the models. The random effects 
model and the one-step GMM model were selected for the study. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS ANALYSIS 
8.1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 6 discussed the observed debt ratio of Chinese listed companies, and then 
raised this study's hypotheses. Chapter 7 presented the measurements of dependent and 
independent variables. It explained data collection and the sample set of the study. It 
also introduced static and dynamic panel data models, and discussed which model is 
preferred for use in this study. 
Based on the discussions before, this chapter will present the regression results of panel 
data models, and further discuss the results by industry index and variable 
measurement. 
Section 8.2 presents the regression results of both static and dynamic panel data models. 
Section 8.3 discusses the results of variables, and finds significant correlations between 
independent variables and leverage. Section 8.4 further discusses. the relationship 
between state ownership and leverage. Section 8.5 gives a summary of the chapter. 
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8.2. REGRESSION RESULTS 
This section will present the regression results of both static panel data models and 
dynamic panel data models. It will also explain these results and which variable is 
significant correlated with leverage. 
8.2.1. Results of Static Panel Data Models 
According to the discussion in the previous chapter, there are three static panel data 
models, they are: pooled OLS model, fixed effects model, and random effects model. 
The study also found that the random effects model should be a better model for 
examining the sample set. The study ran the random effects model, and also the applied 
fixed effects model and the pooled OLS model as references. 
The coefficients and their standard errors for the static models are presented in Table 8.1, 
Table 8.2, Table 8.3, and Table 8.4. As the study discussed in chapter 7 about software 
use, although there are slightly different levels of significance of the three static models 
by using PcGive and LIMDEP, both software options offer quite similar results. Here, 
the study uses PcGive to run the three static panel data models. 
Total Debt Ratio (TD) 
Table 8.1 showed the regression results for dependent variable TD. According to the 
results of chapter 7, random effects model should be the better model for the study. The 
results of random effects model are used to analyze the significance of independent 
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variables. The results of other two models also are listed in the table as references. 
Table 8.1 Static Panel Data Model - TD 
Dependent Variable: TD 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Random Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Pooled OLS 
t-value 
TANG 0.1601*** 4.0000 0.1401*** 112000 0.0910 * 1.3800 
PROF -0.2296 ""* -4.3800 -0.2475*** -14.6000 -0.3172*** -4.3200 
SIZE-1 -0.0493**' -2.9200 -0.0505*** -14.9000 -0.0499 **' -3.1400 
SIZE-2 0.0735*** 4.5000 0.0749*** 10.6000 0.0579*** 3.9800 
GROWTH -0.0000" -1.6400 -0.0000 -0.6940 -0.0000 -1.1400 
DIVID 0.0000 0.8040 0.0002 0.3110 -0.0010 ** -2.0700 
SS -0.0189 -1.1600 -0.0178**" -3.7600 -0.0150** -2.2800 
EV 0.0000 0.7260 0.0000 0.2200 -0.0000 -1.1500 
TS 0.2820 ""' 3.3400 02325**' 13.5000 0.0862 0.8470 
Constant -0.3845 -2.4400 -0.0542 -0.8420 0.0742 0.6880 
DUM IND 2 0.3697 0.7930 0.0250 0.5040 0.0041 0.4910 
DUM IND 3 0.2325"*" 2.8400 -0.0458 -0.1370 -0.0380 -0.2520 
DUM IND 4 -0.1593* -1.7600 -0.0649" -1.3500 -0.0845" -1.3500 
DUM IND 5 -0.0205 -1.2700 0.0064 0.3840 -0.0117 -0.3160 
DUM IND 6 0.3654*** 6.1900 0.1585 1.2300 0.0588 0.9760 
DUM_IND 7 0.1302 0.5130 -0.1515 -0.3180 0.0339 1.0800 
DUM_IND_8 0.3054*** 8.2900 -0.0989** -1.9700 -0.0928 "* -1.8600 
DUM IND 9 0.1297 *** 2.3400 0.06070 1.3900 0.1489 1.0600 
DUM_IND_10 02565*** 8.9000 0.2478 0.4740 0.0186 0.2990 
DUM_IND_11 0.5541.0" 22.0000 0.0352 0.6730 -0.0065 -0.6450 
DUM IND_12 0.31630.0 20.0000 0.0440 0.6350 -0.0688 -0.9330 
DUM_IND_13 0.21710"' 3.5800 0.0089 1.1300 0.0201 1.0000 
DUM_IND_14 0.0251*** 10.3000 0.0365 0.1630 0.0152 0.3260 
DUM_IND_15 -0.06580"' -3.5500 0.0455* 1.5700 0.0021 1.0800 
DUM IND_16 02950*** 13.4000 0.0346 0.2870 -0.0212 -0.0108 
DUM IND_17 0.08715*' 5.3900 0.0785 0.6140 0.0551 0.9880 
DUM IND 18 0.10130.0 13.2000 0.1075 0.4600 -0.0314 -0.3070 
DUM IND_19 0.1035*** 21.2000 0.0625 0.3170 -0.0400 -0.5370 
DUM_IND_20 0.2380*** 33.9000 0.0508 0.5790 0.0072 0.3490 
DUM_IND 21 0.6344*** 4.8500 0.1639 0.5580 0.0074 0.6650 
DUM IND_22 0.1468*** 12.8000 -0.0736 -1.0600 0.0957 0.6610 
DUM_IND 23 0.0270.0" 6.5400 0.2103 0.1110 -0.0007 -0.1940 
DUM IND_24 0.1222*** 5.1200 0.1194 1.1400 0.0347 0.7440 
DUM_IND 25 0.0318*** 4.0900 0.0115 0.4800 0.0657 0.4660 
DUM_IND_26 0.1998 0.6910 0.0833' 1.7000 0.080900 1.7900 
DUM IND 27 022240" 1.8500 0.0642 0.5650 0.0088 0.6010 
DUM IND 28 0.37085*' 4.7500 0.0614 0.4110 0.0149 0.2700 
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DUM_IND_29 0.2656*** 13.9000 0.1066 0.5380 0.0059 0.2310 
DUM_IND_30 0.1927*** 44.9000 -0.0034 -0.6150 0.0503 0.6060 
DUM_IND_31 0.2554*** 18.9000 0.07469* 1.6400 0.0236* 1.3200 
DUM_IND_33 0.1767*** 4.0700 -0.0052 -0.0319 0.0486 0.2400 
DUM_IND_34 0.0347*** 7.8500 0.0760 0.3620 0.0677 0.4860 
DUM_IND_35 0.4183*** 6.5900 0.0488 0.5800 -0.0496 -0.5980 
DUM_IND_36 0.1832*** 4.2000 0.0520 0.3640 0.0451 0.4910 
DUM IND 37 1.0249*** 2.9700 0.0598 0.3900 0.0320 0.3420 
R"2 0.5490 0.1555 0.1260 
Wald Chi"2 128.7000 (0.0000)** 1046.0000 (0.0000)* * 100.4000 (0.0000)** 
AR(1) test 6.7970 (0.5590)** 43.2900 (0.0000)** 11.5800 (0.0000)** 
AR(2) test 1.7650 (0.0000) 13.9900 (0.0000)** 13.6600 (0.0000)** 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1 %a 5% and 10% levels 
Variable TANG, PROF, SIZE-1, SIZE-2, SS, and TS are significant at a 1% level. PROF 
has a negative correlation with total debt ratio, and the coefficient is -0.2475. It means if 
PROF increases 1%, the total debt ratio will decrease about 0.25%. SIZE-1 has a 
negative relationship with TD, which means Sales is negatively correlated with TD. 
SIZE-2 has positive correlation with TD, which means Total Assets is positively 
correlated with TD. TANG has a positive relationship with TD with the coefficient of 
0.1401. 
In addition, TS has a positive relationship with TD, but SS has a negative correlation. It 
means that listed companies which have a higher total debt level will have a lower state 
owned shares ratio. Their coefficients are all relatively small. 
The results of the industry dummy showed that only one industry sector has significant 
correlation at 5% level with TD, it is: Papermaking and Printing (DUM IND 8). 
Meanwhile, there are four industry factors that have significant correlation with TD at 
10% level, they are: Beverage Manufacturing (DUM_IND 4), Smelting and Processing 
of Ferrous Metals (DUM IND 15), Construction (DUM IND 26), Commerce 
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Brokering and Agent (DUM IND 31). They all have small coefficients. 
Total Liabilities Ratio (TL) 
Table 8.2 showed the regression results for dependent variable TL. 
Table 8.2 Static Panel Data Model - TL 
Dependent Variable: TL 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Random Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Pooled OLS 
t-value 
TANG 0.2054** 1.6500 0.1726*** 72100 0.0570** 1.7500 
PROF -0.5368*** -5.7400 -0.6216*** -18.7000 0.8607 *** -5.8000 
SIZE-1 -0.1191*** -2.6100 -0.1065*** -16.3000 -0.0732 ** -1.9400 
SIZE-2 0.0924*** 2.4800 0.0939*** 7.74000 0.0766 *** 2.7700 
GROWTH -0.0000** -1.8800 -0.0000 -0.5380 0.0001* 1.4900 
DIVID 0.0000 0.0465 -0.0006 -0.6110 -0.0017* -1.3500 
SS -0.0738*** -2.9100 -0.0328*** -4.0900 -0.0033** -1.7200 
EV -0.0005 -0.1800 -0.0000 -0.2050 -0.0005 -0.6710 
TS 0.1498* 1.3500 0.0744** 2.2600 -0.3748 -1.1600 
Constant 0.6396 0.0172 0.0359 0.4080 0.4056 1.1500 
DUM IND_2 0.0146** 2.2109 0.0109 1.0700 0.0172 1.0800 
DUM IND 3 -0.0050** -2.2200 0.0057 0.5950 -0.0034 -0.5150 
DUM_IND 4 0.0268** 1.6700 -0.1173* -1.5600 0.0285 1.2700 
DUM IND_5 0.0035** 1.8400 -0.0007 -0.6770 0.0030 0.7420 
DUM IND 6 0.0135*** 5.2000 0.0187 0.3340 0.0185 0.3360 
DUM_IND 7 0.0155 0.6290 -0.0188 -0.2180 0.0191 0.5870 
DUM IND_8 0.0487*** 6.0700 -0.1426* -1.5100 -0.1215** -2.0100 
DUM_IND 9 0.0868*** 3.2600 0.0562 0.0693 0.0872 0.1770 
DUM IND_10 0.0245*** 7.3100 -0.0100 -0.0259 0.0288 0.0479 
DUM_IND_11 0.0124*** 21.4000 0.0683 0.2540 0.0088 0.1700 
DUM_IND_12 0.0948*** 12.8000 0.2085 0.9550 -0.0834* -1.4300 
DUM_IND_13 0.0252*** 3.0700 0.0337 0.0711 0.0278 0.1920 
DUM IND_14 -0.0034*** -6.8400 -0.0276 -0.4380 0.0027 0.5160 
DUM IND_15 0.0076 02140 0.1457** 2.0400 0.0115 0.9750 
DUM IND_16 0.0264*** 6.9200 0.0644 0.4540 0.0245 0.8080 
DUM IND_17 0.0250*** 3.4200 -0.0115 -0.3650 0.0281 0.4020 
DUM_IND_18 -0.0038*** -6.6400 -0.0392 -0.6090 0.0007 0.7700 
DUM IND_19 0.0086*** 13.2000 0.0449 1.1900 -0.0688* -1.4000 
DUM_IND_20 0.0179*** 16.3000 0.0612 0.1900 0.0196 0.2980 
DUM_IND_21 -0.0041*** -3.9800 -0.0105 -0.8110 0.0021 0.7790 
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DUM IND 22 0.0600*** 8.1800 0.0036 0.1920 0.0635 0.2550 
DUM IND 23 -0.0010*** -5.7000 -0.0135 -0.8390 0.0026 0.8750 
DUM IND 24 0.2018*** 4.4500 0.4149 0.8740 0.2044 0.5120 
DUM IND 25 0.0845*5* 3.1400 0.0757 0.0999 0.0860 0.0505 
DUM IND 26 -0.0030*** -2.4300 -0.0766 -0.0962 0.0012 0.0626 
DUM IND 27 0.0079*** 2.8200 -0.0435 -0.8480 0.0068 1.0000 
DUM IND 28 -0.0026*** -4.4300 0.0552 0.3450 0.0031 0.5740 
DUM IND 29 0.0052*** 5.5700 0.0251 0.1760 0.0001 0.1310 
DUM IND 30 0.0569*** 29.4000 0.0417 0.2470 0.0604 0.1720 
DUM IND 31 0.0250*** 12.2000 0.0079 0.3070 0.0089 0.3120 
DUM IND 33 -0.0458*** -5.5200 -0.0026 -0.3700 0.0365 0.4480 
DUM IND 34 0.012925** 8.8200 0.0052 0.4440 0.0284 0.4940 
DUM IND 35 0.0064*** 4.2400 0.0569 0.2420 0.0346 0.0376 
DUM IND 36 0.1585*** 4.6600 0.0463 0.0855 0.0785 0.0334 
DUM IND 37 -0.15155*' -3.2100 0.0006 0.3100 0.1075 02210 
R^2 0.4893 0.1338 0.1394 
Wild Chi^2 128.7000 (0.0000)** 875.8000 (0.0000)** 113.1000 (0.0000)** 
AR(1) test 2.4510 (0.5590)* 57.5300 (0.0000)5* 3.2920 (0.0000)** 
AR(2) test 0.6489 (0.0000) 16.3800 (0.0000)** 5.3640 (0.0000)'* 
Notes: ***, **and* indicate coefficient is significant at I Yo, 5% and 10% levels. 
Variable TANG, PROF, SIZE-1, SIZE-2, and SS are significant at a 1% level. TANG has 
a positive relationship with TL. PROF has a negative correlation with total liabilities 
ratio, and the coefficient is -0.6216. SIZE-1 has a negative relationship with TL, which 
means Sales is negatively correlated with TL. SIZE-2 has positive correlation with TL, 
which means Total Assets is positively correlated with TL. 
SS has a negative correlation with TL with a coefficient of -0.0328. In addition, TS is 
also significant at a 5% level, and has a positive relationship with TL. 
Similar to TD, the results of the industry dummy showed that only one industry sector 
has a significant correlation with TL at a 5% level, it is: Smelting and Processing of 
Ferrous Metals (DUM IND_15). There are two industry sectors which have a 
significant correlation with TL at a 10% level, they are: Beverage Manufacturing 
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(DUM IND 4), Papermaking and Printing (DUM IND 8). 
Short Term Debt Ratio (SD) 
Table 8.3 showed the regression results for dependent variable SD. 
Table 83 Static Panel Data Model - SD 
Dependent Variable: SD 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Random Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Pooled OLS 
t-value 
TANG 0.1187*** 3.0600 0.0934*** 8.2100 0.0238 0.8990 
PROF -0.2295*** -4.5000 -0.2513*** -16.4000 -0.3412*** -4.7000 
SIZE-1 -0.0475*** -2.8000 -0.0468*** -15.2000 -0.0383*** -2.3900 
SIZE-2 0.0368*** 2.7000 0.0310*** 5.3500 0.0156 1.0700 
GROWTH -0.0000 -0.6360 -0.0000 -0.2650 -0.0000 -0.3800 
DIVID 0.0003 0.4950 0.0001 0.1520 -0.0008** -2.1900 
SS -0.0261** -1.6800 -0.0181*** -4.1900 -0.0121** -2.1800 
EV 0.0000 0.0358 -0.0005 -0.2330 -0.0005 -1.2800 
TS 0.0896** 1.9500 0.0503*** 3.2200 -0.0677*** -2.3600 
Constant -0.0672 -0.4690 0.2422 0.1490 0.3742 0.3570 
DUM IND_2 0.0690*** 2.4400 -0.0737 -1.0200 -0.7470 -0.9980 
DUM_IND 3 0.1351** 1.6900 -0.0099 -0.2320 -0.0137 -0.2800 
DUM IND 4 -0.1474** -1.6700 -0.0523 -1.2000 -0.0545 -1.1600 
DUM_IND 5 0.1355*** 3.3100 0.0265 0.6180 0.0237 0.5780 
DUM IND 6 0.3505*** 6.2100 0.0457 0.9420 0.0255 0.6070 
DUM_IND 7 0.0193 0.0637 0.0299 0.2550 0.0396* 1.3100 
DUM_IND 8 02596*** 7.3000 -0.0711 -1.5600 -0.0575** -1.6600 
DUM_IND 9 0.1255*** 2.3700 0.0768* 1.3900 0.0672 1.1400 
DUM IND_10 0.2221*** 8.4100 0.0207 0.5950 0.0143 0.4200 
DUM IND_II 0.5131*** 21.1000 -0.0273 -0.6490 -0.0240 -0.6240 
DUM IND_12 0.1507*** 12.3000 -0.0774* -1.5400 -0.0821*** -2.4500 
DUM IND_13 0.1174*** 4.9400 0.0318 0.7560 0.0286 0.7240 
DUM IND_14 0.4133*** 10.1000 -0.0080 -0.2070 -0.0127 -0.3760 
DUM_IND 15 0.0019 0.1180 0.0705** 1.7000 0.0557 1.2000 
DUM IND_16 0.1604*** 12.2000 0.0283 0.6040 0.0156 0.3780 
DUM IND_17 0.0921 * 1.5600 -0.0152 -0.2750 -0.0067 -0.1860 
DUM IND_18 0.3120*** 14.7000 0.0169 0.4200 0.0125 0.3390 
DUM_IND_19 02890*** 23.9000 -0.0053 -0.1450 -0.0114 -0.3290 
DUM_IND_20 0.5547*** 32.2000 0.0364 0.9750 0.0274 0.7130 
DUM_IND 21 0.1354*** 2.3700 -0.0324 -0.8560 -0.0323 -0.9190 
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DUM IND 22 0.6743*** 13.2000 0.0763* 1.3800 0.0639 0.9080 
DUM IND 23 0.3910*** 6.9300 -0.0020 -0.0528 -0.0025 -0.0723 
DUM IND 24 0.3420*** 6.0500 0.0814* 1.4700 0.0752 1.0700 
DUM IND 25 0.1293*** 2.3400 0.0192 0.5080 0.0184 0.4930 
DUM IND 26 0.1116** 2.0100 0.0672* 1.5100 0.0643" 1.6200 
DUM IND 27 0.1726*** 3.0200 -0.0252 -0.5200 -0.0262 -0.5940 
DUM IND 28 0.2492*** 4.4800 0.0039 0.0808 -0.0026 -0.0619 
DUM IND 29 0.1106*** 9.1900 0.0157 0.4540 0.0063 0.1850 
DUM IND 30 0.4290*** 57.2000 0.0325 0.9680 0.0327 0.9810 
DUM IND 31 0.2595*** 17.4000 0.0665" 1.6000 0.0548" 1.3700 
DUM IND 33 0.1520*** 5.8500 -0.0031 -0.0822 -0.0082 -0.2480 
DUM IND 34 02566*** 10.8000 0.0346 0.5860 0.0361 0.7370 
DUM_IND 35 0.0312 1.0500 -0.0312 -0.7820 -0.0329 -0.7530 
DUM IND 36 0.1601*** 2.8000 -0.0295 -0.5620 -0.0330 -0.8090 
DUM IND 37 0.1483*** 2.4300 0.0135 0.4040 0.0123 0.3870 
RA2 0.5590 0.1204 0.1295 
Wald Chi^2 2728.0000 (0.0000)** 756.0000 (0.0000)** 67.4700 (0.0000)** 
AR(1) test 6.0220 (0.0000)** 47.2000 (0.0000)** 10.0900 (0.0000)** 
AR(2) test 2.4110 (0.0000)** 16.8900 (0.0000)** 13.0100 (0.0000)** 
Notes: "! "s and *indicate coefficient is significant at 1 %, 5% and] 0% levels. 
Variable TANGS PROF, SIZE-1, SIZE-2, SS, and TS are all significant at a 1% level. 
TANG has a positive relationship with SD. PROF has a negative correlation with total 
liabilities ratio, and the coefficient is -0.2513. SIZE-1 has a negative relationship with 
SD, which means Sales is negatively correlated with SD. SIZE-2 has positive 
correlation with SD, which means Total Assets is positively correlated with SD. 
SS has a negative correlation with SD with a coefficient of -0.0181. In addition, TS is 
also significant at a I% level, and has a positive relationship with SD. 
Similar to TD and TL, the results of the industry dummy showed that only one industry 
sector has a significant correlation with SD at a 5% level, it is: Smelting and Processing 
of Ferrous Metals (DUM IND_15). There are seven industry sectors have significant 
correlation with SD at a 10% level, they are: Papermaking and Printing (DUM_IND_8), 
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Petroleum Processing and Coking (DUM_IND 9), Rubber and Plastic Products 
(DUM IND_12), Instruments, Meters, Culture and Office Machinery (DUM IND 22), 
Other Manufacturing (DUM_IND 24), Construction (DUM IND 26), and Commerce 
Brokering and Agent (DUM IND 31). 
Long Term Liabilities Ratio (LD) 
Table 8.4 showed the regression results for dependent variable LD. 
Table 8.4 Static Panel Data Model - LD 
Dependent Variable: LD 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Random Effects 
t-value Coefficient 
Pooled OLS 
t-value 
TANG 0.0535*** 5.6100 0.0625*** 10.9000 0.0837*** 7.8000 
PROF -0.0137* -1.5000 -0.0077 -0.9840 0.0115* 12900 
SIZE-I -0.0041** -1.7300 -0.0056*** -3.6100 -0.0130 *** -3.7500 
SIZE-2 0.0404*** 3.7200 0.0431*** 14.7000 0.0528*** 6.0900 
GROWTH -0.0000* -1.4700 -0.0100 -0.6080 -0.0000*** -3.6300 
DIVID 0.0001 1.0000 0.0000 0.3530 -0.0023 -0.3120 
SS 0.0026 0.5010 -0.0017 -0.8240 -0.0045** -1.8500 
EV 0.0000 0.0216 0.0005 0.1000 0.0005 0.0143 
TS -0.0544*** -2.5900 -0.0348*** -4.4000 0.0189* 1.3600 
Constant -0.3250 -0.7230 0.3079 0.1060 -0.3550 -0.5130 
DUM IND_2 -0.0198* -1.4500 0.0002 0.0073 -0.0005 -0.0159 
DUM_I14D 3 0.0954*** 4.6000 -0.0034 -0.1650 -0.0034 -0.1660 
DUM_IND_4 0.0108 0.5080 0.0187 0.8940 0.0169 0.5360 
DUM IND 5 0.0489*** 3.4000 -0.0044 -0.2130 -0.0049 -0.2510 
DUM IND_6 0.0407** 1.9200 0.0096 0.4120 0.0149 0.8200 
DUM_IND_7 0.0155 0.8160 -0.0211 -0.3750 -0.0238* -1.5900 
DUM IND_8 0.0639*** 5.6000 -0.0052 -0.2380 -0.0117 -0.6090 
DUM_IND 9 0.0275* 1.5300 -0.0033 -0.1230 -0.0009 -0.0515 
DUM IND_10 0.0176** 1.9500 -0.0027 -0.1630 -0.0010 -0.0611 
DUM_IND_11 0.0562*** 9.4400 -0.0004 -0.0206 -0.0027 -0.1560 
DUM_IND_12 0.1469*** 32.1000 0.0431** 1.7900 0.0442* 1.5800 
DUM_IND_13 0.0124** 1.9100 0.0111 0.5490 0.0108 0.3680 
DUM_IND_14 0.0507*** 3.0400 0.0009 0.0485 0.0021 0.1160 
DUM IND_15 0.0088 0.7830 -0.0114 -0.5750 -0.0068 -0.4080 
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DUM_IND_16 0.0178*** 3.0500 -0.0277 -1.2300 -0.0237 -1.2800 
DUM IND 17 02018*** 8.8000 0.0358* 1.3500 0.0321 1.1800 
DUM_IND_19 -0.0083 -0.7110 -0.0144 -0.7430 -0.0128 -0.6890 
DUM_IND 19 0.0070 1.0600 -0.0112 -0.6360 -0.0103 -0.6410 
DUM_IND 20 0.0413*** 6.7500 -0.0156 -0.8720 -0.0127 -0.7280 
DUM_IND_21 0.2350*** 9.4900 0.0225 1.2400 0.0206 0.9180 
DUM IND 22 0.0107 0.6340 -0.0260 -0.9780 -0.0217 -0.9560 
DUM IND 23 0.0018 0.0991 0.0008 0.0437 0.0003 0.0146 
DUM IND 24 0.0020 0.0930 -0.0193 -0.7280 -0.0186 -0.8640 
DUM IND 25 0.1668*** 7.1100 -0.0011 -0.0602 -0.0029 -0.1620 
DUM IND 26 0.0664*** 3.0500 0.0190 0.8850 0.0186 0.8170 
DUM IND 27 0.0539** 1.8300 -0.0003 -0.0130 -0.0003 -0.0134 
DUM IND 28 0.0584*** 2.4800 -0.0061 -0.2630 -0.0038 -0.1800 
DUM_IND_29 0.0785*** 28.4000 -0.0092 -0.5530 -0.0064 -0.3950 
DUM IND 30 0.0376*** 9.3000 -0.0088 -0.5480 -0.0096 -0.6070 
DUM II D 31 0.0129*** 3.8000 -0.0089 -0.4480 -0.0055 -0.3180 
DUM IND 33 -0.0160 -0.9650 -0.0046 -0.2540 -0.0034 -0.1940 
DUM IND 34 0.0248*** 2.7200 -0.0035 -0.1230 -0.0057 -0.3170 
DUM IND 35 0.2012*** 13.4000 -0.0028 -0.1450 -0.0036 -0.1810 
DUM IND 36 0.0120 0.6370 -0.0056 -0.2220 -0.0059 -0.2330 
DUM IND 37 0.1779*** 7.0300 0.0034 0.2130 0.0027 0.1680 
RA2 0.5219 0.0640 0.1232 
Wald ChIA 2 7026.0000 (0.0000)** 366.6000 (0.0000)** 99.6400 (0.0000)** 
AR(1) test 8.5320 (0.0000)** 40.6000 (0.0000)** 11.3000 (0.0000)** 
AR(2) test 0.1249 (0.0000) 10.2700 (0.0000)** 8.6190 (0.0000)** 
Notes: "t ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at ]? /% 5% and 10% levels 
Variable TANG, SIZE-1, SIZE-2, and TS are all significant at a 1% level. TANG has a 
positive relationship with LD. SIZE-1 has a negative relationship with LD, which 
means Sales is negatively correlated with LD. SIZE-2 has positive correlation with LD, 
which means Total Assets is positively correlated with LD. In addition, TS is also 
significant at a I% level, and has a negative relationship with LD. 
The results of the industry dummy showed that only one industry sector has a 
significant correlation with LD at a 5% level, it is: Rubber and Plastic Products 
(DUM IND_12). There is one industry sector has significant correlation with LD at a 
10% level, which is Metal Products (DUM IND_17). 
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8.2.2. Results of Dynamic Panel Data Models 
According to the discussion in chapter 7, one-step GMM model is the better model for 
the study. The sample set is applied to one-step GMM model by using PcGive. The 
lagged variables include lagged-dependent variables (TD-1, TL-1, SD-i, and LD-1) and 
lagged-independent variables (TANG-1, PROF-l, SIZE-1-1, SIZE-2-1, GROWTH-1, 
DIVID-1, SS-1, EV-1, TS-1). The results are listed in Table 8.5 and Table 8.6. Table 8.5 
listed the results for dependent variable TD and TL. Table 8.6 listed the results of 
dependent variable SD and LD respectively. 
Total Debt Ratio (TD) 
The model has a very small R-square result. However, it passed all tests including Wald 
test, Sargan test, and AR tests. For the lagged variables, the results showed that TD-1, 
SIZE-2-1, GROWTH-1, and EV 1 are significant. 
TD-1 has a significant negative correlation with TD at a 1% level. It means that TDt_1 
affects TDtwhit a coefficient of -0.23. Meanwhile, SIZE-2-1 has a positive correlation 
with TD at a 1% level. GROWTH-1 is significant at 10% level and negatively related to 
TD. EV-1 is positively significant at 5% level, but the coefficient is very small. 
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Total Liabilities Ratio (TL) 
The model passed Wald test and Sargan test. For the lagged variables, the results 
showed that TL-1, TANG-1, SIZE-1-1, GROWTH-1, and EV 1 are significant. 
TL-l has a significant negative correlation with TL at a 5% level. It means that TLt_1 
affects TLt whit a coefficient of -0.05. Meanwhile, TANG-1 is positively correlated with 
TL at a 1% significant level. SIZE-1-1 has a negative correlation with TL at a 5% level. 
GROWTH-1 is significant at 5% level and negatively related to TL. EV-1 is positively 
significant at 5% level, but the coefficient is very small. 
Table 8.5 Dynamic Panel Data Model - TD &TL 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
Depandent Varible: TD & TL 
Independent GMM - TD GMM-TL 
Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
TD(-1) -0.2348*** -6.5300 - - 
TL(-1) - - -0.0512 -2.0800 
TANG 0.1805 "'" 4.4400 0.2253 ** 1.7100 
TANG(-1) -0.0006 -0.0309 0.1086 2.4500 
PROF -0.1269"*" -3.2300 -0.4156 -4.7000 
PROF(-1) -0.0700 -1.0900 -0.0245 -0.1380 
SIZE-1 -0.0344*** -2.4200 -0.0670** -1.8600 
SIZE-1(-1) -0.0043 -0.6300 -0.0219** -2.0100 
SIZE-2 0.0365*** 3.1300 0.0567 "" 2.1100 
SIZE-2(-l) 0.0241*** 2.8800 0.0021 0.1840 
GROWTH -0.0000* -1.5200 -0.0000*** -2.7500 
GROWTH(-1) -0.0000* -1.5600 -0.0000** -2.3000 
DIVID -0.0000 -0.0618 -0.0002 -0.6540 
DIVID(-1) -0.0000 -0.2100 -0.0002 -0.6750 
SS -0.0115 -0.7670 -0.0050 -0.2660 
SS(-1) 0.0022 0.3190 0.0156 0.8420 
EV -0.0001 -0.6470 -0.0002 -0.3350 
EV(-1) 0.0000** 1.8800 0.0001*" 2.0200 
TS 0.4254*** 6.9500 0.0493 0.6920 
TS(-1) 0.0309 0.6380 0.0667** 1.9000 
Constant -0.0055 -1.1400 0.0186 0.2870 
DUM_IND_2 0.0168 1.2300 -0.0193 -1.2600 
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DUM IND 3 0.0026 0.2740 -0.0053 -0.4140 
DUM_IND 4 0.0044 0.4330 0.0125 0.9220 
DUM IND 5 0.0066 0.6990 -0.0076 -0.5960 
DUM ND_6 0.0059 0.4410 -0.0089 -0.4140 
DUM IND 7 0.0183*** 3.4800 -0.0253*** -2.5300 
DUM_IND_8 0.0008 0.0892 -0.0129 -0.9340 
DUM IND 9 0.0069 0.7090 0.0295* 1.3700 
DUM IND_10 0.0024 0.3990 -0.0060 -0.5430 
DUM_IND_11 0.0135 0.7820 0.0227 0.7840 
DUM IND 12 0.0017 0.1500 -0.0240** -1.6500 
DUM IND_13 0.0097 1.1900 -0.0042 -0.3520 
DUM IND 14 -0.0041 -0.5990 -0.0163* -1.4800 
DUM IND 15 0.0130* 1.3000 0.0723 0.9700 
DUM IND 16 0.0194*** 2.6700 0.0054 0.4410 
DUM_IND_17 -0.0031 -0.1860 -0.0098 -0.5330 
DUM_IND_18 -0.0049 -0.5380 -0.0017 -0.1600 
DUM IND 19 0.0138** 1.7200 -0.0069 -0.5690 
DUM IND 20 0.0045 0.5770 -0.0083 -0.6820 
DUM IND 21 0.0034 0.3530 -0.0108 -0.8230 
DUM IND 22 -0.0082 -0.4000 . -0.0477** -2.0800 
DUM_IND 23 0.0072 0.8820 -0.0114 -0.9950 
DUM IND 24 0.0165 0.6710 0.0464 0.9370 
DUM_IND 25 0.0019 0.1700 -0.0120 -0.8330 
DUM_IND 26 0.0106 0.8700 -0.0048 -0.3260 
DUM_IND_27 -0.0066 -0.7030 -0.0221 * -1.6400 
DUM IND 28 0.0093* 1.4300 -0.0241 -1.7400 
DUM_1ND 29 0.0016 0.1930 0.0028 0.1810 
DUM_IND 30 0.0199** 2.0300 0.0037 0.2450 
DUM IND 31 0.0042 0.4980 -0.0030 -0.2350 
DUM IND 33 0.0096* 1.4700 -0.0107 -0.9540 
DUM IND 34 0.0271*** 2.8700 -0.0061 -0.3100 
DUM IND 35 0.0190* 1.3500 0.0536 0.0874 
DUM IND 36 -0.0090* -1.3400 -0.0170 -0.9900 
DUM IND 37 0.0053 0.8500 -0.0031 -0.2870 
RA2 0.0970 0.1462 
Wald Ch1"2 555.2000 (0.0000)** 250.2000 (0.0000)** 
Sargan Test 66.6100 [0.0010] ** 110.7000 (0.0000)** 
AR(1) test -2.9770 [0.0030] ** -0.9262 [0.3540] 
AR(2) test -3.0820 [0.00201 ** 0.5232 10.60101 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
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Short Term Debt Ratio 
The model passed the Wald test, Sargan test, and has a very small R-square. For the 
lagged variables, the results showed that SD-1, SIZE-2-1, are significant. 
SD-1 has a significant negative correlation with SD at a 1% level. It means that SDt_1 
affects SDtwhit a coefficient of -0.23. Meanwhile, SIZE-2-1 has a positive correlation 
with TD at a 5% level, but the coefficient is small. 
Long Term Liabilities Ratio (LD) 
The model passed the Wald test, Sargan test, and AR tests, but has a small R-square 
result. For the lagged variables, the results showed that LD-1, TANG-1, PROF-1, 
SIZE-2-1, DIVID-1, and EV-1 are significant. 
LD-1 has a significant negative correlation with LD at a 1% level. It means that LDt_1 
affects LDt with a coefficient of -0.23. Meanwhile, TANG-1 is positively correlative 
with LD at a 5% significant level. PROF-1 has a negative relationship with LD at a 5% 
significant level. SIZE-2-1 has a positive correlation with LD at a 10% level. DIVID-1 
is significant at 1% level and positively related to LD. EV 1 is positively significant at 
5% level. All these lagged-independent variables have small coefficients. 
Table 8.6 Dynamic Panel Data Model - SD &LD 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
Depandent Varible: SD & LD 
Independent GMM - SD GMM-LD 
Variables Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
SD(-1) -0.2288'*" -4.8500 -- 
LD(-1) -- -0.2246"*" -5.5200 
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TANG 0.1779 **' 42900 0.01718 ** 2.1700 
TANG(-1) 0.0068 0.4430 0.0238** 1.9000 
PROF -0.1288*** -3.4700 -0.0072 -0.8680 
PROF(-l) -0.0742 -1.1600 -0.0094** -1.7300 
SIZE-1 -0.0284** -2.0000 -0.0028* -1.5700 
SIZE-1(-1) -0.0037 -0.5840 -0.0003 -0.2040 
SIZE-2 0.0121 0.8410 0.0218*** 3.0300 
SIZE-2(-1) 0.0122** 2.0200 0.0079* 1.5100 
GROWTH -0.0000 -1.0700 -0.0000* -1.3900 
GROWTH(-1) -0.0000 -1.2100 -0.0000 -0.5470 
DIVID -0.0001 -0.6220 0.0001*** 2.5400 
DIV1D(-1) -0.0001 -0.6480 0.0001*** 2.5600 
SS -0.0058 -0.3740 0.0011 0.1850 
SS(-1) -0.0008 -0.1250 -0.0007 -0.1700 
EV -0.0001 -0.5140 -0.0001 -1.1400 
EV(-1) -0.0000 0.5060 0.0000** 2.1600 
TS 0.0814 ** 1.9700 -0.0441*** -3.5000 
TS(-1) -0.0094 -0.7020 0.0084 0.6040 
Constant 0.0070 1.2700 -0.0068 -0.1670 
DUM IND 2 -0.0018 -0.1650 0.0133 1.2800 
DUM_IND 3 -0.0102* -1.3900 0.0119** 1.6800 
DUM IND 4 -0.0058 -0.5680 0.0074 1.0100 
DUM IND 5 0.0068 0.7780 0.0035 0.5920 
DUM_IND_6 0.0035 0.2830 -0.0051 -0.6880 
DUM IND 7 0.0162*** 2.7000 0.0002 0.0442 
DUM IND_8 -0.0041 -0.4940 0.0068 0.9780 
DUM IND 9 -0.0011 -0.1250 0.0043 0.9180 
DUM_IND_10 -0.0091* -1.4300 0.0084** 1.7900 
DUM_IND_11 0.0049 0.3060 0.0078* 1.3000 
DUM IND_12 -0.0087 -1.2400 0.0144* 1.4400 
DUM IND_13 0.0046 0.5230 0.0038 0.6110 
DUM IND 14 -0.0104* -1.5100 0.0010 0.1730 
DUM_IND_15 0.0015 0.1620 0.0080* 1.2900 
DUM IND_16 0.0071 0.9070 0.0074* 1.6000 
DUM IND_17 0.0027 0.2320 -0.0018 -0.3510 
DUM IND_18 -0.0064 -0.8140 0.0030 0.4610 
DUM_IND_19 0.0064 0.8090 0.0057 1.1900 
DUM IND 20 -0.0018 -0.2210 0.0123** 1.7800 
DUM_IND_21 -0.0097 -1.0500 0.0099** 1.7500 
DUM IND 22 -0.0152 -0.6960 0.0080** 1.6800 
DUM_IND_23 -0.0073 -0.9180 0.0096* 1.5800 
DUM IND_24 0.0157 0.7230 -0.0023 -0.4270 
DUM IND 2S -0.0043 -0.4160 0.0083* 1.5500 
DUM_IND 26 0.0094 0.9070 0.0001 0.0214 
DUM_IND_27 -0.0158* -1.7500 0.0104** 1.7500 
DUM_IND_29 0.0023 0.3340 0.0020 0.3660 
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DUM IND 29 -0.01330 -1.5800 0.0115"*" 2.5400 
DUM_1ND 30 0.0101 0.9980 0.0081"" 1.8400 
DUM_IND 31 -0.0146' -1.7300 0.0174""" 2.5900 
DUM CVD 33 -0.0053 -0.7930 0.0093"" 1.8400 
DUM IND 34 0.0123' 1.3200 0.0135*" 1.7100 
DUM_IND 35 0.0054 0.3520 0.0124*" 2.3600 
DUM_IND 36 -0.0100 -1.0800 0.0029 0.4530 
DUM_IND_37 -0.0044 -0.6600 0.0095** 2.0700 
R"2 0.0858 0.0452 
Wald Ch1"2 247.8000 (0.0000)'" 162.9000 (0.0000)*" 
Sargan Test 108.5000 [0.0000]'" 57.3800 [0.0130] 
AR(1) test -2.2170 [0.0270] " -3.2100 [0.0010] "" 
AR(2) test -1.9420 [0.0520] -5.8610 [0.0000]'" 
Notes: "*, " and* indicate coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
8.3. RESULTS ANALYSIS 
Based on the regression results which are presented in the previous section, the study 
analyses the results of both static panel data models and dynamic panel data models in 
this section. It will sum up the results of all models and discover the relationships 
between independent variables and dependent variables. It includes three parts: (1) static 
panel data models analysis; (2) dynamic panel data models analysis; (3) industry effect 
analysis. 
8.3.1. Static Panel Data Models Analysis 
Asset Structure 
In chapter 6, hypothesis one suggests that there is a positive relationship between asset 
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structure and leverage ratios. The results of all static panel data models support this 
hypothesis, and they are all statistically significant at I% level. 
Table 8.7 Regression Results of Tangible Assets 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD + 1% 
TL + 1% 
SD + 1% 
LD + 1% 
This study confirms the positive relationship between a company's leverage and the 
tangibility of its assets. The result shows that the presence of tangible assets plays an 
important role in determining the borrowing capacity of the firm, and it reduces agency 
costs as debts can be secured with known tangible assets that have alternative 
redeployable uses should a default occur. Tangible assets positively correlated with all 
'dependent variables. The coefficient of tangible assets in model SD and LD are small 
(0.09 and 0.06 respectively). It means tangible assets have a weak correlation with SD 
and LD. 
The relationship between tangible assets and short term debt might be weakened by 
Chinese banks' guaranteed loans. Sometimes the Chinese lending bank requires a third 
party to guarantee the loans for project financing. Chinese listed companies usually 
guarantee for each other to obtain secured short term loans from banks. It means that 
listed companies can borrow from banks in this way without high tangibility. Because it 
happens widely in China, the study expects that this characteristic of listed companies' 
bank borrowing affected the relationship between tangible assets and SD. 
228 
Chapter 8 Results Analysis 
The relationship between tangible assets and long term liabilities ratio is weak because 
Chinese listed companies usually use tangible assets for bank loans. Most of these 
banks loans are short term bank loans (within 1 year, chapter 4 and 6), which are not 
included in long term liabilities. 
Profitability 
Trade-off models suggest that profitable firms should borrow more, while pecking order 
theory suggests firms will use retained earnings first as investment funds and then move 
to bonds and new equity only if necessary. This study's hypothesis two supports pecking 
order theory, and suggests that there is an inverse relationship between profitability and 
leverage. The result confirms this suggestion. Most models have negative coefficient 
and are significant at a 1% level, except long term liabilities ratio. 
Table 8.8 Regression Results of Profitability 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD - 1% 
TL - 1% 
SD - 1% 
LD No 
As Myers (1989) describes, profitability is the single largest determinant of leverage. 
His study claims that the negative coefficient on profitability implies evidence for the 
pecking order hypothesis. This study's results showed that profitability has significant 
negative relationship with TD, TL, and SD. It means that Chinese listed companies 
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prefer to finance new projects from their retained earnings. Profitable listed companies 
have less debt. 
However, there is a negative correlation between profitability and long term liabilities 
ratio, but is not significant. According to the discussion in chapter 6, Chinese listed 
companies seem to use retained earnings first as investment funds, then bank borrowing 
and equity issuance. Short term bank loans are not included in long term liabilities. 
Profitability cannot significantly affect a company's LD. 
Firm Size 
Agency theory (Jensen, 1986) and transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1988) 
suggest that large firms issue more long-term debt because shareholders could use debt 
to better control management behaviours due to more dilute ownership. On the other 
hand, pecking order theory suggests that larger firms with less asymmetric information 
problems should tend to have more equity than debt and thus have lower leverage. Due 
to the different institutional environment, the study suggests that neither of them can be 
applied in China. 
Hypothesis three suggests that there is a positive relationship between size of firm and 
leverage as firm size has strong impact on bank borrowing in China. The results confirm 
this suggestion. The results of Size-1 (Sales) are all negatively correlated with 
dependent variables. However, the results of Size-2 (Total Assets) are all positively 
related to dependent variables. All results are significant at a 1% level. 
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Table 8.9 Regression Results of Size-1 (Sales) 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD - 1% 
TL - 1% 
SD - 1% 
LD - 1% 
Table 8.10 Regression Results of Size-2 (Total Assets) 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD + 1% 
TL + 1% 
SD + 1% 
LD + 1% 
Sales has negative correlations with dependent variables. Because high Sales means 
high retained earnings, this leads to companies having less debt. Otherwise, Total Assets 
has positive correlations with all dependent variables. Large Chinese listed companies 
have privileges in bank borrowing due to their government related background. Because 
most large companies have a high level of state owned shares, they might find it easier 
to borrow from banks due to their state owned background. It means that large listed 
companies have higher leverage. 
However, the coefficients of Total Assets are relatively small. The study suggests that 
large listed companies have better access to capital markets for equity finance because 
usually they have higher total assets and profitability which are advantageous in rights 
issue and followup offering. Therefore, they find it easier than smaller sized companies 
to issue new shares for project financing. It can be understood that large companies 
cannot only finance from bank borrowing, but can also use equity issuance. Comparing 
these two options, new share issuance is more difficult because of the tight regulation 
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and small issuance allowance. 
Growth Opportunity 
Hypothesis four suggests that there is a positive relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. The results do not support a positive sign. All models are not 
significant, and the coefficients in the study are small. 
Table 8.11 Regression Results of Growth Opportunity 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD - No 
TL - No 
SD - No 
LD - No 
Growth Opportunity has negative but not significant correlations with dependent 
variables. Trade off theory suggests that companies which have future growth 
opportunities will tend to have lower leverage. Because growth opportunities are a form 
of intangible assets, they cannot be collateralised. In China, most listed companies are 
in the manufacturing and heavy industry sectors (see Chapter 6). They normally have 
more tangible assets and less intangible assets. For such generally low technology level 
Chinese listed companies, trade off theory's suggestion might not be the reason for the 
study's results. 
On the other hand, high growth listed companies find it easier to issue equity than low 
growth companies because they have better performance and higher profitability. They 
also have higher retained earnings for project financing. These might reduce the 
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correlation between Growth Opportunity and leverage. 
Dividend Policy 
Tax-adjusted models surmise that if capital gains taxes are higher than dividend income 
taxes then firms with a high payout ratio will have a higher debt ratio, while agency 
costs suggests that dividend and debt interest payments decrease the free cash flow 
available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager 
perquisite consumption. However, both theories can not be applied in China (chapter 6). 
Hypothesis five suggests that there is a positive relationship between dividend policy 
and leverage. The results showed that most of them have positive signs but are not 
significant. 
Table 8.12 Regression Results of Dividend Policy 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD + No 
TL - No 
SD + No 
LD + No 
Many Chinese listed companies are growing fast and need free cash flow to invest in net 
present value projects. As the study discussed earlier, retained profit might be the 
quickest and easiest source of finance for these projects. It means that some companies 
reduce or do not pay dividend to shareholders. 
On the other hand, many listed companies which pay dividends propose to give a signal 
or message to investors that they are doing well, in order to seek further financing in the 
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capital market through bank loans. Because equity issuing has tight regulations and 
limited allowance amounts, listed companies will prefer bank borrowing as the main 
method of financing in this case. It means that there is a positive relationship between 
dividend payout and leverage ratio from this point of view. However, the regression 
results showed that this relationship is not significant. 
Combining the two discussions above, the study concludes that Chinese listed 
companies' dividend policy does not have significant impact on leverage. However, 
some of them use dividend payouts as a signal to inform investors that they are doing 
well in order to borrow more from banks. Unfortunately, not all of profitable listed 
companies pay dividends. Some of them use retained profit as the first choice for their 
financing. This might explain why the regression results have positive signs but are not 
significant. 
State Owned Shares 
Agency theory suggests that the optimal structure of leverage and ownership may be 
used to minimize total agency costs. They propose two types of conflicts of interest: 
conflicts between shareholders and managers, and conflicts between shareholders and 
debtholders. However, Chinese listed companies' management level do not hold shares. 
In addition, due to undeveloped corporate bond markets and- a tight regulation 
environment, most listed companies do not issue corporate bonds. Neither conflicts 
between shareholders and managers nor conflicts between shareholders and debtholders, 
works in China. 
Hypothesis six suggests that there is an indeterminate (either positive or negative) 
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relationship between state-owned shares ratio and leverage. The results showed that 
most models have negative signs and are significant at 1% level, except long term 
liabilities, which is not significant. 
Table 8.13 Regression Results of State Owned Shares 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD - 1% 
TL 1% 
SD - 1% 
LD - No 
State Owned Shares has negative correlations with all dependent variables. However, all 
coefficients are small, which means weak correlations. According to chapter 6, listed 
companies which have a high level of state owned shares would have a deeper and 
wider relationship with government, and would thus find it easier to have bank loans. 
Chinese listed companies either state owned companies or non state owned companies 
can finance from bank loans easily. However, state owned shares ratio has significant 
negative correlation with short term debt ratio. This result showed that the above 
suggestion might not be true. 
On the other hand, listed companies can also finance by equity issuing. Companies 
which have high state owned shares might find it easier to issue new equity. Listed 
companies which have higher state owned shares might tend to use their government 
connections more to finance from equity issuing. However, only a small number of 
listed companies can issue new equity each year. This may have only a weak impact on 
the relationship between state ownership and leverage. 
The discussions above still cannot clearly explain the regression results, especially the 
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negative signs. One existing question is whether there is any indigenous reasons which 
have not yet been discovered? For example: the measurement of state ownership. 
According to the discussion in chapter 5, many listed companies (about 20%) do not 
have state owned shares, while about 30% of listed companies have a high level of state 
owned shares, which are within the range between 60% to 80% of their outstanding 
shares. This characteristic shows that the study's current measurement might be wrong 
or not good enough to explain Chinese listed companies' state ownership. The study 
will further discuss the relationship between state owned shares and leverage in next 
section. 
Cost of Bankruptcy 
Trade-off theory suggests that firms with highly volatile earnings should borrow the 
least. According to the discussion in chapter 6, the cost of financial distress seems to not 
impact on debt ratios in China. The study therefore assumes that there is an 
indeterminate relationship (or no relationship) between the cost of financial distress and 
leverage in China. The regression results for the cost of bankruptcy are not significant. 
It suggests that the relationship between earning volatility and leverage is not clear. 
Table 8.14 Regression Results of Cost of Bankruptcy 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD + No 
TL No 
SD No 
LD + No 
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The study supposes that there are two main reasons which lead to this result. Firstly, 
borrowing from banks is the main way to finance companies in China, but the interest 
rate is not elasticized. Thus the relationship between bankruptcy costs and leverage is 
not obscure. 
Secondly, issuing new shares is difficult. To apply for new share issuance, a company 
must ensure that its annual return on net assets in the past three years exceeds an 
average of 10%as. A listed company could allot new shares only once a year that was 
limited to at most 30% of the existing equity capital. If a listed company cannot issue 
new shares, it does not care about the leverage ratio, because the only one way left to 
finance is to borrow from a bank. 
Tax Shields Effects 
The results for non-debt tax shields are mostly positive signs, and significant at a 1% 
level. Bradley et al. (1984) find leverage is positively related with NDTS. NDTS is 
highly correlated with tangible asset. The results are similar with Tangible Assets. It 
means that Chinese listed companies might use NDTS to reduce tax. 
Table 8.15 Regression Results of Tax Shield Effects 
Dependent Variables Correlation Significant Level 
TD + 1% 
TL + 5% 
SD + 1% 
LD - 1% 
45 Source: CSRC 
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8.3.2. Dynamic Panel Data Models Analysis 
Table 8.16 listed the summary of the dynamic panel date models' results including 
correlation signs and significant levels. The table showed that all lagged-dependent 
variables have negative signs and significant at 1% or 5% level. It means that 
lagged-dependent variables have negative relationship with dependent variables. It 
seems Chinese listed companies might have target debt ratios, and trying to reach them 
during the period. 
According to trade-off models, the optimal capital structure does exist, and a firm is 
regarded as setting a target debt level and gradually moving towards it. Modigliani and 
Miller's irrelevance theory (1958,1963) suggests that debt provides a corporate interest 
tax shield, and this tax shield may more than compensate for any extra personal tax that 
the investor has to pay on debt interest. Also, high debt levels may spur managers to 
work harder and to run a tighter ship. But debt has its drawbacks if it leads to costly 
financial distress. The firm's optimal capital structure will involve the trade-off among 
the effects of corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs and agency costs, etc. 
However, as discussed in chapter 6, China has different institutional environment, such 
as: undeveloped corporate bond market, tax preference, bankruptcy difficulty, 
ownership concentration, the agency and monitoring problems existed in the former 
SOEs, etc. These factors suggest that the possible target debt-equity ratio predicted by 
the dynamic panel date models may not be the effect of the relationship between 
leverage and taxes as the assumptions are different in China as suggested by the 
trade-off models. It may well be that Chinese listed companies mainly use bank loans 
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for new projects, and they do not have alternative options to finance. 
Table 8.16 Dynamic Models Results Summary - Correlation and Significant Level 
TD TL SD LD 
Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Correlation Correlation Correlation Correlation 
Level Level Level Level 
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The results of lagged-independent variables showed many of them are not significant. 
For Tangible Assets, lagged-Tangible Assets significantly correlated to TL and LD with 
positive signs, but are not significant with TD and SD. The positive signs showed that 
the previous year's tangible assets positively affects leverage. This result showed that 
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the previous year's tangible assets only affect company's liabilities (total liabilities and 
long term liabilities), but do not affect short term debt (total debt and short term debt). 
No significant results with TD and SD further proved the discussion about listed 
companies using tangible assets for bank loan financing. According to the discussion in 
previous chapters, the relationship between tangible assets and short term debt might be 
weakening because they can guarantee for each other to obtain bank loans. Listed 
companies can finance from short term bank loans without high tangibility. From this 
point of view, it does make sense why lagged-Tangible Assets has no significant 
correlation with TD and SD. 
For Profitability, the results of lagged-Profitability were surprisingly not significant. 
They all have negative signs with all dependent variables, but only LD was significant 
at 5% level. This result showed that the previous year's profitability does not have 
significant impact to the current year's leverage. 
For Firm Size, lagged-Size-2 (Total Assets) is significant to most dependent variables 
with positive signs. It means previous year's total assets has a positive relationship with 
leverage. The result showed that large Chinese listed companies might have privileges 
in bank borrowing due to their deeply government related background. As most large 
listed companies have a high level of state owned shares, they might be able to borrow 
from banks much easier than smaller companies. 
For State Owned Shares, all results of lagged-State Owned Shares Ratio are not 
significant. It means that the previous year's state owned shares ratio has no significant 
impact to leverage. One possible reason is Chinese listed companies' state owned shares 
do not frequently change. Normally the ratio keeps the similar percentage comparison 
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with the previous year. 
83.3. Industry Effect Analysis 
In all developed countries, capital structures have pronounced industry patterns. 
However, in this study, it found it is different in the case of Chinese listed companies. 
From the regression results, the study found that nearly all of the industry dummy 
variables are not significant. Table 8.17 listed a summary of these results. 
Table 8.17 Summary of Industry Dummy- Correlation and Significant Level 
TL TD SD LD 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
DUM II D4 - 10% - 10% 
D[Jlýl LýJD S - 10% - 5% - 10% 
DUM ND 9 + 10% 
DUM_LND_12 - 10% + 5% 
DUM_LND 15 + 10% + 10% + 5% 
DUM IND 17 + 10% 
DUM IND_22 + 10% 
DUM LND 24 + 10% 
DUM LND 26 + 10% + 10% 
DUM_IND 31 + 10% + 10% 
The table presented all significant industry dummy by its correlation signs and 
significant levels. It showed that DUM IND 8 and DUM_IND_15 are significant with 
most dependent variables. Industry DUM_IND_8 (Papermaking and Printing) has 
negative correlation with leverage. Industry DUM IND_15 (Smelting and Processing of 
241 
Chapter 8 Results Analysis 
Ferrous Metals) has positive correlation with leverage. 
In addition, industry DUM_IND 4 (Beverage Manufacturing) negatively correlated 
with TD and TL, while industry DUM_IND 26 (Construction) and DUM IND 31 
(Commerce Brokering and Agent) positively correlated with TD and SD. 
According to the empirical studies, some industries are characterised by high leverage 
(such as: capital-intensive manufacturing companies, utilities) while others are proved 
to have low leverage (such as: hi-technology companies, mining companies). However, 
it is difficult to find the industry effect pattern from the study's regression results. It did 
present some manufacturing industries having a positive relationship with leverage, but 
there is no strong sign showing that these companies are significantly correlated to 
leverage. 
One possible reason is because the large index (36 indexes) affects degrees of freedom. 
To verify this suggest, the study changed the classification of the industry index from 36 
to 21, and tried to find some differences. The new industry index is shown in Table 8.18. 
This classification of industry was published by CSRC in 1999. Some industries which 
used this before are consolidated. As a result, machinery, equipment and meter sector 
becomes the biggest section (115 firms) of the sample set. 
The random effects model was applied by this relatively smaller industry index. 
However, the result was very similar as before, where most dummy variables were not 
significant. The study also tried using cross section regression models to verify this 
problem. It chose the data of 2005 (720 firms) from this study's data set as the cross 
section data set, and applied by PcGive. The result was almost the same as before. 
Chinese listed companies' financing systems might be the reason why there is no 
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significant industry effect. As the study discussed earlier, Chinese listed companies 
mainly finance from short term bank loans or use retained profit to finance their new 
projects. Both manufacturing companies and IT companies are using the same way to 
finance. The undeveloped corporate bond market might be the root of this problem. 
Table 8.18 New Industry Index (21 Sectors) 
Industry Sample Number 
1 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 14 
2 Mining 5 
3 Food, Beverage 29 
4 Textile, Apparel, Leather 26 
5 Wood Product I 
6 paper, Printing 11 
7 Petroleum, Chemical Product, Plastics, Rubber 83 
8 Electrical Equipment 14 
9 Metal, Non-metallic Mineral Product 63 
10 Machinery, Equipment, Meter 115 
11 Medicine, biologic Product 31 
12 Other Manufacturing 7 
13 Electricity, Gas, Water Supply 27 
14 Construction 12 
15 Transport, Storage 21 
16 Information, Technology 47 
17 Wholesale and Retail Trade 84 
18 Real Estate 28 
19 Social Services 26 
20 Transmission, Culture 8 
21 Conglomerate 68 
Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
8.4. FURTHER DISCUSSION: OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE 
Ownership structure clearly seems to influence capital structure (Megginson, 1996). The 
more concentrated a company's ownership structure the more debt it seems to desire 
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and to be able to tolerate. Ownership structure of Chinese listed companies is different 
from developed countries. The institutional environment of Chinese companies is a 
salient feature, because most Chinese listed companies were state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and the state still maintains its controlling right after the companies go public. 
The government still have a controlling right of these listed companies by holding huge 
numbers of state owned shares. From this point of view, state ownership structure is the 
most important character of Chinese listed companies. 
For example, Chinese listed companies have high levels of non-tradable shares, which 
amounted to 61.80% of total shares at the end of 2005. The largest part of non-tradable 
shares are state owned shares which are owned by either central government or local 
government. It constituted 47.37% of total issued shares at the end of 2005. This high 
concentrate ownership may affect corporate financing and capital structure. 46 
Due to this background, companies with high state owned shares supposedly have a 
closer relationship with government, which could affect their financing policy. The 
discussion in chapter 6 also suggested that these companies, which have a high level of 
state owned shares, would find it easier to have bank loans because of their close 
relationship with government. 
The study focused on this characteristic of Chinese listed companies, and raised a 
hypothesis about the relationship between state owned shares and leverage. However, 
according to the regression results in Section 8.3, state owned shares ratio has a 
negative relationship with leverage. Table 8.13 listed the regression results for each 
model. The results do not support the hypothesis set on the ownership. 
46 Figures are from the calculations of chapter 5. 
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Did the regression results tell us the real relationship between state owned shares and 
leverage, or is there any indigenous reasons which have not been discovered yet? For 
example, state owned companies are normally concentrated in particular industries, such 
as Petroleum, Chemical Product, Machinery, etc. On the other hand, some industries 
such as IT and Retail have more non state owned companies. This industry pattern may 
have an impact on the relationship between state owned shares and leverage. 
In addition, according to the discussion in chapter 5, there are a large number of listed 
companies which do not have state owned shares, and the remaining companies mostly 
concentrate within the range between 30% and 70%, especially from 50% to 70%, of 
their outstanding shares. There might be some interesting results found by using a range 
of dummy variables to replace the state owned shares ratio in the regression models. 
To answer these questions, this section will further investigate the relationship in details 
by two subsections: state ownership's industry pattern and range dummy. 
8.4.1. State Ownership's Industry Pattern 
The study used state owned shares ratio to measure state ownership in the previous 
models. The regression results showed that most models have negative signs, and are 
significant at 1% level, except long term liabilities, which is not significant. As a result 
of the discussion in previous chapters, the study suggested that Chinese listed 
companies, either state owned companies or non state owned companies, find it easy to 
finance from bank loans. However, the results showed that state owned shares ratio has 
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significant negative correlation with short term debt ratio. 
Does this mean that the discussions and suggestions in chapter 5 and 6 were wrong? 
The study suggests that there may be some indigenous reasons which have, not been 
discovered. Industry patterns might be one of them. The correlation between state 
ownership and leverage might be different in different industries. For example, some 
industries such as Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products, Special Purpose 
Equipment, Transport Equipment, etc, have more state owned companies than other 
industries. On the other hand, some industries such as Information Technology, 
Wholesale and Retail, etc, have less state owned companies than others. 
This section chooses some particular industries which might have more or less state 
owned companies, and run a panel data model by using each individual industry's data. 
This means the new regressions will use much smaller data sets (individual industry) to 
find the relationship between state owned shares and leverage in each industry. It will 
only use Random Effects models to run the panel data, which has been proved to be 
better than other models for Chinese listed companies in the previous chapters. 
According to industry classification, Chinese listed companies can be classified by 36 
sectors (see Table 7.4). Due to the data limitation, the study only uses the largest five 
industries for this analysis. 7 Their name, industry ID, and company numbers are listed 
below in Table 8.19. 
47 As the result of the discussion in chapter 7, this data set did not include financial industry. This 
analysis also did not include Conglomerate Industry, which has 68 listed companies, due to the difficulties 
of defining whether these companies are state owned. 
246 
Chapter 8 Results Analysis 
Table 8.19 Top 5 Industries in the Sample Set 
Industry Name Industry ID Sample Number 
1 Wholesale and Retail 30 68 
2 Information and Technology 29 47 
3 Chemical Materials and Chemical Products 10 45 
4 Special Purpose Equipment 19 31 
5 Raw Medical and Pharmaceutical Products 23 31 
As the table showed, industry 29 and 30 are Information & Technology and Wholesale 
& Retail respectively, which supposedly have less state owned companies. On the other 
hand, industry 10,19, and 23 are Chemical Materials & Chemical Products, Special 
Purpose Equipment, and Raw Medical & Pharmaceutical Products respectively, which 
should have more state owned companies. The above is only a suggestion, but, is it 
correct? The statistic analysis of these industries is listed in Table 8.20, which showed 
the general feeling might be wrong. 
Table 8.20 Statistic Results of State Owned shares Ratio in Different Industries 
Industry 30 Industry 29 Industry 10 Industry 19 Industry 23 
Mean 0.2532 0.2998 0.2623 0.2255 0.2882 
Median 0.2437 0.3500 0.2674 0.1005 0.2677 
Kurtosis -0.9871 -1.3071 -1.3547 -1.0751 -1.3504 
Skewness 0.4974 0.0445 0.1742 0.5747 0.3202 
Minimum 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.8375 0.7482 0.7500 0.7222 0.7307 
The study found that there are no significant signs showing state owned shares ratio is 
obviously larger or smaller in different industries. These statistical results do not 
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strongly support the suggestion of state owned shares ratio's industry pattern at this 
stage. However, if you put the state owned shares ratio together with other variables, 
there might be some impacts to leverage in different industries. 
The next step uses the regression model to further discuss the relationship. The model 
specified in this section is the same as the previous models. The regression results are 
listed in the tables below from 8.21 to 8.25 for each individual industry. Due to the aim 
of this analysis is to find the relationship between state owned shares and leverage in 
different industries, the study only presented the regression results of state owned shares 
ratio, and omitted other independent variables. It also listed the results of R Squares and 
Wald test for each models. 
Table 8.21 showed the results of industry 30 (Wholesale and Retail). In this industry, SS 
has negative correlation with leverage, and SS is significant with TL, TD, and SD at 
10%, 1%, and 1% level respectively. This result is very similar with the result of the 
previous chapter, which applied to all industries. 
Table 8.22 showed that industry 29 (Information and Technology) has different results 
of SD and LD, which SS was not significant with SD, but negatively significant at 5% 
level with LD. Table 8.23 and 8.25 presented the results of industry 10 (Raw Chemical 
Materials and Chemical Products) and industry 23 (Raw Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Products). The results of these two industries were not good, especially industry 23, 
which SS only significant with TL at 10% level. However, SS in industry 19 (Special 
Purpose Equipment) were significant with all dependent variables at 5% level (see 
Table 8.24). 
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Table 8.21 Regression Results of Industry 30 (Random Effects Model) 
Industry: Wholesale and Retail (Industry 30) 
TL TD SD LD 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
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Table 8.22 Regression Results of Industry 29 (Random Effects Model) 
Industry: Information and Technology (Industry 29) 
TL TD SD LD 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
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Table 8.23 Regression Results of Industry 10 (Random Effects Model) 
Industry: Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products (Industry 10) 
TL TD SD LD 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
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Wald Test 180.2000 [0.0000] ** 94.3300 [0.0000] ** 61.3800 [0.0000] ** 74.0100 [0.0000] ** 
Table 8.24 Regression Results of Industry 19 (Random Effects Model) 
Industry: Special Purpose Equipment (Industry 19) 
TL TD SD LD 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
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R^2 0.5748 0.4154 0.4416 0.1107 
Wald Test 339.3000 [0.0000] ** 178.4000 [0.0000] ** 198.5000 [0.0000] ** 31.2400 [0.0000] ** 
249 
Chapter 8 Results Analysis 
Table 8.25 Regression Results of Industry 23 (Random Effects Model) 
Industry: Raw Medical and Pharmaceutical Products (Industry 23) 
TL TD SD LD 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
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Wald Test 56.1000[0.0000]** 37.7600 [0.0000] ** 13.6700 [0.1350] 53.3000 [0.0000] ** 
A summary of these five industries is presented in Table 8.26. The results showed that 
there is no significant difference with the results in the previous chapter, which showed 
most models have negative signs and are significant at 1% level. Table 8.26 presented 
some different and interesting results. 
Table 8.26 Summary of Industry Pattern Results - Correlation and Significant Level 
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TL TD SD LD 
Significant Significant 
Correlation Correlation 
Level 
Significant 
Correlation Correlation 
Level 
Significant 
Level 
Industry 30 - 
Level 
10% 1% - 1% - No 
Industry 29 - 1% - 5% - No - 5% 
Industry 10 - 10% - No - 10% 
.+ 
No 
.. 
Industry 19 - 5% - 5% - 5% + 5% 
Industry 23 + 10% - No - No + No 
Firstly, state owned shares ratio (SS) in industry 29 and 30, which supposedly have less 
state owned companies, both have negative signs, and are significant at 5% in industry 
29 (Information and Technology). Secondly, SS in industry 10,19, and 23, which 
supposedly have more state owned companies, all have positive correlation with LD, 
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and are significant at 5% level in industry 19 (Special Purpose Equipment). This weak 
result supports the theory that in some industries, mainly manufacturing industries, SS 
might have positive correlation with LD. 
Concluding the discussions above, the study found that there is no strong sign to prove 
the industry pattern of the correlation between state owned shares and leverage. In this 
case study (five industries), the statistical results showed that the mean of state owned 
share ratios are of a similar level for different industries. This result makes sense 
because most listed companies were state owned before they went public. The average 
of the ratio might be similar for every industry. However, individual listed companies 
may vary. Due to the sample set of each industry being relatively small, it is difficult to 
find this difference by using statistical results. A small sample set is probably the main 
disadvantage of this analysis. 
8.4.2. Range Dummy 
In previous discussions, state owned share ratio was used as the measurement of state 
ownership. The study suggests that this measurement was probably not the best way to 
express its characteristics. There might be more interesting results by using range 
dummy variable to replace state owned shares ratio. This section discusses range 
dummy and its impact on leverage. 
According to the discussion in chapter 5, it found that there are a large number of listed 
companies which do not have state owned shares, whereas, the remaining companies 
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have a wide range of state owned shares. According to chapter 5's calculation, there are 
21.78% of total samples that do not have state owned shares (0%). Only about 1% of 
samples have state owned shares of over 80% of their total outstanding shares. Most 
samples concentrate within the range between 30% and 70%, especially from 50% to 
70%, which has about 30% samples. 8 
Based on these calculations, the study suggests that state owned shares could be 
measured as range dummy. Table 8.27 showed the classification of the range and 
related dummy variables. There are ten ranges from 0% to 100%. The study will use 
these range dummy variables to replace state owned share ratio in the regression 
models. 
Table 8.27 Range Classification and Dummy 
Range Number % Range Dummy 
1 0% DUM RANGE 0 
2 0%-10% DUM RANGE 1 
3 10°/x20% DUM RANGE 2 
4 20%-30% DUM RANGE 3 
5 30°/. -40% DUM RANGE 4 
6 400/o-50% DUM RANGE 5 
7 50°/x60% DUM RANGE 6 
8 60%-70% DUM RANGE 7 
9 70%-80% DUM RANGE 8 
10 80°/-100% DUM RANGE 9 
The regression results are listed in Table 8.28 for each dependent variable. Results of 
as These figures were calculated in chapter 5 by using ownership structure data of all Chinese listed 
companies from 1992 to 2005. 
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TL showed that DUM RANGE 2 has significant positive correlation with TL at 1% 
level, while DUM RANGE 8 negatively significant at 1% level. Results of TD showed 
that except DUM RANGE 4 and DUM RANGE 9, all others are significant. 
DUM RANGE 7 and DUM RANGE 8 are negatively correlated with TD at 10% and 
5% level respectively. Results of SD are very similar with TD, which showed that 
DUM RANGE 7 and DUM RANGE 8 negatively significant at 10% level. 
DUM RANGE 4, - DUM RANGE 6, and DUM RANGE 9 are not significant. 
Results of LD are slightly different with other three dependent variables. All dummy 
variables have positive signs. DUM RANGE 1, DUM RANGE 2, and 
DUM RANGE 6 significant at 1% level, while DUM RANGE 7 at 10% level. 
Table 8.28 Range Dummy Results - TL, TD, SD, LD 
TL 
Cofficient t-value 
TD 
Cofficient t-value 
SD 
CofficIent t-value 
LD 
Cofficlent t-value 
DUM_RANGE 1 0.0970*** 3.6900 0.0288** 1.8500 0.0317** 2.2400 0.0091* 1.3200 
DUM RANGE 2 0.0434* 1.5900 0.0624*** 3.9100 0.0480*** 3.3100 0.0117* 1.6400 
DUM_RANGE 3 0.0169 0.7170 0.0281** 2.0100 0.0239** 1.8700 0.0059 0.9420 
DUM_RANGE 4 0.0032 0.1480 0.0023 0.1760 0.0036 0.3010 0.0048 0.8160 
DUM_RANGE 5 -0.0037 -0.1630 0.0242** 1.8200 0.0214** 1.7600 0.0004 0.0600 
DUM RANGE 6 -0.0141 -0.6320 0.0189* 1.4200 0.0092 0.7580 0.0076* 1.2900 
DUM_RANGE 7 -0.0235 -0.9780 -0.0350*** -2.4700 -0.0373*** -2.8900 0.0155*** 2.4600 
DUM RANGE 8 -0.0505* -1.5600 -0.0398** -2.1400 -0.0407*** -2.4000 0.0074 0.8860 
DUM_RANGE 9 0.0293 0.2780 0.0300 0.4830 0.0170 0.3010 0.0285 1.0300 
R^2 - 0.1303 0.1536 0.1166 0.0610 
Wald Test 
47.2800 [0.0000] ** 45.0400 [0.0000] ** 73.8300 [0.0000] ** 169.1000 [0.0000] ** 
(Dummy) 
A summary of these results is listed in Table 8.29 including correlation signs and 
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significant level. It shows that most dummy variables in TD and SD models are 
significant. DUM RANGE 9 (80%-100% range) is not significant with any dependent 
variables, while DUM RANGE 1 and DUM RANGE 2 are significant with all 
dependent variables. 
Table 8.29 Summary of Range Dummy Results - Correlation and Significant Level 
TL TD SD LD 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
Correlation 
Significant 
Level 
DUM RANGE 1 + 1% + 5% + 5% + 10% 
DUM RANGE 
_2 
+ 10% + 1% + 1% + 10% 
- 
DUM RANGE3 
" -"- -'+ No + 5% + 5% + No 
DUM RANGE 4 + No + No +' No + No 
DUM RANGE 5 - No + 5% + 5% + No 
DUM RANGE 6 - No + 10% + No + 10% 
DUM RANGE 7 
- ---"- 
--- 
-- 
No 
--"- 
- 1% - 1% + 1% 
DUM RANGE 8 - 10% - 5% - 1% + No 
DUM RANGE 9 + No + No + No + No 
An important result is DUM RANGE 7 and DUM_RANGE_8 have negative 
correlation with most dependent variables (except LD). However, other dummy 
variables are all positively correlated with leverage. According to the calculations in 
chapter 5, about 25% of the samples' state owned share ratios concentrate in the range 
from 60% to 80%, which are measured by DUM RANGE 7 and DUM RANGE 8. 
This result also matches the suggestion of Figure 6.2 in chapter 6, which observed that a 
higher range of state ownership has a lower level of bank loan financing. 
Table 8.29 also showed that except DUM RANGE 7 and DUM_RANGE_8, most 
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results have positive signs with leverage. This might explain why the previous results 
showed negative signs with leverage. The companies in the range between 60% and 
80% seem highly affected by the state owned share ratio's results in the previous 
chapter. 
Concluding the discussion above, range dummy has been proved to be a better 
measurement for state ownership. According to the discussion in chapter 6, the 
relationship between state ownership and leverage is supposed to be a non-linear 
relationship. As most listed companies can easily finance from bank loans, there is no 
strong sign to show that state ownership is positively or negatively correlated to 
leverage. Due to this reason, range dummy might match the characteristic of Chinese 
listed companies' state ownership. 
As the regression results show, most companies in the range between 0% and 60% have 
positive signs, especially from 0% to 20%, which are all positively significant. However, 
the companies in the range between 60% and 80% have negative signs, and most of 
them are significant. 
8.5. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the regression results of both static and dynamic panel data 
models. It explained the results and the correlation between independent variables and 
dependent variables. This chapter also discussed the results of hypothese. It found most 
of the study's hypotheses are matched with the regression results. 
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The results of both static and dynamic models do not support the trade-off model, while 
they weakly support the pecking order theory. The results of profitability showed that 
Chinese listed companies tend to use retained earnings as their first choice for financing 
followed by bank borrowing as the second choice. Equity is an alternative way for listed 
company to finance. However, the tight regulations and small amounts of quota limited 
these companies to finance by issuing new shares. Equity issuance might be the third 
choice for listed comapnies. 
The undeveloped corporate bond market might be able to explain most of these results. 
According to the discussion in chapter 4, most listed companies do not issue corporate 
bonds. This means companies have to finance from banks. However, the situation is 
changing now. According to Financial Times news, CSRC has already taken over the 
authorization right of issuing corporate bonds from national development commitees in 
the beginning of 2007. The government will also improve its credit rating system. 
Chinese listed companies might be able to issue their corporate bond or medium term 
notes (MTNs) to finance in the future. If this happened, the current pecking order would 
change as well. 
The results of dynamic panel data models showed that lagged dependent variables are 
all negatively correlated with dependent variables. It means that Chinese listed 
companies might have target debt ratios and are trying to reach them during the period. 
In addition, the study also found that there is no industry effect in China. 
A further discussion about the relationship between state ownership and capital structure 
showed that listed companies, which have less than 60% state owned shares, have a 
positive correlation with leverage. As about 75% listed companies have less than 60% 
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state owned shares, the study suggests that leverage has positive relationship with state 
ownership for most Chinese listed companies (75% listed companies). 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
This study presented the economic environment in China and discussed whether capital 
structure theory can be applied in China. It examined the capital structure of Chinese 
listed companies' by using a 720 firm-level panel data set from 1997 to 2005. It found 
that the firm-specific factors which have been identified by theoretical studies and by 
previous empirical studies from other countries, also affect Chinese listed companies' 
leverage in a similar way. However, neither the trade-off model nor the pecking order 
hypothesis provides convincing explanations for the capital choices of the Chinese 
listed companies. 
This chapter will conclude all these discussions in section 9.2, and list the contributions 
of the study in section 9.3. In addition, it will also discuss the limitations of the study in 
section 9.4, and the suggestions for further research in section 9.5. 
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9.2. THE MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
This study has achieved the objectives set out in the introduction and answered the 
questions posed. Although China is still transforming its economy from a command 
economy to a market economy, and the state is still the controlling shareholder for most 
listed companies, the firm-specific factors which affect companies' leverage in other 
countries also affect Chinese companies' leverage in a similar way. 
The regression results of static panel data models confirmed that leverage in Chinese 
listed companies has positive correlation with tangible assets, firm size (total assets), 
and non-debt tax shields, and negatively correlates to profitability and firm size (sales). 
The study also fords that growth opportunity, dividend policy, and cost of bankruptcy 
have no significant impact on capital structure. In addition, most industries do not have 
a significant relationship with leverage. 
The results of dynamic panel data models showed that lagged dependent variables are 
all negatively correlated with dependent variables. It means that Chinese listed 
companies might have target debt ratios and are trying to reach them during the period. 
However, China's different institutional environment suggests that the possible target 
debt-equity ratio predicted by the dynamic panel date models may not be the effect of 
the relationship between leverage and taxes as the assumptions are different in China as 
suggested by the trade-off models. 
The results of both static and dynamic models do not support the trade-off model, while 
the support for the pecking order theory is weak. The results of profitability and firm 
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size (sales) showed that Chinese listed companies tend to use retained earnings as their 
first choice for financing, followed by bank borrowing as the second choice. Equity is 
an alternative way for listed companies to finance. However, the tight regulations and 
small amounts of quota limit these companies to finance by issuing new shares. Equity 
issuance might be the third choice for listed comapnies. A remarkable difference 
between the capital choices of Chinese listed companies and companies in developed 
economies, such as the US, is that Chinese listed companies prefer short term finance 
and have substantially lower amounts of long term debt. On the other hand, the obtained 
total debt ratio is similar to developed countries. 
The difference between the institutional environment of China and developed countries 
leads to differences in capital choice, such as: ownership concentration, the state of the 
legal system, the historical role played by the government, banks and securities markets, 
the development of financial sectors and capital markets, and the agency and monitoring 
problems existed in the former SOEs are all factors influencing the importance of 
firm-specific factors on companies' leverage decision. 
China has a relatively small bond market, because of China's undeveloped credit rating 
system (only domestic rating agencies operate in China and their methodologies are 
questionable), weak valuation and monitoring systems. In particular, the corporate bond 
market is small compared to other developed countries. Most listed companies do not 
issue corporate bonds. Bank loans become the most important way to finance new 
projects. This undeveloped corporate bond market might explain most of these 
regression results. 
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In addition, creditors in China often have difficulty recovering debts from bankrupt 
companies which are mainly state owned companies. Current policy requires that 
money recovered from a bankrupt company be used to settle employees first. And bank 
creditors have priority over non-bank creditors for the remaining money, if any. As 
there is often little money left after employee settlements, state-owned banks, which are 
the main creditors, are often hit hard by bankruptcies. These banks therefore often 
oppose companies' efforts to file for bankruptcy or will only accept bankruptcy under 
the government's planned programme. 
As most Chinese listed companies were state owned companies before and the state still 
maintains its controlling right after the companies go public, the government could 
exercise its control over various functions of these listed companies. Even though the 
Chinese government has started to reduce the proportion of state shareholding, in order 
to increase the independence and reduce insider problems, state owned shares are still a 
problem, affecting company's corporate governance and capital structure. A further 
discussion about the relationship between state ownership and capital structure in 
chapter 8 showed that listed companies, which have less than 60% state owned shares, 
have a positive correlation with leverage. As about 75% listed companies have less than 
60% state owned shares, the study suggests that leverage has positive relationship with 
state ownership for most Chinese listed companies (75% listed companies). 
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9.3. CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study has examined all research questions and hypotheses that have been raised by 
the study in capital structure decisions of Chinese listed companies. The empirical 
findings of the study are likely to be a contribution to knowledge for a number of 
reasons. 
Since Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory (1958) established the foundation of 
capital structure theory, many literatures and empirical studies over the past four 
decades have tested the theory for developed and developing countries. However, 
China, as the largest developing and transitional economy in the world, has different 
institutional structures from developed as well as many developing countries, such as: 
undeveloped corporate bond market, tight control over the issuance of equities, and 
large amount of state owned shares. Only few previous empirical studies focused on 
Chinese listed companies' capital structure (Chen, 2004; Huang and Song, 2006). 
These existing empirical studies have been carried out using a relatively small sample 
set and short time series. A long time series and wide cross section sample set could be 
better able to analyse Chinese listed companies' capital structure. On the other hand, 
these existing empirical studies discussed China's institutional environment broadly, but 
have not had space to develop a deeper and wider discussion about China's financing 
system, ownership structure, bankruptcy, etc. 
This research provides a comprehensive study on Chinese listed companies' corporate 
financing, ownership structure, and corporate control, etc., and examines the 
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implications on capital structure of these listed companies by using a relatively large 
panel data set including 720 firms from 1997 to 2005. 
Even though the institutional environment is different at the moment, China is changing 
fast and is trying to improve its domestic corporate bond market and credit rating 
system. Chinese listed companies might be able to issue their corporate bonds or 
medium term notes (MTNs) to finance in the future. If this happened, the current capital 
choices would change as well. 
Overall the study contributes to the existing literatures by providing in empirical 
evidence in a Chinese setting to the capital structure debate. It highlights the importance 
of financial market and institutional environment for corporate financing decision. It 
also provides important policy guidelines for the firm's financial management in 
Chinese listed companies. 
9.4. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
It is impossible for one study to cover everything relating to capital structure. Thus, this 
study is not perfect and it is subject to several limitations. 
Capital structure is a relatively large topic, which includes many theories and large 
amount of empirical studies. This study has examined Chinese listed companies' capital 
structure, but it did not have enough space to further discuss some interesting individual 
factors, such as performance, growth opportunity and dividend policy. Although chapter 
8 did discuss aspects of state ownership, they still need to be continually updated 
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because the policy environment in China is always changing. For example, since the 
beginning of 2005, CSRC has launched several policies to allow state owned shares to 
become tradable, thus reducing the proportion of state owned shares. This kind of policy 
will have a significant impact on listed companies' corporate governance, and also 
might affect company's capital structure. 
Static and dynamic panel data models have been used in this study using balanced panel 
data to apply these models. This is one reason why the study's data set is from 1997 to 
2003. If an earlier year than 1997 had been chosen, the sample set would be 
significantly smaller to match the balanced panel data set. As introduced in chapter 4, 
the number of listed company increased sharply in the 1990's. For balanced panel data 
set selection, it is difficult to choose the start year for the data set. 
Using unbalanced panel data set might be an option for this kind of problem. It can 
make the time series of the data set longer. This study did not use unbalanced panel data 
because the study wanted to do a regular study in the first stage. In addition, from the 
length of time series point of view, there is not much difference between balanced and 
unbalanced panel data set in this case because Chinese listed companies only officially 
started to publish their annual financial statements since 1995. If unbalanced panel data 
had been used, the length of time series would be 11 years, only 2 years longer than 
currently used in this study. However, unbalanced panel data is a better option for 
longer time series and can include more individual companies (wider cross-section). 
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9.5. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has considered the effect of institutions and agencies as determinants of 
capital structure and laid some groundwork upon which a more detailed evaluation of 
institutional influences might be based. Based on the discussions in previous sections, 
some suggestions for further research are addressed below. 
Firstly, further research is required to focus on some specific areas, for example: the 
relationship between dividend policy and capital structure. According to the regression 
results, the study did not find a significant correlation between dividend policy and 
capital structure as many Chinese listed companies are growing fast and need free cash 
flow to invest in net present value projects. Retained profit might be the quickest and 
easiest source of finance for these projects. It follows that some companies may reduce 
or not pay dividends to shareholders. 
However, the institutional environment is changing now. The Chinese government and 
regulators are trying to improve the Chinese domestic corporate bond market to let 
listed companies issue corporate bonds or MTNs (Medium Term Notes) for their 
medium term or long term financing. At the same time, the Chinese stock market has 
turned into a bull market since 2006. More foreign institutional investors entered the 
Chinese stock market by using QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) quota. 
Due to the high competition and the pressure from investors, Chinese listed companies' 
management are willing to improve their dividend policy to develop wealth. A further 
study can focus on these changes and might be able to find some interesting results by 
using new data after 2006. 
265 
Chapter 9 Conclusions 
In addition, as the study discussed earlier, the relationship between ownership structure 
and capital structure is still an interesting topic, which needs some further study due to 
the Chinese government reducing the proportion of non-tradable shares since 2005. This 
reform is trying to change most of the non-tradable shares to tradable shares, in order to 
improve listed companies' ownership structure and corporate governance. At the same 
time, management levels have started to own company's share options, and this will be 
broadly applied in 2007 and 2008 to most listed companies. All these new moves will 
affect the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure, which might 
be an interesting topic to be followed. 
Secondly, the study's results showed that some industries have significant correlation 
with leverage, such as the transport industry. Some further research will focus on these 
specific industries, with detailed analysis of their capital structure. 
Thirdly, Chinese listed companies' capital structure under a bull stock market 
environment might be different from a bear market. Due to CSRC planning to allow 
more Chinese companies to IPO in domestic stock market, it will permit more listed 
companies to issue CBs (Convertible Bond) and PIPEs (Private Investment in Public 
Equities) in 2007. Therefore, Chinese listed companies' capital structure might be 
changed after this point. A further study focusing on the changes of corporate financing 
and capital structure will be an interesting topic. 
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Appendix A: Listing Requirements of A Shares and B Shares49 
Public Offering of A Shares 
Companies applying for the public offering and listing of A shares have to meet the 
requirements stipulated in the Company Law, Securities Law, Provisional Regulations 
on the Administration of Issuing and Trading of Stocks, and all other relevant laws and 
regulations and be reported to their the CSRC for scrutiny. These laws and regulations 
set forth in detail the requirements for both initial public offerings (IPOs) and any 
followup public offerings. 
A company that applies for an offering of A shares to the public and listing on the stock 
exchanges shall meet the following requirements: 
  The previous issue of shares has been fully subscribed and at least one year has 
elapsed since that issue; 
  The company has been continuously profitable for the last three years and is able to 
pay dividends to its shareholders; 
  The projected profit of the company equals or exceeds the interest rates on bank 
deposits; 
  Its production and operations are consistent with state industrial policy; 
  The capital contributions by promoters shall not be less than RMB 30 million, 
except as otherwise specified by the state; 
  The company's shares already issued to the public account for over 25% of the 
49 China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), "China's Securities and Futures Markets", 2004 
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company's total share i. e. public float of 25%; 
  The company's total share capital is not less than RMB 50 million; 
  During the last three years, the company has not breached any significant 
regulations and the company's financial statements have not been found to contain 
any false information; 
  The intangible asset of the company shall no more than 20% of its net asset before 
its TO. 
Listed companies can issue new shares to the public by offering rights to existing 
shareholders (rights issue) or by offering additional shares to the public (followup 
offering). 
According to the Measures on the Administration of New Shares Issuance by Listed 
Companies, a listed company applying for new share offering shall meet the following 
requirements, in addition to the other relevant provisions stipulated in the Company Law 
and Securities Law: 
  Has sound corporate governance practices, operates independently from its major 
shareholders (or other connected entities) in terms of management, assets and 
financial affairs, ensuring that the listed company's financial affairs as well as 
assets are properly segregated; 
  The Articles of Association of the listed company comply with the Company Law 
and Guidelines for Articles ofAssociation of Listed Companies; 
  The giving of notices for shareholders' meetings, the convening of the meetings, the 
proposing of resolutions and the voting at the shareholders' general meeting are all 
in accordance with the Company Law and other relevant regulations; 
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  The capital raised shall be used in a manner compliant with state industrial policy; 
  In principle, the capital raised in the new issue shall not exceed the amount for 
investment projects approved by the shareholders at its general meeting; 
  The major shareholders and its connected parties have not misappropriated any 
capital or assets of the listed company. There had been no connected transactions 
that were prejudicial to the interests of the listed company or its minority 
shareholders; 
  All major purchases or sales of the company's assets are in compliance with the 
CSRC's applicable regulations. 
Public Offering of B Shares 
B shares are subscribed and traded in US dollars on SHSE and in HK dollars on SZSE 
since 1992. B shares allow Chinese companies to raise foreign currency from both 
Chinese and overseas investors. The B shares market was China's first step to 
internationalize its securities markets. 
In accordance with the State Council Rule Regarding the Domestic Listing of Foreign 
Owned Shares (25 December 1995, the State Council), B share issuers are expected to 
meet the following requirements: 
  The capital raised by issuing B shares shall be used in a manner consistent with 
state industrial policy; 
  Comply with regulations regarding fixed-asset investments; 
  Comply with regulations regarding foreign investments; 
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  The joint-stock company shall be set up with at least 5 promoters, with more than 
half of the promoters being located in China. The promoters must hold at least 35% 
of the issued shares at the time when the company is set up; 
  The capital contributions by promoters shall not be less than RMB 150 million; 
  The company must maintain a public float in excess of 25% of the company's total 
shares; however, if the company's total share capital exceeds RMB 400 million, the 
public float may be reduced to not less than 15% of the company's total shares; 
  Neither (a) any predecessor entity (entities) of which the joint-stock company was part 
of; nor (b) any major promoter who is also a state-owned enterprise, had committed 
any significant breaches against the law over the last three years; 
  Both (a) and (b) in paragraph above have been continuously profitable for the last 
three years. 
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Appendix B: Listing Requirements of London Stock Exchange (UK)so 
  At least three years trading and revenue-earning record, the UK Listing Authority 
has the discretion to allow a shorter period in certain circumstances; 
  Must report significant acquisitions in the three years running up to the flotation; 
  The company's directors and senior management must show they have collective 
experience and expertise to run the business; 
  At least 700,000 pounds for shares at the time of listing; 
  At least 25% of shares should be in public hands; 
  To show the company has enough working capital for its current needs and for at 
least the next 12 months; 
  The company must be able to carry on its business independently and at arm's lengh 
from any shareholders with a controlling interest; 
 A general description of the future plans and prospects must be given; 
  If the company gives an optional profit forecast in the document or has already 
given one publicly, a report will be required by the Sponsor and the Accountant; 
  Cover latest three full years and any published later interim period, usually in the 
form of an accounts' report; 
  If latest audited financial data is more than 9 months old interim (usually audited) 
S0 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Going Public Guide China", 2004 
289 
Annendix 
financial information is required. 
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Appendix C: Regulations of Chinese Financial Markets 
(I) Regulations Regarding Securities Offering, Listing, and Disclosure 
The regulations that govern the public offering and listing of shares issued by a 
joint-stock company are: 
  Provisional Regulations on Public Offering and Trading; 
  Ordinance of the CSRC Public Offering Review Committee; 
  The CSRC Public Offering Approval Procedures; 
  Provisional Rules on the Administration of Companies under Tutoring; 
  Implementing Rules on Information Disclosure of Public Companies; 
  Regulations on the Administration of Initial Public Offerings; 
  Regulations on the Administration of Information Disclosure on Shareholding 
Changes of Listed Companies; 
  Standards for Content and Format of Information Disclosure of Public Companies 
(No. 1 to 19). 
  Interim Measures on the Public Offering Review Committee of the CSRC 
(II) Regulations on Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions of Listed 
Companies 
On August 16,2001, the CSRC promulgated the Guidelines for Establishing 
Independent Directors of Listed Companies to provide guidance with regards to the 
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nomination, retaining, and responsibilities of independent directors in listed companies. 
On January 7,2002, the CSRC and State Economic and Trade Commission jointly 
issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies. The Code outlines the 
fundamental principles of corporate governance for listed companies, mechanisms to 
ensure basic investors' protection, and codes of conduct and ethical standards for 
directors, supervisors, managers and other senior executives of listed companies. 
On December 1,2002, the Measures on the Merger and Acquisition of Listed 
Companies and Measures on the Administration of Information Disclosure on 
Shareholding Changes of Listed Companies took effect. Both regulations contain 
detailed provisions regarding various disclosure requirements in mergers and 
acquisitions situations. They constitute the most fundamental legal requirements for 
listed companies engaged in mergers and acquisitions activities. 
On November 4,2002, the Notice on Some Issues about Transfer of State-Owned Shares 
and Legal-entity Shares of Listed Companies to Foreign Entities was jointly 
promulgated by the CSRC, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Economic and Trade 
Commission. This regulates the purchase of state-owned or legal entity shares of listed 
companies by foreign entities. 
On August 28,2003, the CSRC and the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) jointly promulgated Notice 
on Certain Issues on the Capital Flows between Listed Companies and Related Parties 
and Outbound Guarantees of Listed Companies. The Notice aims to protect the interests 
of listed companies when capital flows take place between listed companies and related 
parties. With regards to outbound guarantees, the Notice specifies detailed requirements 
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on guaranteed target, the percentage of the guaranteed amount to the net assets, the 
decision-making procedures, counter-guarantees and information disclosures, etc. 
(III) Regulations of Market Intermediaries 
The Measures on the Administration of Securities Companies, promulgated by the 
CSRC, took effect on March 1,2002. It outlines detailed requirements for the setting up 
of securities companies, their organizational structure, operation, reporting of material 
changes, cessation of business, day to day supervision and responsibilities. 
On August 29,2003, the CSRC promulgated Provisional Measures on the 
Administration of Securities Companies Bonds. The securities companies can issue 
bonds via public offering and designated offering. The Measures sets forth the issuance 
criteria, procedures of application and approval, information disclosure system, 
especially the risk control system on registration, custody and reimbursement measures, 
etc. 
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